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I. INTRODUCTION: THE JUSTIFICATION FOR PROTECTIVE TRUSTS AND
FOR THE VITIATING EFFECT OF SELF-SETrLEMENT AND
BENEFICIARY CONTROL

Virtually all American states recognize the validity of trust arrange-

ments that shield a beneficiary's interest in the income, the corpus, or
both, from the reach of the beneficiary's creditors. Perhaps the most
common protective trust term is a spendthrift clause, which prohibits the
beneficiary from alienating or anticipating her interest or from pledging
it as security.1 Creditors may have no better rights in the trust assets
than the beneficiary herself. Hence, until distributions actually are
made, both principal and corpus are beyond the grasp
of creditors be2
cause they are beyond the control of the beneficiary.
Protection from creditors may also take the form of a discretionary
or a support trust.3 Under a discretionary trust, the trustee has almost
total leeway in making income and corpus distributions; the trustee's discretion is limited only by a standard of subjective good faith.4 Thus,
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1969, Ph.D., 1971, Columbia University; J.D., with highest honors, University of MissouriKansas City, 1988.
1. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TRUSTS §§ 152, 153(1) (1959).
2. 2A Ausn'N W. Scor" & WmLiM F. FRATCHER, THE LAW OF TRUSTS § 152, at 85-92,
§ 152.5, at 120-24, § 153, at 139-46 (4th ed. 1987); accord,e.g., Bank of Dallas v. Republic Nat'l
Bank of Dallas, 540 S.W.2d 499, 501 (Tex. Civ. App. 1976) (holding that so long as the principal and the income of a spendthrift trust are in the hands of the trustee, both are beyond the
reach of the beneficiary, and hence both are beyond the grasp of creditors).
3. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TRUSTS §§ 154 (support trusts), 155 (discretionary trusts)
(1959). Discretionary and support trusts are very similar, and it is not always easy to tell
which kind of trust a settlor meant to create. See, eg., McNeal v. Bonnel, 412 S.W.2d 167, 171
(Mo. 1967); Bohac v. Graham, 424 N.W.2d 144, 146 (N.D. 1988).
4. First Nat'l Bank of Md. v. Department of Health & Mental Hygiene, 399 A.2d 891,89396 (Md. 1979); RESTATEmENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 128 cmt. d (1959); see Heisserer v.
Friedrich, 797 S.W.2d 864, 870 (Mo. Ct. App. 1990).
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creditors may not reach the beneficiary's interest because the beneficiary
has no enforceable right to receive anything.5 Under a support trust, the
trustee has discretion to make distributions for a particular purpose
specified by the settlor, such as maintaining the beneficiary at a certain
standard of living or providing for the beneficiary's education or medical
needs.6 The trustee's discretion is wide, but it is guided by the objective
standard set forth in the trust instrument. 7 Nonetheless, the beneficiary's interest may not be seized by her general creditors because the
beneficiary herself may not compel distributions at her pleasure. Trust
assets may be used only for the purposes and according to the standard
that the settlor established in creating the trust. 8 With both discretionary
and support trusts, it is the nature of the beneficiary's interest, rather
than any express restraint on alienation, that provides a shield against
the claims of creditors. 9
It is possible, of course, to combine two or more protective provisions in a single trust arrangement. For example, a spendthrift clause
may be joined with a discretionary or a support term.10 Different aspects
of a beneficiary's interest may have different layers of protection. A
beneficiary may have an absolute right to receive all trust income, or a
certain percentage of it. This right, which would normally be within the
reach of creditors, may be protected by a spendthrift clause." The same
beneficiary's right to corpus distributions, however, may be protected by
a discretionary or support provision, or by a combination of a discretion-

5.

GEORGE G. BOGERT & GEORGE T. BOGERT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES

§ 228, at 520-34 (rev. 2d ed. 1992); see In re Kreiss, 72 B.R. 933, 937-38, 942 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y.

1987); In re Pechanec, 59 B.R. 899, 904-05 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1986).
6. Miller v. Department of Mental Health, 442 N.W.2d 617, 619 (Mich. 1989); Coverston
v. Kellogg, 357 N.W.2d 705, 707-08 (Mich. Ct. App. 1984); Heisserer, 797 S.W.2d at 870;
Rekdahl v. Long, 407 S.W.2d 339, 340, 344 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966) (direction that trustee was to
make distributions to enable beneficiary to enjoy his "customary standard of living" provided
objective standard of support trust), aff'd, 417 S.W.2d 387 (Tex. 1967); see In re Penn Yah
Manor Nursing Home, Inc., 409 N.Y.S.2d 201, 203 (N.Y. Sur. Ct. 1978).
7. In re Estate of Dodge, 281 N.W.2d 447, 451 (Iowa 1979); Woodberry v. Bunker, 268
N.E.2d 841, 843-44 (Mass. 1971); State v. Rubion, 308 S.W.2d 4, 8-10 (Tex. 1958).
8. 2A Sco-r & FRATCHER, supra note 2, § 154, at 146-52; accord In re McLoughlin, 507
F.2d 177, 185-86 (5th Cir. 1975); In re Kinsler, 24 B.R. 962, 966-67 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1982).
9. RE STATEmENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS §§ 154 cmt. b, 155 cmt. b (1959).
10. E.g., Altman v. Commissioner, 83 B.R. 35,36-37 (D. Haw. 1988) (discretionary spendthrift trust); In re Wilson, 140 B.R. 400, 404-06 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1992) (same); Kinsler, 24
B.R. at 965-67 (spendthrift term purported to protect debtor's income interest but was invalid;
support term protected debtor's interest in corpus and was upheld).
11. Miller, 442 N.W.2d at 618-19.
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ary or support provision and a spendthrift clause.'" Likewise, some
13
courts have recognized a hybrid of a discretionary and a support trust.
Protective trusts in general-and spendthrift trusts in particular-are
arguably inimical to the core principles that lie at the heart of a liberal
free market society: free circulation of wealth, individual responsibility,
and the right of creditors to look to a debtor's property.' 4 In eighteenthcentury Milan, reformers inveighed against fedecommessi, the equivalent
of protective trusts, on the grounds that fedecommessi stifled commerce,
frustrated rational lending, and blocked the road to social mobility. Protective fedecommessi were antithetical to the liberal capitalist society
that the reformers wanted to create.15 A century ago, when protective
trusts-especially spendthrift trusts-became common in the United
States, Professor John Chipman Gray launched Olympian fulminations
against these arrangements, condemning protective trusts on moral, so-6
cial, and economic grounds from the standpoint of classical liberalism.'
Despite such onslaughts, protective trusts were quickly recognized as
a valid method of transmitting and preserving family wealth.' 7 Today,
they are a common and legitimate tool for estate planning and for passing family fortunes from generation to generation.' 8 Although John
Chipman Gray has had many latter-day followers, even his disciples
12. See Altman, 83 B.R. at 36-37; Wilson, 140 B.R at 404-06; Kinsler, 24 B.R. at 965-67.
13. Smith v. Smith, 517 N.W.2d 394,398-99 (Neb. 1994); see Evelyn G. Abravanel, Discretionary Support Trusts, 68 IowA L. REv. 273, 277-80, 293-304 (1983).
14. Gregory S. Alexander, The Dead Hand and the Law of Trusts in the Nineteenth Century, 37 STAN. L. REv. 1189, 1204-08, 1219-24, 1243-46, 1256-65 (1985); Ann S. Emanuel,
Spendthrift Trusts: It's Time to Codify the Compromise, 72 NEB. L. REv. 179, 185-94 (1993).
15. Alfonso Longo, Osservazioni su fedecommessi (original 1764), in PmTRo VERRa ET.
AL., IL CAFF-, OssrA BREvi E VARi DiscoRsi DisTRmurr IN FoGLi PERIODICI (original 17641766) 86, 87-97 (Sergio Romagnoli ed. 1960); accord CESARE BECCARTA, ELEMENTI DI
ECONOM[A PUBBLICA, reprinted in 1 OPERE Di CESARE BECCARIA 442-44 (Sergio Romagnoli
ed. 1958); see Antonio P. Schioppa, Sul fedecommesso nella Lombardia teresiana, in 3
ECONOMIA, INSTIUZIONI, CULTURA IN LomBARDIA NELL'ETA Di MARIA TERESA 807 passim
(1982); see generally David B. Young, Alternative Ideologies of Law: Traditionalistsand Reformers in Eighteenth-Century Lombardy, 34 McG.L L.J. 264,276-79 (1989).
16. JOHN C. GRAY, RESTRANT ON THE ALmNATION OF PROPERTY iii-v, viii-xi (2d ed.
1895).
17. The familial nature of most protective trust transactions was a major factor in winning
acceptance for them. E.g., Steib v. Whitehead, 111 Ill. 247, 251-52 (Ill. 1884); Guernsey v.
Lazear, 41 S.E. 405, 410 (W. Va. 1902); see Alexander, supra note 14, at 1252-54.
18. JESSE DUKEMINIER & STANLEY JOHANSON, WILLS, TRUSTS AND ESTATES 443-44,53839, 543-49, 556-61, 567-68 (4th ed. 1990). Thorough analyses of the history and status of spendthrift trusts-and protective trusts in general-in all the states are provided in BOGERT &
BOGERT, supra note

at 92-108.

5, § 222, at 401-45 and in 2A ScoTr & FRATcHER, supra note 2, § 152.1,
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have been compelled to acknowledge that protective trusts are too
deeply ensconced to be uprooted:
Logic, to my mind, impels the conclusion that spendthrift provisions are invalid. Gray's arguments carry the day. Experience,
on the other hand, teaches that they are valid. The current of
history has swept away Gray's position without refuting it.
Spendthrift [and other protective] provisions may be theoretically
suspect; they are, nonetheless, not only valid but also thriving. 9
Of the many arguments advanced to support protective trusts in general and spendthrift trusts in particular, two have carried the day and
have often been repeated. First, there has been a strong inclination to
recognize the freedom of the settlor to dispose of his property as he
wishes.20 The settlor may place such terms and conditions on his gift as
he pleases, and courts generally will try to give effect to the intentions
that he has expressed. 2 Second, and closely related, the creditors of the
beneficiary are not really prejudiced by a protective trust arrangement.
Except for the bounty of the settlor, the beneficiary never would have
had any rights at all in the trust property, and creditors may scarcely
complain if the settlor did not establish a trust for their benefit.'
If protective trusts have been upheld in intrafamily transactions,
there are strict limits on the degree of shielding of assets that a liberal
free market society will tolerate2 3 In particular, the beneficiary of a protective trust may not also be the settlor. The arguments based on the
settlor's donative intent and the lack of prejudice to creditors simply do
not apply in the case of a self-settled protective trust. Public policy will
not permit anyone to place her own property-i.e., property that otherwise would have been available to creditors-beyond the reach of credi19. Emanuel,
note 14, at 209. Gray himself was forced to admit by the close of the
nineteenth century that his arguments had not prevailed. GRAY,
note 16, at iv-v.

20.

BOGERT

& BOGERT,

note

§ 222, at 383-84; Alexander,

note 14, at 1233-

40.
21.
Loe, 83 B.R. 641, 645 n.6 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1988); Broadway Nat'l Bank v.
Adams, 133 Mass. 170, 174 (Mass. 1882); Glass v. Carpenter, 330 S.W.2d 530, 533-34 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1959).
22.
83 B.R. at 645 n.6; Pacific Nat'l Bank v. Windram, 133 Mass. 175, 176 (Mass.
1882); Glass, 330 S.W.2d at 533-34;
2A ScoTr & FRATCHER,
note 2, § 152, at 88-90.
23. Among other restrictions, certain classes of creditors are generally allowed to reach
the beneficiary's interest in a spendthrift or a support trust (though not the beneficiary's interest in a pure discretionary trust) despite the protective provisions. These favored creditors
usually include the beneficiary's spouse and children when they are entitled to support or
alimony; creditors who have supplied essential goods or services to the beneficiary; those who
have preserved or enhanced the beneficiary's interest in the trust; and the federal government
or a state government. REsTATEmENT (SECOND) OF TRUSm § 157 (1959);
2A Scorr &
FRATCHER,
note 2, §§ 157-157.5, at 186-222; Emanuel,
note 14, at 194-98.
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tors while she still retains a beneficial interest in that property and keeps
it ready to meet her own needs.' 4 If a supposedly protective trust is selfsettled, therefore, the protective provisions fail, and the interest of the
settlor-beneficiary is completely available to creditors.35
Beneficiary control over trust assets is another limitation on protective trust provisions, even when the beneficiary is not the settlor. A protective trust arrangement may not give to the beneficiary with one hand
what it purports to take away with the other.26 If the beneficiary has
free access to trust assets, then creditors may claim no lesser fights.2
These two restrictions on the validity of protective trust provisionsself-settlement and beneficiary control-are well established and, indeed, commonplace. Applying these principles to individual situations,
however, may cause confusion. In particular, partial self-settlement may
present difficulties. If A and B contribute equal amounts to the res of a
protective trust for A's sole benefit, for instance, one might wonder
whether the protective provision should be deemed totally valid, totally
invalid, or valid in part. The situation might grow even more complicated if A and B contributed equal amounts to a protective trust of
which they were both beneficiaries, but in which they held unequal beneficial interests. A might have a ninety percent equitable interest and B a
ten percent equitable interest in the corpus and the income, even though
each party had contributed fifty percent of the res. One might ask
whether the interest of each party should be deemed self-settled and, if
so, to what extent.
Similarly, the kinds of rights over trust assets that a beneficiary must
enjoy in order to "control" the trust are not necessarily self-evident. If a
beneficiary may direct trust investments but may not compel the trustee
to make distributions, one might inquire whether the beneficiary "controls" the trust in the sense necessary to vitiate a protective provision.
The same question might arise if the beneficiary herself is a cotrustee, or
if the income beneficiary is the sole trustee, managing the trust for her
own benefit and the benefit of the remaindermen.
24. E.g., Nelson v. California Trust Co., 202 P.2d 1021, 1021-22 (Cal. 1949); Windram, 133
Mass. at 176-77; In re Mogridge's Estate, 20 A.2d 307, 309 (Pa. 1941); Glass, 330 S.W.2d at
534; 2A Scorr & FRATCHER, supra note 2, § 156, at 167-68.
25. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUsTS § 156 (1959); 2A Scorr & FRATCHER, supra
note 2, §§ 156-156.2, at 164-79.
26. E.g., In re Boon, 108 B.R. 697, 708 n.19 (W.D. Mo. 1989) ("While no Missouri cases
have expressly adopted the 'dominion and control' test, it is widely accepted, and in fact it is
simply another way of expressing the idea that the trust is illusory if the beneficiary may at any
time circumvent its restrictions and gain unsupervised access to the trust property.").
27. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 153(2) (1959).
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Although these situations are not necessarily straightforward or simple, the answers to the questions concerning the validity vel non of protective trust terms are not terribly difficult, provided that one keeps the
relevant policies in mind. Once one loses sight of the basic reasons for
recognizing protective trusts and for refusing to recognize self-settled or
beneficiary-controlled protective trusts, however, one is likely to fall into
irretrievable confusion.
Precisely this danger is illustrated by the bankruptcy court decision in
In re Shurley.28 The Shurley court held, inter alia, that a beneficiary who
contributes anything at all to a trust arrangement has ipso facto selfsettled her entire interest,2 9 and that a beneficiary who has the right to
ask a trustee to terminate a trust thereby has sufficient "control" to vitiate any protective provision.30 A careful examination of the Shurley decision and the lines of authority upon which the court relied is a useful
vehicle for establishing the proper rule to follow in analyzing partially
self-settled protective trusts. Shurley also provides an excellent point of
departure for considering what beneficiary "control" of a protective
trust means. In both matters, the Shurley decision serves as an all-butperfect negative example and an illustration of unsupported and unsupportable reasoning.
II. TmE SHURLEY DECISION
A. The Bryant Trust
The trust at issue in the Shurley case, the M.D. Bryant Family Trust
(the "Bryant Trust"), was created in 1965 by a formal written declaration
(the "Trust Instrument") acknowledged and recorded in Tom Green
County, Texas.3 ' The settlors were M.D. Bryant, his wife, Ethel C. Bryant, and their daughters, Jane Bryant Shurley and Anne Bryant Ridge
(now known as Anne Bryant Watkins). 32 Each settlor conveyed property to the Bryant Trust. The two daughters were joined by their respective husbands in the conveyances, although the joinder of these men
appears to have been purely pro forma. 33 The Trust Instrument recited
that the Bryants had contributed two-thirds of the corpus, while each
28. 171 B.R. 769 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1994).
29. Id. at 784-86; see i at 778-82.
30. Id. at 782-83.
31. A copy of the Trust Instrument is reproduced as an Appendix to this article. The
Trust Instrument was also recorded in several other Texas counties.
32. Trust Instrument (Appendix), Preamble; see Shurley, 171 B.R. at 776.
33. Shurley, 171 B.R. at 776 n.2. Apparently the two daughters contributed their separate
property rather than community property to the Bryant Trust, but this is not altogether clear.
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daughter had contributed one-sixth of the total value of the res.a4 Mrs.
Shurley's contribution consisted of approximately 10,950 acres of ranch
property in western Texas, together with certain mineral interests.35 This
ranch property was encumbered by senior liens at the time that the Bryant Trust was established. 6
The four settlors initially had an absolute right to receive trust income proportionate to their original contributions-Le., the Bryants
would receive two-thirds of the income, and each daughter would receive one-sixth.37 In addition, the Bryant Trust contained a support provision allowing the trustee, in his discretion, to make corpus distributions
to each beneficiary to maintain his or her accustomed standard of living,
taking into account the other resources and income available to the beneficiary." The portion of the principal that could be invaded for the
support of each beneficiary was initially limited to the proportion of the
original contribution. 9
Although the beneficial interests of the members of the Bryant family at first reflected their respective contributions, the remainder interests of the two generations of settlors were vastly different. Mr. and Mrs.
Bryant had absolutely no remainder interest in their daughters' share of
the Bryant Trust. If the parents predeceased their daughters-and the
Trust Instrument contemplated that they would-their beneficial interests were to pass to the daughters, so that Mrs. Shurley and Mrs. Watkins
34.
35.
36.
37.

Trust Instrument (Appendix), § I.
Shurley, 171 B.R. at 776.
ld. at 778-79 & nn. 4-5.
Trust Instrument (Appendix), § I(a).

38. lIL § I(b). The Shurley court was mistaken in characterizing this as a discretionary
rather than a support provision. Shurley, 171 B.R. at 778. The trustee was to make such
principal distributions as he might deem fit in order to maintain a beneficiary's "accustomed

manner of living, taking into account, however, such beneficiary's income from all other
sources . .

. ."

This is classic support trust language, providing an objective standard by which

the trustee's discretion is to be guided. It is not discretionary trust language, limiting the
review of a trustee's decision to a standard of subjective good faith. See, e.g., Pyle v. United
States, 766 F.2d 1141, 1145-46 (7th Cir. 1985) (discretion of trustee to make distributions in
order to maintain beneficiary at "accustomed station in life" provided objective support trust
standard); Union Trust Co. v. Tomlinson, 355 F.2d 40, 42 (5th Cir. 1966) (authorization of
distributions in trustee's discretion to maintain beneficiary in "standard of living to which she
was accustomed" would have qualified as objective support trust standard); National Bank of
Commerce of San Antonio v. United States, 369 F. Supp. 990, 993 (W.D. Tex. 1973) (if settlor
had expressed intention that corpus might be invaded to maintain beneficiary's usual standard
of living, this would have created an objective standard support trust; authorization of
trustee's discretion to invade corpus merely for beneficiary's "benefit," however, created a
subjective standard discretionary trust), affd, 491 F.2d 1271 (5th Cir. 1974).
39. Trust Instrument (Appendix), § I(b).
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would eventually have an equitable life estate in one-half of the trust
income and the corpus.4" If either of the daughters were to predecease
her parents, however, then her share of the trust would ultimately pass
to her lineal descendants. 4 '
The Trust Instrument gave Mr. Bryant and Mrs. Bryant a testamentary power of appointment. Each could appoint up to one-third of the
corpus of the Bryant Trust to their daughters and the lineal descendants
of their daughters. In default of the exercise of this power, however, all
assets were to remain in trust for the benefit of the two daughters.4'
Mrs. Shurley and Mrs. Watkins were also given a special power of appointment, but that power over the corpus was to arise only after the
deaths of their parents.43 Ultimately, each daughter was to have both an
inter vivos and a testamentary power to appoint up to one-half of the
trust res to her children and other lineal descendants. The same descendants were the takers in default as well as the objects of the power.44
Clearly, the children and grandchildren of Mrs. Watkins and Mrs.
Shurley were the ultimate remainder beneficiaries of the Bryant Trust.
If either of the Bryants' daughters should die survived by a husband,
however, the widower was to hold an equitable life estate in his wife's
share of the trust income.45 If both of the Bryant daughters were to die
without surviving lineal descendants, then the ultimate remainder beneficiary-i.e., the ultimate taker in default under
the special powers of
46
appointment-was to be a specified charity
Mr. Bryant retained the right to revoke the Bryant Trust during his
life. He could not do so unilaterally, however. Revocation, so long as he
lived, required the consent of at least one of his daughters.47
The Trust Instrument named three special trustees whose appointment would take effect two years following the date of the death of the
40. Id. § I(a); see id. § I(d).
41. Id. § I(a).
42. Id. § I(d).
43. Id. § I(f). The power was special rather than general, in that neither donee could
appoint the property to herself, to her creditors, to her estate, or to the creditors of her estate.
See RESTATE MEN (SEcoND) OF PROPERTY § 11.4 (1986).
44. Trust Instrument (Appendix), § I(f).
45. Id. §§ I(c), I(f). The Shurley court was mistaken in saying that neither of the Bryants'
sons-in-law who executed the Trust Instrument was a beneficiary of the Trust. In re Shurley,
171 B.R. 769,776 n.2 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1994). Plainly, each man held a contingent equitable
life estate remainder interest in one-half of the trust income.
46. Trust Instrument (Appendix), § I(f).

47. Id. § I(c).
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last surviving parent.48 These special trustees included a western Texas
judge (in his individual capacity), a Texas attorney, and a Texas accountant.4 9 Upon request by Mrs. Shurley, or by Mrs. Watkins, these special
trustees, in their discretion, could terminate the Bryant Trust, in whole
or in part, and distribute the trust assets.50 Such a decision could be
made only by the unanimous consent of the special trustees, and only
upon a showing that termination would best serve the purposes for
which the Bryant Trust was established. Making a decision on termination was to be the only duty of these special trustees.5 1
The regular trustee of the Bryant Trust was given broad leeway in the
administration of trust assets. Among other things, he was permitted to
make loans to the beneficiaries.52 Finally, a spendthrift clause prohibited
any trust beneficiary-not merely Mr. and Mrs. Bryant and their daughters-from
assigning, pledging, or alienating his or her interest in the
53
trust
The Trust Instrument specifically allowed any of the original settlors
to make further contributions to the Trust.' 4 In fact, Mr. and Mrs. Bryant did so. Mr. Bryant died in 1967 leaving substantial assets to the Bryant Trust. Mrs. Bryant died in 1971, and her will likewise bestowed
additional property on the Bryant Trust. Indeed, the bulk of the assets
of the Bryant Trust came from the testamentary dispositions of Mr. and
Mrs. Bryant, not from the original 1965 funding.55 Apparently, Mr. and
Mrs. Bryant did not exercise their testamentary power of appointment,
and no settlor contributed any new assets to the Bryant Trust after 1971.
It is obvious that the Bryant Trust was a classic example of using a
protective trust with spendthrift and support provisions as a vehicle for
the intergenerational transfer of family wealth. Mr. and Mrs. Bryant intended that the fortune that they had accumulated should be safeguarded from the possible improvidence of their daughters (or their
sons-in-law), and that it should pass intact to their grandchildren or
great-grandchildren, minus such corpus distributions as might be needed
to maintain the two daughters in their accustomed standard of living.
Even in this respect, the trustee was to make corpus distributions only if
48.
49.
50.
51.

Id. § I(e).
Id.
Id.
Id.

52. Id. § 1().
53. Id. § I(m).
54. Id. § L
55. In re Shurley, 171 B.R. 769, 786 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1994).
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the other resources of Mrs. Shurley and Mrs. Watkins-including trust
income-were insufficient for their support. 6
The elder Bryants-and Mr. Bryant in particular-were the moving
force in the establishment of the Bryant Trust, as the name indicates.
The two daughters played little, if any, role in preparing the Trust Instrument. 7 According to Mrs. Shurley, she and her sister participated in the
creation of the Bryant Trust because, "We agreed that we would do what
Daddy wanted."58 Obviously the patriarch dictated the estate planning
device for the preservation of the wealth that his family had
accumulated.
Creditors, however, were apt to take a jaundiced view of the arrangement. In particular, the status of Mrs. Watkins and Mrs. Shurley as
cosettlors of the Bryant Trust could make their beneficial interests vulnerable to creditor attack. Precisely this issue came to a head when Mrs.
Shurley, joined by her husband, filed a petition under Chapter 7 of the
Bankruptcy Code more than a quarter of a century after the Bryant
Trust was established and more than twenty years after the deaths of Mr.
and Mrs. Bryant.59
B.

The Reasoning of the Bankruptcy Court on Self-Settlement and
Beneficiary Control

The issue before the bankruptcy court considering the Shurleys' case
was whether Mrs. Shurley's interest in the Bryant Trust should become
part of her bankruptcy estate and, hence, be available to satisfy the
claims of her creditors.6 ° Under the Bankruptcy Code, all of a debtor's
legal and equitable interests in property normally pass to her bankruptcy
estate as soon as a bankruptcy petition is filed.6 ' Section 541(c)(2) of the
Bankruptcy Code, however, excludes from estate property all of a
debtor's interest as a trust beneficiary if the transfer of that interest is
restricted by a provision that is enforceable under nonbankruptcy law.62
Thus, a debtor's interest in a valid protective trust is excluded from the
bankruptcy estate.
The spendthrift and support provisions of the Bryant Trust normally
would have shielded Mrs. Shurley's interest. The Chapter 7 bankruptcy
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.

Trust Instrument (Appendix), § I(b).
See Shurley, 171 B.R. at 778-79.
Id. at 778 n.4.
See id. at 776-77.
Id.
11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1) (1988).

62. Id. § 541(c)(2).
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trustee, however, joined by two creditors, claimed that those protective
terms were invalid for two reasons. First, they maintained that Mrs.
Shurley's interest in the Bryant Trust was self-settled. Second, they contended that she controlled the trust.6 3
The bankruptcy court agreed on both points, although it devoted far
more attention to self-settlement than to beneficiary control. The court
held that the protective provisions would exclude Mrs. Shurley's interest
from her bankruptcy estate only if those provisions would be upheld
64
under Texas law, and, under Texas law, those provisions failed.
Although Texas law happened to provide the "applicable nonbankruptcy
law,"965 the governing principles would have been the same under the
trust law of virtually any other jurisdiction.
On the self-settlement issue, the court determined that Mrs. Shurley
was a settlor of the Bryant Trust. The Trust Instrument plainly described
her as a settlor, and she unquestionably had conveyed property to the
trust.66 The fact that the property she transferred was encumbered by
liens, and that the value of her equity at the time was uncertain, did not,
in the court's view, alter her status as a settlor-i.e., a person who had
bestowed property upon the corpus. 67
The more difficult question was whether Mrs. Shurley's entire interest in the Bryant Trust should be deemed self-settled. It was clear that
she had contributed only a tiny percentage of the trust assets, yet she
enjoyed a lifetime equitable interest in one-half the income and the
corpus. 68 The court flatly rejected the application of any pro tanto rulei.e., any holding that a beneficiary's interest should be deemed self-settled only to the extent that her equitable interest is proportionate to her
trust
contribution: "The extent of a creditor's reach in a self-settled
69
should not depend upon a settlor's initial contribution.9
At least three bases for rejecting the pro tanto rule are explicit or
implicit in the Shurley court's decision. The first, clearest, and most
63. Shurley, 171 B.R. at 777.
64. Id. at 780-83. The Texas Legislature has codified the rule that spendthrift provisions
are void in self-settled trusts. TEx. PRop. CODE ANN. § 112.035(d) (West 1984). That statute,
however, only took effect in 1984. No relevant trust transaction in the Shurley case occurred
after that date. In the Shurley court's view, this made no difference. The common law of
Texas would hold protective terms in self-settled trusts to be of no effect. Shurley, 171 B.R. at
781 n.7.
65. 11 U.S.C. § 541(c)(1) (1988).
66. Shurley, 171 B.R. at 778-79.
67. Id. at 778-79 & nn. 4-5; see RESTATEmENT (SEcoND) OF TRUSTS § 3(1) (1959).
68. See Shurley, 171 B.R. at 783-84 & n.12.
69. Id. at 785.
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straightforward is that, by providing "consideration"-i.e., by contributing to the res-a settlor-beneficiary has ipso facto "purchased" her entire interest in a trust, regardless of the proportionate contributions of
other settlors. Since she has exchanged her property for an interest in
the trust, her creditors may reach whatever she has "bought," regardless
70
of any ratio between the contribution made and the interest received.
As the court explained:
For example, the interest of a sole settlor retaining a 1/10 beneficial interest in a trust is reachable under [protective] trust law
only to the extent of his 1/10 interest, the extent of his retained
control (the settlor might otherwise have just given away the remaining 9/10 interest, in which case the creditors would not recover anything). The interest of a settlor who contributes1/10 of
the assets to a [protective] trust and becomes the sole beneficiary,
however, is completely subject to the claims of creditors .... 7
The second and third possible bases for the Shurley court's decision
were seemingly more sophisticated. Both depended on the order in
which contributions were made to the corpus. Under the second possible thesis, a beneficiary would be deemed a settlor only to the extent of
his contribution, provided that another party had settled the trust first.
In that case, there would be a valid protective trust at the inception, and
later contributions by the beneficiary would result in self-settlement only
pro tanto. For example, if A created a protective trust with B as the sole
beneficiary, and if B later made a contribution to the res equal to A's, B
would be deemed a settlor only as to fifty percent of his interest. If,
however, B made the initial contribution, or if A and B made their contributions simultaneously, then B's interest would be deemed totally self70. It. at 785-86; see id. at 782 & n.10.
71. Id. at 784 n.13 (emphasis added). In other words, according to the Shurley court, if a
protective trust has assets worth $1,000,000.00, and if A is the sole beneficiary of the trust, it
does not matter whether A has contributed $1,000,000.00 to the corpus (total self-settlement),
or only $1.00, with other settlors contributing property worth $999,999.00 (partial self-settlement). In either event, according to the Shurley court, A's interest would be totally selfsettled because he would have "bought" his entire interest, regardless of how much he "exchanged" for it. "To state the proposition is to refute it." Howard v. Illinois Cent. R. R. Co.,
207 U.S. 463, 502 (1907).
The Shurley court was correct in saying that, if a sole settlor creates a protective trust for
his own benefit and the benefit of others, then the protective provisions are valid as to the
equitable interests of the nonsettlor beneficiaries and void only as to the retained interest of
the settlor-beneficiary. ERWIN N. GRISWOLD, SPENDrTH
TRUSTS § 282.1, at 345 (2d ed.
1947). Other courts have used this very principle to conclude that protective terms in a partially self-settled trust may be valid in part and invalid in part. Accordingly, these courts have
held that protective trust provisions are void only to the extent of the settlor-beneficiary's
contribution. E.g., In re Cates, 73 B.R. 874, 877 (Bankr. D. Or. 1987).
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settled.72 The Shurley court never fully explained why the pro tanto rule
should depend on the order of contributions, nor did the court elaborate
on any time lapse requirement between the nonbeneficiary's contribution and the settlor-beneficiary's contribution that might be necessary to
invoke the pro tanto rule.73
It is not at all clear that the Shurley court intended to state yet another position, but a third argument may be implicit in the court's decision. At the most complicated level, the court may have meant to say
that, in a trust transaction involving multiple parties who are both settlors and beneficiaries, the interest of any such party will be deemed
totally self-settled if his initial interest is proportionate to his initial contribution. Any protective provisions would thus be void from the outset,
and later contributions by another settlor to that beneficiary's interest
would not be shielded. For example, if A and B each contributed fifty
percent of the corpus of a trust in which each had a fifty percent equitable life estate, and in which each settlor-beneficiary was the remainder
beneficiary of the other's interest, and if A died leaving B as the sole
beneficiary, B's interest would be deemed entirely self-settled because
his initial interest was proportionate to his original contribution. 74
There are several problems with this thesis, however, both logically
and as applied to Mrs. Shurley's interest in the Bryant Trust. First, this
third position would suggest that a settlor-beneficiary's initial interest
should not be deemed totally self-settled if her contribution was disproportionately small in comparison to her original interest. Clearly, the
Shurley court did not mean to say this. 75 Second, the Shurley court
never explained why the order of contributions matters. 76 Finally, as applied to Mrs. Shurley, this third line of analysis would fail. Although her
initial income interest was proportionate to her initial contributionone-sixth in each case-her remainder interest was vastly disproportionate to her contribution. Her life interest would-and did-increase from

72. Shurley, 171 B.R. at 785 n.14.
73. Id Particularly if a trust arrangement is part of a common plan-for the intergenerational transfer of family wealth, for instance-it would seem to make no difference whether a
settlor-beneficiary made her contribution before or after a cosettlor. Moreover, under the
reasoning of the Shurley court, there is no principled reason why what was initially a gift of an
interest in a protective trust should not subsequently be transformed into a complete
"purchase" if the beneficiary later gave "consideration" for her equitable interest.
74. See id at 783-84 & n.12.

75. Id. at 784-85 & n.13.
76. See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
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one-sixth to one-half upon the death of her parents; her parents77 had no
remainder interest in Mrs. Shurley's share of the Bryant Trust.
At bottom, the Shurley court's central thesis-that a beneficiary's
contribution, however tiny, is tantamount to total self-settlement-may
have rested on the perceived practical difficulty of determining what
Mrs. Shurley's proportionate contribution to her interest was. Her current interest was settled in seriatim. The initial establishment of the Bryant Trust in 1965 was only the beginning. When Mr. and Mrs. Bryant
died (in 1967 and 1971, respectively), Mrs. Shurley's equitable life interest in the initial trust assets increased from one-sixth to one-half. Moreover, the bulk of trust assets came by way of the Bryants' respective
wills, not from the original contributions. 7 As the Shurley court noted,
it would not necessarily be an easy task to determine what portion of
Mrs. Shurley's interest was self-settled under a pro tanto analysis. This,
as much as a good faith perception of the state of the law, may have
convinced the court to hold that partial self-settlement is equivalent to
total self-settlement.79
Having concluded that Mrs. Shurley had self-settled her entire interest in the Bryant Trust, the court proceeded to say that Mrs. Shurley had
also controlled the trust so as to vitiate the protective terms. Compared
to the discussion of self-settlement, the discussion of beneficiary control
was extremely cursory. Indeed, the court never bothered to define what
constitutes beneficiary "control" in the requisite sense.80
Within the terms of the Trust Instrument, the court found three indicia of "control." First, there was Mrs. Shurley's special power of appointment over one-half of the trust assets, a matter to which the court
referred with some regularity. 8 ' The court held-quite rightly-that the
special power itself was not within the reach of Mrs. Shurley's creditors.82 In the court's view, however, the special power, standing alone,
would not have undermined the protective provisions, but it was one
indication that Mrs. Shurley "controlled" the Bryant Trust.83 In addition, Mrs. Shurley's right to ask the three special trustees to terminate
the trust and distribute her share of the assets to her was further eviSee supra notes 40-41, 54-55 and accompanying text.
Shurley, 171 B.R. at 783-84 & n.12.
See i&.at 785-86.
Id. at 782-83.
Id, at 783; see i& at 776-77, 781 n.8.
82. Id. at 786-87; see 11 U.S.C. § 541(b)(1) (1988); RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF PROP77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
ERTY

§ 13.1 (1986).

83. Shurley, 171 B.R. at 783.
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dence of "control," in the court's opinion.8 Finally, Mrs. Shurley's right
to join with Mr. Bryant in revoking the Bryant Trust during Mr. Bryant's
'85
lifetime allegedly bespoke "control.
Outside the Trust Instrument, the Shurley court found three other
indicia of beneficiary "control." First, the trustee of the Bryant Trust
had made corpus distributions to Mrs. Shurley on terms that the court
thought excessively liberal.86 Second, the Bryant Trust had made loans
to Mrs. ShurleyY Third, the court believed that Mrs. Shurley, Mr.
Shurley, or both, had purported to pledge or assign Mrs. Shurley's interest in the Bryant Trust as security for loans, or otherwise had behaved as
though Mrs. Shurley had complete dominion over trust assets.8
The Shurley case provides an excellent point of departure for analyzing both partial self-settlement and beneficiary control. The Shurley
court's conclusion that a beneficiary who has made any contribution
whatsoever to the corpus of a trust has automatically self-settled her entire interest, is flatly contrary to a rational understanding of the relevant
policy concerns. It is also contrary to every line of decisional law that
has dealt with the issue. The pro tanto rule on self-settlement is virtually
universal, and a careful consideration of all the relevant lines of authority shows why this is the case.
As for beneficiary "control," the Shurley court had no conception of
the proper use of the term in the pertinent context. Upon careful scrutiny, each factor that the court cited was either actually a negation of
beneficiary "control," or completely irrelevant to the "control" issue, or
based upon an incomplete and cursory analysis. In this respect, as with
self-settlement, the Shurley case is highly instructive in a negative sense.
III.

PARTIAL SELF-SETTLEMENT AND T=i

A.

PRO TANrro RuLE

Protective Trust Policy and the Pro Tanto Rule

As soon as one examines the relevant policy considerations, it appears self-evident that the protective provisions in a partially self-settled
spendthrift, discretionary, or support trust should be void only to the
extent that the settlor-beneficiary's interest is proportionate to her contribution to the res. It is wise to recall what those fundamental policies
are:
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.

Id.
Id.
Id.
I&
Id.
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Inherent in recognition of the validity of spendthrift [and other
protective] trusts .. has been acceptance of the premises: that
one has the right to control the disposition and to limit the use of
one's own property conferred by gift or bequest; and, that a beneficiary's creditors are not prejudiced by spendthrift [or other protective] provisions in gifts or bequests since, absent the generosity
of the donor or devisor, the beneficiary would have no right, entitlement, or interest in the property given or bequeathed....
[since] nothing is insulated from creditors by a [protective] trust
that they might otherwise become entitled to. Accordingly, the
nature of the corpus and its source, are critical to the determination... of whether a particulartrust is a valid spendthrift [or other
form of protective] trust.89
The critical question, then, is who actually furnished the res for the
trust, regardless of the precise form of the transaction. 90 When a settlor
creates a trust for his own benefit, and when another party also contributes to the corpus, the situation is analytically indistinguishable from the
creation of two trusts, one of which is self-settled, and one of which is
not. In such an instance, protective provisions would be invalid as to the
former and valid as to the latter. With a single trust, this means that
protective terms fail only to the extent that a settlor-beneficiary's interest is self-settled-i.e., to the extent that her interest is proportionate to
her contribution.
Courts throughout the country have followed this simple, equitable
pro tanto rule. It is almost inconceivable that any other rule would give
effect to the relevant policy concerns.
For example, in State v. Nashville Trust Co.,91 a father owned a valuable tract of land that he permitted his son to occupy. The son proceeded
to build a palatial home for his own use on the property. The real estate-including the house-was then conveyed to a spendthrift trust for
the son's benefit. 2 The court held that the spendthrift term was void,
but only to the extent of the son's contribution.
The effect of what [the son] did in this case was to put $350,000 of
his money [i.e., the cost of the mansion] into property to be put
into a trust for himself beyond the reach of his creditors, present
and prospective. He and his father intended this result and to89. In re Loe, 83 B.R. 641, 645 n.6 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1988) (emphasis added). The Loe
court was discussing Minnesota law, but its reasoning would apply equally well in other
jurisdictions.
90. 6 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 26.124, at 579 (A. James Casner ed. 1952).
91. 190 S.W.2d 785 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1944).
92. Id. at 787-89.
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gether they brought it to pass.... Under all the authorities [the
protective provision in] the trust is invalid to the extent of this contribution. So we agree with the learned chancellor that... a creditor of [the son] ... has the right to subject the property [to a lien]
to the extent of... his contributions.93
The court, however, upheld the validity of the spendthrift trust to the
extent of the father's contribution-i.e., the value of the unimproved real
estate. Except for the father's bounty, the son would have had no interest at all in the raw land, and the father could place such terms and
conditions on his gift as he chose. There was no reason why the restraint
on alienation should not be valid pro tanto. The upshot was that a creditor of the son was granted a lien on the property, but only to the extent
that the mansion enhanced its total value.94
The Shurley court purported to analyze Nashville Trust and concluded that the case stood for the proposition that the pro tanto rule
applies only if: (1) the beneficiary pays down a lien on trust property,
(2) after another party has already settled a protective trust.95 Apparently, the Shurley court was confused. First, no encumbrance on trust
assets (apart from the one that the court created) was even at issue in
Nashville Trust. For aught that appears in the reported opinion, the son
paid cash for the improvements that he had built, and no lien upon the
raw land was even mentioned. 6 Second, the son built the home before
the spendthrift trust was created, at a time when all that he had was an
expectancy that he would have a beneficial interest in the land. The father had originally intended to devise the land to his son outright, but,
growing dissatisfied with his will, he decided to make an inter vivos conveyance to a protective trust for his son's benefit. 97
The Shurley court had no grounds whatsoever for suggesting that the
order of contribution is at all relevant to a self-settlement analysis. 98
Probably the best view of Nashville Trust is that the father and the son
made their respective contributions simultaneously when the propertyhouse and all-was conveyed to the trust. The court in that case, however, went out of its way to make clear that it did not matter one iota
when the father and the son had made their respective contributions. 99
93.
94.
95.
96.

Id. at 790-91 (emphasis added).
Id. at 798-99.
In re Shurley, 171 B.R. 769, 785 n.14 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1994).
See Nashville Trust, 190 S.W.2d at 789.

97. Id.
98. Shurley, 171 B.R. at 785 n.14.
99. Nashville Trust, 190 S.W.2d at 790-91.
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As the Shurley court noted, the pro tanto rule on the validity of protective trust provisions does apply when a beneficiary discharges a lien
on trust property. 100 This, however, is simply a particular application of
a much broader principle. As in Nashville Trust, it does not matter if the
settlor-beneficiary's contribution comes before, after, or simultaneously
with the contributions of a cosettlor. The beneficiary is a settlor of his
interest, but he is not the settlor. Moreover, as in Nashville Trust, it does
not matter whether the settlor-beneficiary's contribution comes by way
of the discharge of a lien, or whether it takes some other form.
This point is illustrated by In re Johannes Trust,10 which involved a
discretionary rather than a spendthrift trust. In that case, there was an
unresolved fact issue as to whether the beneficiary herself or a relative
was the settlor of the trust, or whether the two of them were cosettlors.
The court gave very careful thought to the policies at stake. If the relative was the only settlor, the protective provision would have been totally valid. If the beneficiary herself had been the only settlor, the
discretionary term would have been totally void. Combining the two
principles, the court held that the only way to treat the trust, if it were
partially self-settled, would be to adopt the pro tanto rule. To say that
protective terms in a partially self-settled trust are altogether valid would
be to ignore that the beneficiary is a settlor; to say that they are totally
invalid would be to ignore that someone else is also a settlor. °2 In effect, the creation of a partially self-settled trust is no different than the
creation of two distinct trusts with different settlors. 0 3
Since the pro tanto rule conforms so closely to the relevant policy
concerns, it has won widespread acceptance. Three principal lines of
cases have touched on partial self-settlement, particularly in recent
times: (1) bankruptcy court decisions involving employee pension plans;
(2) opinions concerning reciprocal or mirror trusts, where two or more
settlors create trusts for one another's benefit; and (3) trusts for the benefit of one spouse created with uniquely marital property. The Shurley
court made reference to all three types of cases. All three support the
pro tanto rule, not the Shurley court's position.

100. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 156 cmt. f (1959); see Shurley, 171 B.R. at 785
n.14.
101. 479 N.W.2d 25 (Mich. Ct. App. 1991).
102. lIL at 29.
103. See id. The Shurley court dealt with Johannes Trust, though dismissing the case by
ipse dixit. Shurley, 171 B.R. at 785 n.14.
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B. Bankruptcy Retirement Trust Cases and the Pro Tanto Rule
By far the most numerous line of recent cases to deal with self-settlement of protective trusts has arisen in the bankruptcy context, as the
Shurley court suggested. 0 4 Section 541(c)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code
excludes a debtor's interest in a trust from her bankruptcy estate if that
interest is shielded from creditors "under applicable nonbankruptcy
law."' 05 In In re Goff,"° the Fifth Circuit considered a pension plan that
was protected by anti-alienation terms that were valid under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 ("ERISA"). The question was whether the debtor's interest in the plan should be excluded
from the bankruptcy estate. Examining the legislative history of section
541(c)(2), the court concluded that "applicable nonbankruptcy law" referred solely to state spendthrift trust law, not to ERISA. Accordingly,
the Fifth Circuit held that an ERISA-qualified retirement plan would be
excluded from the bankruptcy estate if, but only if, it met the requirements of state law spendthrift trust doctrines. 10 7
In the years following Goff, a majority of courts agreed with the Fifth
Circuit and held that ERISA-qualified plans should be examined
through state law spendthrift trust lenses.'0 8 A minority disagreed, however, holding that "applicable nonbankruptcy law" referred to any
nonbankruptcy law, including ERISA. 10 9 In 1992, the Supreme Court
resolved the dispute in Patterson v. Shumate'" by upholding the minority position."' Thus, federal courts exercising bankruptcy jurisdiction
are no longer required to examine most pension plans as though they
were traditional spendthrift trusts.
Before Patterson,however, numerous decisions throughout the country attempted to fit retirement plans onto the Procrustean bed of spendthrift trust law. This was an instance of difficult cases frequently leading
104. Shurley, 171 B.R. at 782.
105. 11 U.S.C. § 541(c)(2) (1988).
106. 706 F.2d 574 (5th Cir. 1983).
107. Id. at 581-86.
108. E.g., In re Daniel, 771 F2d 1352, 1359-60 (9th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1016
(1986); In re Lichstrahl, 750 F.2d 1488, 1490 (11th Cir. 1985) (expressly adopting Goff); In re
Graham, 726 F.2d 1268, 1270-73 (8th Cir. 1984); see Michelle M. Arnopol, Including Retirement Benefits in a Debtor'sBankruptcy Estate: A Proposalfor Harmonizing ERISA and the
Bankruptcy Code, 56 Mo. L. Rlv. 491, 509-17 (1991).
109. E.g., In re Moore, 907 F.2d 1268, 1270-73 (4th Cir. 1990); see Arnopol, supra note
108, at 518-23.
110. 504 U.S. 753 (1992).
111. Id. at 757-66.
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to harsh and confusing results."' Relatively few state court cases had
dealt with retirement trusts in this light, which is scarcely surprising
when one considers that protective trusts were designed primarily for
intrafamily transactions." 3 When subjected to spendthrift trust tests,
ERISA-qualified plans often failed on the grounds that the beneficiary
had relatively unrestricted access to trust funds, at least under certain
circumstances or for certain purposes. In other words, the beneficiary
"controlled" trust assets, thus, undermining the protection of the antialienation provisions." 4
It was also frequently possible to attack retirement trusts as totally
self-settled, even if the employer had made all the contributions. Some
courts attempted to fit employer-funded pension plans into the
purchased trust mold." 5
As with any question of self-settlement, the inquiry had to begin with
the question of who actually had furnished the res for the trust. That
party would be deemed the settlor, even if someone else had in form
created the trust." 6 Aside from the objective question of who conveyed
assets to the trust, there would be a more subjective inquiry as to
whether the ostensible settlor had acted because he was "paid" to do so,
or whether the beneficiary had given "consideration." In contract law,
"consideration" refers to what is given or received when there is a conscious intention to bargain for a quid pro quo." 7 In the classic purchased
trust cases, the beneficiary ostensibly has placed nothing in the corpus112. See In re Swanson, 79 B.R. 422,425-26 (D. Minn. 1987) (noting that "the conceptual
problem presented by this case stems from 'the difficulty of fitting a retirement trust within
the traditional definition of a spendthrift trust."' (quoting Laurence B. Wohl, Pension and
Bankruptcy Laws: A Clash of Social Policies, 64 N.C. L. REv. 3, 15 (1985))), afj'd, 873 F.2d
1121 (8th Cir. 1989); In re Hysick, 90 B.R. 770, 774-75 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1988) (expounding on
the difficulty of applying a traditional spendthrift trust analysis to retirement plans); Arnopol,
supra note 108, at 513-17; Daniel Spitzer, Comment, Contra Goffi. Of Retirement Trusts and
Bankruptcy Code § 541 (c) (2), 32 UCLA L. REv. 1266, 1294-1321 (1985).
113. See supra notes 17-18 and accompanying text.
114. See John M. Newell, ERISA Retirement Plansin IndividualBankruptcy, 19 U. MICH.
J.L. REF. 183, 207-13 (1985).
115. Id at 205-07; see In re Idalski, 123 B.R. 222,234 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1991) (discussing
cases that accepted this view).
116. 6 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, supra note 90, § 26.124, at 579 ("The question is,
whose property was actually used in the establishment of the trust?"); see In re Kincaid, 96
B.R. 1014, 1019 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1989), rev'd on other grounds, 917 F.2d 1162 (9th Cir. 1990);
In re Loe, 83 B.R. 641, 645 n.6 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1988).
117. REsTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF Coi'mAcrs § 71 (1980); see id § 81 & cmts. a, b (desire
to bargain for the exchange need not be the only motive, but it must be one motive; if both
parties know that what is bargained for is mere pretense, there is no valid consideration, and
hence no contract).
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ie., in form, he has not provided any part of the res for the trust. Instead, he has given contractual consideration, or struck a bargain with a
third party to create the trust for his benefit. The third party, as contractual consideration for what he has received, provides the funding for the
corpus." 8 Transactions of this nature amount in substance to the beneficiary purchasing assets from the ostensible settlor and then placing them
in trust for his own benefit." 9 In such a case, the trust is deemed totally
self-settled, regardless of whether the beneficiary made a good bargain
or a bad one by giving up something that he possessed in return for trust
assets. 20 In no case could there have been any donative intent on the
part of the ostensible settlor. Protective provisions fail because the beneficiary has, in effect, purported to place his own property beyond the
reach of his creditors while still having it available for his own use.' 21
One could make a good faith argument that all employment retirement trusts are of this nature."2 An employee-beneficiary could rarely
be seen as a "donee" or a "testamentary trust beneficiary" in the sense

118. E.g., Balaban v. Willett, 27 N.E.2d 612, 619 (Ill. App. Ct. 1940); De Rousse v. Williams, 164 N.W. 896, 899 (Iowa 1917); Daniels v. Pecan Valley Ranch, Inc., 831 S.W.2d 372,
378 (Tex. Ct. App. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 2944 (1993).
119. 6 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, supra note 90, § 26.124, at 579 ("These transactions
are equivalent to a purchase of the trust property by the beneficiary and a subsequent transfer
of it by him to the trustee on trust for himself.").
120. De Rousse, 164 N.W. at 899.
121. 2A Scotr & FRATCHER, supra note 2, § 156.3, at 180-81. The Shurley court apparently concluded that Mrs. Shurley's interest in the Bryant Trust was "purchased" in toto-i.a,
that she had "bought" the contributions of her parents, so that no donative intent could be
imputed to them. In re Shurley, 171 B.R. 769,784-86 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1994). The only case
that the Shurley court was able to cite in support of its position that a beneficiary who contributes anything to a trust has automatically self-settled her entire interest was De Rousse, 164
N.W. at 899. Shurley, 171 B.R. at 785-86.
Apparently, the Shurley court believed that Mrs. Shurley had provided "consideration" for
the creation of the Bryant Trust by contributing property to it. This by itself was not "consideration" in any contractual sense, however. It was simply an outright conveyance of assets. In
De Rousse, as in all of the other classic purchased trust cases, the beneficiary did not contribute directly to the trust; rather, the beneficiary gave contractual consideration to a third party
to create the trust. The ostensible settlor was viewed as though he were not really a settlor at
all. In Shurley, there was no mention of any surrender of rights or other "consideration" by
Mrs. Shurley except for her transfer of her property to the Bryant Trust. On its face, it seems
anomalous to say that Mrs. Shurley, by conveying property to the Bryant Trust, effectively
"bought" the property of her parents (or her sister), which she then placed in trust for her own
benefit. This would be tantamount to denying that Mr. and Mrs. Bryant (or Mrs. Watkins)
were settlors at all, and to saying that they acted simply as Mrs. Shurley's agents in settling a
trust for her benefit. Plainly, Mr. and Mrs. Bryant and Mrs. Watkins were settlors, even if
Mrs. Shurley was a cosettlor. See Shurley, 171 B.R. at 776, 778.
122. See supra note 115 and accompanying text.
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normally reserved for intrafamily trust transactions. 123 When an employer funds a pension plan, one could argue, she does so as consideration for the work furnished by the employee. Establishing the
retirement fund is merely part of the bargained-for payment for the employee's services. Thus, the employee is actually the settlor of the employer's contributions. 124 As one court explained:
Employee participants under this Plan are not donee beneficiaries. Although Debtors have made no monetary contributions
to the Plan, and the Plan, at least so far as their interest is concerned, has been funded by the employer, the employer's contributions are profits of the business and fruits of the employee's
125
work; and, they are a form of employee compensation.
The overwhelming majority of pension trust cases, however, rejected
any absolute rule that an employee retirement trust must always be selfsettled because it has been "purchased" by the employee. 126 Nonetheless, even under the majority view, it was not easy to have an ERISAqualified plan that would not be deemed self-settled if viewed as a
spendthrift trust. First, a retirement trust would be held self-settled if in
fact it were completely funded by the beneficiary. Second, self-settlement would also be found if the beneficiary were an equity owner of the
business with a significant right of management and control.
Under the first prong of the test-funding by the employee-certain
forms of retirement plans could not possibly be anything but totally selfsettled. Goff, 27 for example, involved a Keogh plan, which is designed
for self-employed persons. If viewed as a spendthrift trust, a Keogh plan
is completely self-settled by definition. The Goff court so held, as did
courts throughout the country. 2 8 Likewise, IRAs, retirement annuities,
123. In re Fritsvold, 115 B.R. 192, 195 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1990); see In re McIntosh, 116
B.R. 277, 279 (Bankr. N.D. Okla. 1990).
124. In re Boon, 90 B.R. 988, 993 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1987) ("The fiction upon which some
decisions base a holding that ERISA funds are excluded from the [bankruptcy] estate-that
only the employer makes contributions to the plan-amounts to a blind acceptance of the
employer's disguised payment of salary."), rev'd, 108 B.R. 697 (W.D. Mo. 1989); Electrical
Workers Local 1 Credit Union v. IBEW-NECA Holiday Trust Fund, 583 S.W.2d 154, 160-62
(Mo. 1979) (en banc); see In re Balay, 113 B.R. 429, 438 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1990).
125. In re Loe, 83 B.R. 641, 645 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1988).
126. E.g., In re Boon, 108 B.R. 697, 706-08 (W.D. Mo. 1989); In re Wallace, 66 B.R. 834,
839-40 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. 1986); In re Elsea, 47 B.R. 142, 148-49 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1985);
Hines v. Sands, 312 S.W.2d 275, 277-78 (Tex. Civ. App. 1958); see Newell, supra note 114, at
208.
127. In re Goff, 706 F.2d 524 (5th Cir. 1983).
128. Id at 587-88; see Newell, supra note 114, at 203-05.
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and similar investment vehicles were uniformly held to be totally selfsettled when viewed as trusts. No other result was conceivable. 29
Even if a Keogh plan or a similar arrangement that could only be
self-settled was not at issue, it was self-evident to most courts that a retirement fund was 100% self-settled if the employee had in fact made all
the contributions to it. Even if the plan had been created by the employer, the employee had supplied the entire corpus. 130
Even if a retirement trust was formally settled by the employer, however, courts universally held that the trust was totally self-settled under
state law principles if the debtor-beneficiary was a major equity owner
with a significant right of management and control. In cases involving
closely held corporations, for example, courts consistently concluded
that a controlling person and the corporation were really one and the
same entity for trust settlement purposes, and hence any corporatefunded retirement plan would be deemed to have been settled entirely
by the controlling person-beneficiary herself.3 1 "In cases where pension
plans have been included in bankruptcy estates, the distinction between
the corporation and the beneficiary has been questionable."1' 32
This principle was applied especially vigorously to partnerships, professional associations, professional corporations, and other similar entities through which professionals conduct their business. "When the
plans have been established by employers who are either professional
associations or closely-held corporations, courts have often been willing
to read through the corporate [or partnership] formalities in order to
assert the identity of interest between the employee- [or partner-] debtor
and his or her 'employer.'"1 33 It did not matter at all whether the debtor
was the only controlling person, or whether she was one of several. In
either event, the beneficiary and the business entity that had established
the retirement plan were considered as one and the same. Due to the
129. E.g., In re Spandorf, 115 B.R. 415, 416-17 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1990); In re Howerton,
21 B.R. 621, 622-23 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1982); see Spitzer, supra note 112, at 1294-1310.
130. In re Johnson, 724 F2d 1138, 1140-41 (5th Cir. 1984) (although plan was established
by employer, employee made all contributions); In re Connally, 94 B.R. 908, 911-12 (Bankr.
W.D. Tex. 1989).
131. E.g., In re Lichstrahl, 750 F.2d 1488, 1489-90 (11th Cir. 1985); In re Shuman, 78 B.R.
254,255-57 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1987); In re O'Brien, 94 B.R. 583,586-88 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1988);
4.In re Dyke, 943 F.2d 1435,1444 n.24 (5th Cir. 1991) (suggesting that firm-funded retirement
plan would not be self-settled as to corporate employees who were not controlling shareholders, officers, or directors).
132. In re West, 81 B.R 22, 25 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1987).
133. Spitzer, supra note 112, at 1312.
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beneficiary's significant right of control and equity ownership, she would
1 34
be treated as the only settlor.
The classic example was In re Brooks.15 There, a physician who was
one of thirty-two members of a professional association sought to exclude his retirement plan from his bankruptcy estate on the grounds that
the plan was a valid spendthrift trust. The court disagreed, noting that
the doctor was an equity owner with a significant right to participate in
the management of the association. This, at least as much as the debtor's
control over the plan itself and over his own share of the trust funds,
convinced the court that there was no meaningful distinction between
the individual physician and the business organization. The court laid
great stress on the fact that the doctor was no mere wage employee.
Therefore, the protective provisions failed on grounds of complete selfsettlement. 36
The Shurley court may have believed that this line of cases-and
Brooks in particular-stood for the proposition that any beneficiary who
contributes anything at all to a trust has thereby self-settled his entire
interest. 137 If so, the Shurley court was mistaken. Brooks and the other
controlling person retirement trust cases rejected the very idea that the
business entity had contributed part of the corpus, with the individual
debtor contributing another part. To the contrary, all of these cases
rested on the premise that there was no distinction at all between the
individual and the partnership, corporation, or association. Likewise, in
cases where there were several controlling persons, neither Brooks nor
any other similar decision rested on the notion that the non-debtor partners, shareholders, or association members individually had contributed
part of the trust funds, with the debtor-beneficiary individually contributing another part. Rather, all of these cases accepted the premise that
the business entity in corpore had funded the trust. The courts simply
refused to see any meaningful distinction between the controlling indi1 38
vidual and the business entity.
134. E.g., Dyke, 943 F.2d at 1444 (shareholder-member of professional association and
shareholder in law firm held to be settlors of their respective retirement trusts because of close
identity of interest between debtor-beneficiaries and their "employers"); In re Ridenour, 45
B.R. 72, 79 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1984) (law partner's interest in profit sharing plan adopted by
three-partner law firm held entirely self-settled); In re Graham, 24 B.R. 305, 310 (Bankr. N.D.
Iowa 1982), affd, 726 F.2d 1268 (8th Cir. 1984).
135. 844 F.2d 258 (5th Cir. 1988).
136. Id. at 261-63.
137. See In re Shurley, 171 B.R. 769, 778, 782 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1994) (citing In re
Brooks, 844 F.2d 258 (5th Cir. 1988)).
138. See Newell, supra note 114, at 205; see also Arnopol, supra note 108, at 517 & n.136.
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The general rule in the employee retirement trust cases, then, was
that an ERISA-qualified plan would be upheld in toto as a valid spendthrift trust if: (1) the employer had funded the entire plan; and (2) the
debtor-beneficiary was a mere wage employee with no significant equity
ownership in or right of control over the employer. Conversely, a plan
would be held totally self-settled if either: (1) the beneficiary enjoyed
significant ownership and control over the employer; or (2) the employee had in fact funded the entire trust out of her own pocket.
This left open the situation that would be most closely akin to the
fact pattern typical of intrafamily trusts: (1) the employee did not control or own the business entity;139 and (2) the employee and the employer each provided some of the funds for the retirement trust
corpus. 40 The Shurley court appeared to believe that, if an individual
employee had ever contributed anything whatsoever to her pension plan,
then she would have "bought" her entire interest in the retirement trust,
and the trust would be totally self-settled.' 4 ' If the Shurley court did
entertain this belief, it was very much in error. The overwhelming majority of courts that considered this situation adopted the pro tanto rule.
That restraints on alienation in a partially self-settled employee retirement trust should be deemed valid in part and invalid in part, quickly
achieved the status of a hornbook proposition: "When an ERISA retirement plan is funded, in whole or in part, by the contributions or efforts
of the beneficiary, the plan must be considered self-settled, but only to
the extent of his contributions."142
For example, in In re Cates,14 3 the court examined a pension plan that
was funded in part by the employee-debtor and in part by her employer.
The plan contained anti-alienation provisions that qualified as a spendthrift term under state law. The only issue was whether self-settlement
undercut the protection. Relying on the late Dean Erwin N. Griswold's
magisterial treatise on spendthrift trusts, the court decided that protec139. No business entity of any description funded the Bryant Trust, but rather Mr. and
Mrs. Bryant and their daughters individually did so. The property used to fund the Bryant
Trust never belonged to a legally cognizable collective entity; it belonged to the individual
settlors. To the extent that the Bryant family could be deemed a "business entity," however,
the "controlling persons" were the parents--especially Mr. Bryant-and not the daughters,
Mrs. Shurley and Mrs. Watkins. See supra notes 31-36, 54-58 and accompanying text.
140. This is analogous to the Shurley case, where the parents and each of the daughters
made contributions to the res. See supra notes 31-34, 54-55 and accompanying text.
141. See Shurley, 171 B.R. at 782.
142. Newell, supra note 114, at 202 (emphasis added).
143. 73 B.R. 874 (Bankr. D. Or. 1987).
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tive provisions may be severable, or valid in part and invalid in part.'"
The court concluded that, to the extent of the employer's contributions,
a valid spendthrift trust had been created. To the extent of the employee's contributions, however, the trust was self-settled, and the
spendthrift terms failed.145
Likewise, the court in In re Tisdale"4 meticulously reviewed state law
and the relevant policy concerns, and proceeded to adopt the pro tanto
rule in the context of an employee pension fund. Except for the employer's generosity, the debtor-employee would have had no rights in
the funds that the employer had contributed, and the employer could
shield them with a spendthrift clause if it so chose. On the other hand,
the debtor could not place his own property in a trust for his own benefit
and keep it beyond the reach of his creditors. To the extent of the employee's contributions only, therefore, the pension fund became part of
the bankruptcy estate.' 4 7
The relative size of the contributions of the employee and the employer did not matter in the slightest in these retirement trust cases. In
In re Conroy,'4 the debtor-employee had contributed $177.32 to an ERISA-qualified retirement account, while the employer's contributions
constituted $15,353.08, or roughly eighty-seven times as much. After a
thorough assessment of the relevant decisions, the sources of the corpus,
and the applicable policies of trust law, the court concluded that the protective provisions in the trust were invalid as to the $177.32. To the extent of the $15,353.08 contributed by the employer, the spendthrift term
49
was upheld.'

The relative share of contributions could be reversed without affecting the outcome. In In re Kincaid,5 0 the debtor-employee had funded a
plan with an anti-alienation provision to the extent of $2,375.30, while
the employer had provided only slightly more than a third of that
amount. In light of the principles supporting the pro tanto rule, however, only the employee's larger contribution was held to be self-settled
and within the reach of creditors, while the protective trust terms were

144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.

Id at 877 (citing GRISWOLD, supra note 71, § 282.1, at 345).
Id
112 B.R. 61 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1990).
Id at 65-66.
110 B.R. 492 (Bankr. D. Mont. 1990).
Id at 500-01.
96 B.R. 1014 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1989), rev'd in part,917 F.2d 1162 (9th Cir. 1990).
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upheld with respect to the employer's much smaller funding of the
corpus.'

51

Some retirement plans permit an employee to withdraw her own contributions, but not those of her employer. Several cases held that creditors could reach trust funds to this extent. In these opinions, it was not
always certain whether the courts were following the pro tanto rule because of partial self-settlement, partial beneficiary control, or some combination of these factors. 52 At least one court, however, made it clear
that the same reasoning that would support the partial invalidity of anti53
alienation provisions in one context would also apply in the other.1
In still other cases, the pro tanto rule was endorsed, even though the
partial invalidity of protective trust terms on grounds of partial self-settlement was not directly at issue. When a bankruptcy estate or its creditors sought access only to a debtor-employee's contributions, several
courts upheld rights of creditors on the basis of partial self-settlement,
but observed that protective trust provisions clearly were valid to the
extent of the employer's contributions.'- 4 Conversely, even while affirming the complete validity of spendthrift provisions in an ERISA plan
that was totally employer-funded, at least one court suggested that the
protective terms would have failed to the extent of any self-settlement
by the employee. 55
151. IL at 1016, 1019. In reversing the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel, the Ninth Circuit
accepted that the employer's contributions were not self-settled. The Court of Appeals, however, reached the astounding conclusion that the employee's contributions were not self-settled either. The Ninth Circuit adopted the singular rationale that, by electing to participate in
the plan, the employee had given up any right to his own contributions before they were
placed in the fund, and therefore the employee's contributions were no different from the
employer's. The employee had surrendered only "future" compensation to which he had no
immediate right, not past or present compensation. In re Kincaid, 917 F.2d 1162, 1167 (9th
Cir. 1990). This reasoning strained traditional spendthrift trust law to the breaking point. It
would be just as wrongheaded to say that a partially self-settled protective trust is totally valid
because someone besides the settlor-beneficiary is a cosettlor, as it would be to say that the
protective terms are completely void because the beneficiary has made some small contribution. See In re Idalski, 123 B.R. 222, 234 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1991) (discussing the Ninth
Circuit's holding in Kincaid).
152. In re Tomer, 117 B.R. 391, 394-96 (Bankr. S.D. Ill. 1990); In re Berndt, 34 B.R. 515,
520-21 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1983); Highlands State Bank v. Gonzales, 340 S.W.2d 828, 829-30
(Tex. Civ. App. 1960); see In re Brooks, 844 F.2d 258, 262 (5th Cir. 1988) (discussing
Gonzales).
153. Tomer, 117 B.R. at 394-96.
154. In re Swanson, 79 B.R. 422,425 (D. Minn. 1987), affd, 873 F.2d 1121 (8th Cir. 1989);
see also In re Sanders, 89 B.R. 266,270 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 1988) (court specifically declined to
hold that employee was settlor of retirement trust to the extent of employer's contributions).
155. In re Elsea, 47 B.R. 142, 149 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1985).
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Not one of these ERISA cases that adopted or endorsed the pro
tanto rule considered the order of employer and employee contributions
to be of the slightest importance. Under the reasoning of the Shurley
court, a protective trust would be totally self-settled if a settlor-beneficiary established the corpus prior to or simultaneously with a cosettlor, but
it might be only partially self-settled if the settlor-beneficiary made her
contribution after a cosettlor had established the trust initially.' 56 This

proposition is so aberrant that it was not even discussed in the employee
retirement trust cases. It did not matter at all whether the employee had
made the first contribution (total self-settlement under Shurley), or
whether the funding came from the employer and the employee simultaneously (again, total self-settlement under Shurley), or whether the employer had given property to the corpus first (partial self-settlement
under Shurley). The pro tanto rule applied in any event.
In all fairness to the Shurley court, it must be said that a very small
number of heavily criticized ERISA trust cases held that an entire retirement plan was within the reach of creditors, even though both employer
and employee had contributed to it: "[Some courts] occasionally fail to
observe the pro tanto principle, incorrectly holding that an entire retirement plan is self-settled if any portion was contributed by the
'15 7
beneficiary.
These cases are notable chiefly for their lack of supporting authority
and of any reasoning to uphold their position. Indeed, they do not even
discuss any rule of proportionality. In In re Werner,158 for instance, the
United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Minnesota held that
the debtor had "created his own trust," even though his contributions
were matched by employer funding.' 5 9 This small line of decisions
reached its reductio ad absurdum in several instances where the United
States Bankruptcy Court for the Western District of Missouri held that
an employee-debtor should be considered the only settlor of his retire156. In re Shurley, 171 B.R. 769, 785 n.14 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1994); see supra notes 74-77
and accompanying text.
157. Newell, supra note 114, at 202.
158. 31 B.R. 418 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1983).
159. Id.at 421; see also In re Threewitt, 20 B.R. 434, 438 (Bankr. D. Kan.) (although
employee had contributed some $13,000.00 and employer in excess of $8,000.00, retirement
plan was self-settled because, "it is the funds of the beneficiary that are being placed in
trust."), rev'd, 24 B.R. 927 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1982). In both Werner and Threewitt, the statements concerning self-settlement could be regarded as dicta because in both cases the beneficiaries had broad access to the trust funds. This, without more, was sufficient to invalidate any
restraint on alienation. Werner, 31 B.R. at 421; Threewitt, 20 B.R. at 438.
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ment trust simply because he had the right to make contributions, even
though all funding had in fact come from the employer.160
It is entirely possible, however, that these cases do not really mean
what they appear to say. The Bankruptcy Courts for the District of Minnesota and for the Western District of Missouri were among the small
minority that embraced the view that a retirement plan is necessarily
self-settled, even if all contributions were made by the employer, because such contributions are simply one form of contractual consideration for the employee's services-i.e., that retirement plans are always
purchased trusts.1 61 This view was not unchallenged, even in the respective jurisdictions of these courts.' 62 It is quite conceivable that saying
that any employee contribution-or even an employee's right to make
contributions-to a retirement trust amounts to 100% self-settlement,
was nothing more than a backhanded way of expressing the view that an
ERISA plan should always be considered totally self-settled because the
employee has "bought" the plan with her work, regardless of who formally funded the trust. If these statements were not a disguised way of
saying that retirement plans are always purchased trusts, then these
courts would have been guilty of overlooking the critical issue of whose
property actually had been used to establish the corpus. 63
Whatever the case, these few decisions ignoring the pro tanto rule
were seldom followed. The Shurley court did not cite any of these
opinions.
In sum, like the decisions in State v. Nashville Trust Co.16' and In re
Johannes Trust,165 the overwhelming majority of bankruptcy cases addressing employee retirement plans stands squarely in favor of the pro
160. In re Davis, 125 B.R. 242, 246 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1991); In re Gallagher, 101 B.R.
594, 597-98, 600 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1989). By this reasoning, the remote heirs of Ghengis
Khan should be deemed the cosettlors of every private protective trust in the United States.
There is surely no legal impediment to the distant heirs of that Mongolian potentate adding to

the corpora of whatever trusts may strike their fancy.
161. In re Fritsvold, 115 B.R. 192, 195 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1990); In re Boon, 90 B.R. 988,
993 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1987), rev'd, 108 B.R. 697 (W.D. Mo. 1989); In re Loe, 83 B.R. 641,645
(Bankr. D. Minn. 1988).
162. In re Boon, 108 B.R. 697, 706-08 (W.D. Mo. 1989), rev'g on this issue, 90 B.R. 988

(Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1987); see In re Swanson, 79 B.R. 422, 426 (D. Minn. 1987) (noting the
importance of distinguishing employer and employee contributions), affd, 873 F.2d 1121 (8th
Cir. 1989).
163. See supra notes 89-90 and accompanying text.

164. 190 S.W2d 785, 787-89, 790-91, 798-99 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1944); see supra notes 91-99
and accompanying text.
165. 479 N.W.2d 25,29 (Mich. Ct. App. 1991); see supra notes 101-03 and accompanying
text.
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tanto rule on self-settlement. When a protective trust is established
partly by the contributions of a settlor-beneficiary and partly by the contributions of cosettlors, the only way to give effect to the relevant trust
policies is to hold the protective provisions invalid only to the extent that
the settlor-beneficiary's equitable interest in the trust is proportionate to
her contribution.
C. Reciprocal Trust Cases and the Pro Tanto Rule
If the ERISA trust cases provide the most numerous analyses of partially self-settled trusts, the cases that have most often dealt with situations involving multiple parties who are both settlors and beneficiaries
are reciprocal trust decisions. In a reciprocal trust case, two or more
settlors create trusts for one another's benefit. Courts normally see
through the outward form of such a transaction and look to its substance. Typically, each trust will be deemed self-settled.166
The Shurley court did not reach the issue of whether the reciprocal
(or mirror) trust doctrine should apply in its analysis of the Bryant
Trust.' 67 This decision was correct. By definition, reciprocal or mirror
trusts involve two or more distinct corpora, one for the trust of each
beneficiary, as opposed to a single trust corpus with several beneficiaries.
Nonetheless, the policy considerations at issue in reciprocal trust cases
may apply to other trust arrangements.
Some courts have spoken of reciprocal trusts as though they were a
form of purchased trust. In purchased trust cases, the beneficiary has
surrendered all legal and equitable rights to some property (typically a
chose in action) to the ostensible settlor, who, in return, creates the
trust.'6 "These transactions are equivalent to a purchase of trust property by the beneficiary and a subsequent transfer of it by him to the
trustee on trust for himself.' 69 In reciprocal trust cases, by contrast,
each settlor-beneficiary would have had no rights in the property that
166. Reciprocal trust cases have arisen primarily, although not exclusively, in the context
of federal taxation. See Exchange Bank & Trust Co. of Fla. v. United States, 694 F.2d 1261,
1263 (Fed. Cir. 1982); Estate of Levy v. Commissioner, 46 T.C.M. (CCH) 910, 911-12 (T.C.
1983); Jonathon M. Berge, Note, United States v. Estate of Grace: The Reincarnationof the
Reciprocal Trust Doctrine, 17 UCLA L. Rv. 436, 436-41 (1969).
167. In re Shurley, 171 B.R. 769, 786 n.16 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1994). The Shurley court
thereby declined to reach the question whether Mrs. Shurley's parents and sister were settlors.
It is unclear what the court's intention was. The court had already decided that Mr. and Mrs.
Bryant and Mrs. Watkins were settlors, id at 776, and the Trust Instrument plainly names
them as such. Trust Instrument (Appendix), Preamble.
168. See supra notes 116-21 and accompanying text.
169. 6 AMERMCAN LAW OF PROPERTY, supra note 90, § 26.124, at 579.
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funds the trust for his benefit if no trust arrangement had been established. Nonetheless, under the mirror trust doctrine, by analogy, many
courts have deemed the creation of each trust to be the "consideration"
for the creation of the other.170 Reciprocal trust cases have been one of
the most common sources for the proposition that a beneficiary who
supplies the consideration for the creation of a trust for her own benefit
is the true settlor, even if someone else has formally established the
corpus .171

This principle was critical to the Shurley court's conclusion that Mrs.
Shurley's contribution to the Bryant Trust was the "consideration" for
the contributions of her parents and her sister, including, presumably,
the testamentary additions to the corpus that Mr. and Mrs. Bryant made.
It was on this basis that the Shurley court decided that Mrs. Shurley had
simply struck a good bargain, and that her interest should be considered
totally self-settled, even though her interest was disproportionate to her
contribution. 72 One of the cases that the Shurley court cited frequently
to support this understanding of furnishing the "consideration"
for a
173
beneficial interest in a trust was Lehman v. Commissioner.
Lehman was a leading reciprocal trust case, and perhaps the earliest.
There, two brothers had created trusts for one another funded with identical securities. Each brother had the same beneficial rights. 174 The

court held that each trust was self-settled. The creation of each trust was
the consideration for the creation of the other, and each brother was
placed in the same position as though he had settled a trust with his own
property for his own benefit. 75
The language in Lehman pointed in two different directions: to an
examination of a subjective intention to bargain for a quid pro quo, and
to an examination of the objective position of the parties. 76 In many
mirror trust cases, both factors have been present. There may have been
some intention to achieve a bargained-for exchange, and the respective
corpora have been funded with equal-and usually fungible-prop170. 2A Scowr & FRATcHER, supra note 2, § 156.3, at 181-82.
171. See BOGERT & BOGERT, supra note 5, § 41, at 428-29 (relying chiefly on reciprocal
trust cases for this proposition).
172. In re Shurley, 171 B.R. 769, 785-86 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1994); see id. at 778-79.
173. 109 F.2d 99 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 310 U.S. 637 (1940); see Shurley, 171 B.R. at 778-

79.
174. Lehman, 109 F2d at 100.

175. Id. at 100-01.
176. Id.
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erty. 1 7 7 In some cases, however, there could be a difference in the results
of an objective and a subjective analysis. Following Lehman, some
courts applied the reciprocal trust doctrine if, but only if, there was evidence of a contractual intent to strike a bargain. 78 Others focused on
the extent to which the parties were placed in the same position as
though each had created her own trust, reasoning that the law attaches
consequences to the objective results of peoples' actions, not to their
private subjective motives.179
The split of authority was resolved by the Supreme Court in United
States v. Estate of Grace.'80 The Court pointed out that, in intrafamily
transactions, "consideration," in the normal contractual sense of the
fruits of a private desire to bargain for an exchange, will rarely enter into
the picture. It is far more likely that family members were motivated by
love and affection, by a desire to preserve family wealth, or by a respectful acquiescence in the wishes of a matriarch or patriarch. Moreover,
when a family trust arrangement was created many years in the past,
memories of subjective intent are apt to be fallible, and at least some of
the parties are likely to be deceased.' 8 '
The Court could have been writing with the Shurley case in mind.
Shurley was decided in 1994, although the Bryant Trust was first created
in 1965, Mr. Bryant had died in 1967, and Mrs. Bryant had died in
1971.182 Plainly, the Bryant Trust was meant to preserve and transmit
family wealth.' 83 Although the court stated that Mrs. Shurley had said
that she found the trust arrangement "a good deal," she also thought
that "we [should] do what Daddy wanted.""'
With just this sort of situation in mind, the Estate of Grace Court
concluded that the existence of "consideration" in the usual contractual
sense was largely irrelevant, even if a subjective intent to achieve a bar177. E.g., Security Trust Co. v. Sharp, 77 A.2d 543, 545-47 (Del. Ch. 1950) (spousal reciprocal trusts, each funded by 500 shares of stock in same corporation); McArthur v. Faw, 193
S.W.2d 763, 765, 768 (Tenn.) (stock voting trust arrangement described as "Siamese twins
reciprocal trusts"), cert denied, 329 U.S. 780 (1946); see Commissioner v. Dravo, 119 F.2d 97,
100 (3d Cir. 1941).
178. E.g., McLain v. Jarecki, 232 F.2d 211,212-13 (7th Cir. 1956); see Lehman, 109 F.2d at
100; Estate of Bischoff v. Commissioner, 69 T.C. 32,44 (T.C. 1977) (discussing development of
reciprocal trust doctrine).
179. E.g., Cole's Estate v. Commissioner, 140 F.2d 636, 638 (8th Cir. 1944); see Estate of
Bischoff, 69 T.C. at 44-45.
180. 395 U.S. 316 (1969).
181. Id. at 323-24 & nn.8-9.
182. See supra notes 31-36, 54-55 and accompanying text.
183. See supra notes 56-58 and accompanying text.
184. In re Shurley, 171 B.R. 769, 778 n.4 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1994).
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gained-for exchange could be shown. The Court expressly disapproved
of the language in Lehman' s5 (upon which the Shurley court appeared to
rely186) suggesting that a private motive to strike a bargain is critical in
determining whether interests in a common trust arrangement are reciprocal.187 The Court held that the reciprocal trust doctrine should apply if
two conditions are met: (1) the trust transactions must be interrelated;
and, more importantly, (2) the parties, to the extent of mutuality of contribution, must be placed in the same position as though each had created a trust for his or her own benefit."s An emphasis on the equality of
contribution and other objective considerations had to be controlling.
The Court did allow "consideration" in the normal contractual sense
to play some role, but only as one factor to consider in determining
whether reciprocal trust transactions were interrelated. 89 Even this limited scope for inquiring whether there was a bargained-for exchange has
been criticized sharply. Supposedly, determining whether the parties
privately intended a quid pro quo would help to avoid the application of
mirror trust rules to "Gift of Magi" situations, where family members
make mutual gifts unbeknownst to one another. 190 Such concern is misplaced. Cases in which family members fund trusts for one another by
happenstance, in the manner of 0. Henry's short story, are exceedingly
rare (to put it mildly), and allowing any inquiry into subjective intent
opens the door to all sorts of problems with intrafamily trusts. 191
Even before Estate of Grace was decided in 1969, courts had uniformly rejected the idea of complete mutual self-settlement in cases involving unequal contributions to a common trust arrangement. The
person who funded the smaller corpus and received a beneficial interest
in the larger one was never held to have made a "good bargain" so that
he should be considered the settlor of the entire trust created for his
benefit. Rather, he was deemed a self-settlor only to the extent of the
value of what he had given, not the total value of what he had received.
As with the ERISA employee retirement trust cases, 192 the pro tanto
185. Lehman v. Commissioner, 109 F.2d 99, 100 (2d Cir.), cert denied, 310 U.S. 637
(1940).
186. See Shurley, 171 B.R. at 777-78 (citing Lehman).
187. United States v. Estate of Grace, 395 U.S. 316, 321-23 (1969).

188. Id. at 324.
189. Id. at 324 n.10.
190. See Estate of Grace v. United States, 393 F.2d 939, 952-53 (Ct. C1. 1968) (en banc)
(Davis, J., dissenting), rev'd, 395 U.S. 316 (1969) (adopting the reasoning of Judge Davis'
dissent).
191. Berge, supra note 166, at 447-48.

192. See supra note 142 and accompanying text.
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principle very quickly achieved the status of a hornbook rule under the
reciprocal trust doctrine:
Where trusts are reciprocal in form but unequal in amounts and
the creator of the smaller trust dies, the decedent is deemed to be
the settlor of only so much of the cross trust as equals the value of
the trust which was in form created by him, and so the amount of
the corpus to be included in his estate is determined... by multiplying the value of the cross trust at his death by a fraction, the
numerator of which is the value of the property which he transferred in trust when he transferred it, and the denominator of
which is the value (as of the time he transferred it) of the property which the other settlor transferred in trust.193
For example, in Cole's Estate v. Commissioner,194 the Eighth Circuit
examined a situation in which a husband had placed 700 shares of stock
in trust for his wife, and the wife had placed 300 shares of stock in the
same corporation in trust for her husband. The court held that each trust
would be deemed self-settled only to the extent of 300 shares-i.e., to
the extent that the contributions were equal. 195
This was the only conceivable result in light of the objective reality of
the trust arrangement. Whatever its form, the substance of the transaction was that the wife had settled a 300-share corpus for her own benefit,
the husband had settled a 300-share corpus for his own benefit, and the
husband had settled a 400-share corpus for his wife's benefit. 196 If only a
single trust had been created, the result would have been no different.
The husband would have settled seventy percent of the corpus and received a thirty percent beneficial interest, while the wife would have settled thirty per cent of the corpus and received a seventy percent
beneficial interest.
Under the Shurley court's analysis, the wife simply would have struck
a good bargain, and the entire interest of each spouse should have been
deemed totally self-settled. 97 Under the superior reasoning of the
Eighth Circuit, however, only the husband's interest would be completely self-settled, while merely three-sevenths of the wife's interest
193. Annotation, Estate Tax Consequences of Reciprocal Trusts, 38 A.L.R.2d 522, § 3, at
527 (1954) (emphasis added). This is but a rather cumbersome way of saying that the interest
of a settlor-beneficiary in a common trust arrangement will be considered self-settled only to
the extent that the interest she receives is proportionate to her contribution. The same principle, of course, applies outside the estate tax context.
194. 140 F.2d 636 (8th Cir. 1944).
195. Id at 637-38.
196. See id
197. In re Shurley, 171 B.R. 769, 785-86 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1994).
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would be self-settled. 9 ' The views of the Eighth Circuit were expressly
endorsed by the Supreme Court in Estate of Grace. 99
If the pro tanto rule were universally acknowledged before Estate of
Grace, it has become part of the bedrock of reciprocal trust law since
that decision. For instance, in Krause v. Commissioner,0 ° unequal
spousal reciprocal trusts were at issue. The series of trusts funded by the
husband each consisted of fifty shares of stock and one hundred dollars.
The corpora funded by the wife each consisted of twenty-five shares in
the same corporation and one hundred dollars. Relying on Estate of
Grace, the court held that the respective trusts were self-settled only to
the extent that the contributions were equal-i.e., on a pro tanto basis.2 0 '
Conceivably, the Shurley court may have meant to say that
Mrs. Shurley's interest in the Bryant Trust was initially proportionate to
her contribution, and, being totally self-settled initially, it could not become merely partially self-settled as the result of later contributions by
her parents. 2°a The reciprocal trust cases would undermine even this position, however. First, a series or sequence of contributions to one settlor-beneficiary's interest by a cosettlor will not defeat the pro tanto rule
if the trust transactions are interrelated or part of a common scheme or
plan.2 °3 Second, a fundamental principle of the reciprocal trust doctrine
is that all contributions must have been equal if there is to be complete
mutual self-settlement, regardless of the timing of the contributions. 2 4
Third, the very premise that the initial full interests of the cosettlors
of the Bryant Trust were proportionate to their respective contributions
is fatally flawed. The daughters had remainder interests in their parents'
shares of the trust; the parents held no equitable remainder in their
daughters' shares.20 5 Each parent initially had a testamentary power of
198. See Cole's Estate, 140 F.2d at 637-38.
199. United States v. Estate of Grace, 395 U.S. 316, 324-25 (1969); see Berge, supra note
166, at 451.
200. 57 T.C. 890 (T.C. 1972), affd, 497 F.2d 1109 (6th Cir. 1974), cerL denied, 419 U.S.
1108 (1975).
201. Id. at 899-903.
202. In re Shurley, 171 B.R. 769, 783-84 & n.12 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1994); see supra notes
74-77 and accompanying text.
203. See Estate of Grace,395 U.S. at 324-25 (primary concern must be net economic effect
of trust arrangement; timing is one indication of interrelatedness, but not necessarily dispositive when considered alone); Mahoney v. United States, 831 F.2d 641, 647 (6th Cir. 1987), cert
denied, 486 U.S. 1054 (1988).

204. Cole's Estate v. Commissioner, 140 F.2d 636, 637-38 (8th Cir. 1944); Krause, 57 T.C.
at 899-903.
205. Trust Instrument (Appendix), § I(a); see supra notes 40-41, 77 and accompanying
text.
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appointment over one-third of the corpus. 2 06 Each daughter had no
power of appointment over the corpus until the parents died, and then
that power extended over one-half of the corpus. 20 7 Different rights,
powers, or interests held by different settlors-beneficiaries will defeat
any notion of total mutual self-settlement under the reciprocal trust doctrine, even when the corpora are fungible.2 °8
Reciprocal trust cases, then, like other sorts of cases, fulminate
against the position of the Shurley court. This is especially damning for
the Shurley thesis. Even if the court had found that the reciprocal trust
doctrine applied, a proper analysis would have led to the pro tanto rule.
Unlike a true purchased trust case, where Mrs. Shurley would have
"bought" her parents' property and owned it outright as a purchaser if
no trust had ever existed, the only trust property that she ever owned
was the property that she contributed to the Bryant Trust. Her creditors
could never have reached any more. Therefore, their access to trust assets after the Bryant Trust was established should have been limited
accordingly.
D. Trusts Createdfor the Benefit of One Spouse With Uniquely
Marital Property and the Pro Tanto Rule
The line of decisions apt to cause the greatest confusion with partially
self-settled trusts are cases dealing with protective trusts created for the
benefit of one spouse using uniquely marital property. One must remember clearly the policy rationale for refusing to recognize protective
terms in self-settled trusts: a settlor-beneficiary may not place property
that otherwise would have been available to creditors beyond their reach
while still keeping it available for her own needs. 20 9 Normally, property
that would be available to the creditors of the settlor-beneficiary, and
the settlor-beneficiary's own property, are one and the same. Typically,
a creditor of A may reach all of A's property interests to satisfy a claim,
unless there is some specific exemption. Typically, a creditor of A may
not reach B's property interests to satisfy a claim against A, if B is not
liable for the debt.
206. Trust Instrument (Appendix), § I(d).
207. Id § I(f).
208. See Estate of Levy v. Commissioner, 46 T.C.M. (CCH) 910, 911-14 (T.C. 1983) (different rights in trust assets held by each settlor-beneficiary defeated idea of complete mutual
self-settlement; parties were not in same position as though each had created a trust for his or
her own benefit, even though corpora were fungible).
209. See supra notes 23-25, 89-90 and accompanying text.
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These rules are reflected in trust law. A's creditors are in no way
prejudiced if B uses his property to create a protective trust for A's benefit, and the protective provisions will be upheld. 210 A's creditors are
prejudiced if A uses his property to create a protective trust for his own
benefit, and the protective provisions will fail.211 If A and B together
create a trust for A's benefit, the effect is the same as though two trusts
had been created, and the protective provisions are void pro tanto.
The fundamental principle that A's creditors may reach all of A's
property, and only A's property, to satisfy their claims against A, however, does not apply in the case of some forms of uniquely marital property. Although each spouse may own only an undivided interest,
separate creditors of one spouse may be able to reach more or less than
the debtor spouse's interest, depending on the type of marital property
involved. This change in the normal rules of what creditors may reach is
reflected in protective trust law.
One case that may have misled the Shurley court was Glass v. Carpenter,212 which the Shurley court cited frequently.213 In Glass, a husband and wife had established a series of spendthrift trusts for one
another's benefit. Each was the equitable remainderman of the trusts
created for the lifetime benefit of the other. After the husband's death,
the wife became the only beneficiary of all the trusts. Shortly before her
own death, the widow purported to assign her interest to a third party.
The issue was whether this assignment was valid in light of the anti-alienation terms in the trust instrument. 4 Treating all the trusts as though
the wife had been the only settlor, the court held that the anti-alienation
provisions were completely void.215
This appears odd in light of the fact that the trusts were only partially
self-settled. According to the Glass opinion, the corpora of all the trusts
consisted of community property. 1 6 Under Texas law, each spouse indi210. See supra notes 21-22, 84 and accompanying text.
211. See supra notes 23-25 and accompanying text.

212. 330 S.W.2d 530 (Tex. Civ. App. 1959).
213. In re Shurley, 171 B.R 769, 780-82 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1994).

214. Glass, 330 S.W.2d at 531-33.
215. Id. at 534-35. Although technically distinct from the rights of creditors, the question
of whether a beneficiary may transfer her interest in a self-settled protective trust is very
closely related to the validity of the protective terms as against creditors. Generally, if a beneficiary may transfer her interest in a protective trust, creditors may reach it, and conversely.
See GRIswoLD, supra note 71, § 493, at 571.

216. Glass, 330 S.W.2d at 535 ("The entire transaction can have no other effect than that
[the husband] and his wife have attempted to place their community property... in trust for
the benefit of themselves ... and at the same time have their interest therein freed from
liability for debts and claims of creditors." (emphasis added)).
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vidually owns only an undivided one-half interest in community property. Any unilateral attempt by one spouse to place community property
in a spendthrift trust, such as the ones at issue in Glass, could result at
most in transferring that spouse's one-half interest to the trust; in fact,
such a unilateral effort might fail to create any trust at all. 17 The husband and wife in Glass, then, were cosettlors; nonetheless, the court
treated the arrangement as though the wife had been the only settlor2 18
The Glass court, however, did not expound any general rule that a
settlor-beneficiary who contributes anything at all to a trust has ipso
facto self-settled her entire interest.219 Had the opinion done so, it
would have been among the most freakish decisions in the nation. If
Glass was correctly decided, it is the nature of community property that
provides the key.
Under Texas law, the separate creditors of one spouse are not limited
to the debtor spouse's undivided one-half interest in community property. They need not sell community property and then account to the
nondebtor spouse for the value of his or her interest. Rather, separate
creditors generally may satisfy their claims against the whole community
estate, even though only half of it "belongs" to the debtor spouse.220
Thus, in Glass, all of the properfy that had originally funded the corpora would have been within the reach of the wife's separate creditors.
Placing that property in trust could not alter this characterization, even if
the trustee had sold or exchanged the original assets." 1 The Glass court
did not attempt to characterize the trust assets as community property at
the time at issue in that case, long after the husband's demise. Rather, it
looked to what had been placed beyond the reach of the creditors of the
217. See Land v. Marshall, 426 S.W.2d 841, 846-49 (Tex. 1968).
218. Glass 330 S.W.2d at 534-35.
219. See id.
220. TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 5.01-.02, 5.61-.62 (West 1993); see In re Texas Extrusion
Corp., 68 B.R. 712, 722 (N.D. Tex. 1986) (under Texas law, community property in debtor's
bankruptcy estate was properly used to discharge separate tax liability of nondebtor spouse),
affd, 836 F.2d 217 (5th Cir.), cert denied, 488 U.S. 926 (1988); Seaman v. Seaman, 756 S.W.2d
56, 59 (Tex. Ct. App. 1988) (all community property under sole or joint management of debtor
spouse is subject to separate liabilities of debtor spouse as well as to community debts); Lawrence v. Hardy, 583 S.W.2d 795, 799 (Tex. Civ. App. 1978) (all community property whatsoever is within reach of tort creditors of debtor spouse, even though nondebtor spouse is not
personally liable for the tort).
221. See Glass, 330 S.W.2d at 535. If the wife's creditors had sought to attack the protective trusts while her husband was alive, they could have reached her remainder interest in the
trusts of which her husband was the life tenant, and her lifetime interest in the trusts of which
she was the life tenant. See also King v. Fay, 169 F. Supp. 934, 938-40 (D. D.C. 1958).
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beneficiary spouse-the wife-when the trusts were settled.2" In view
of the rules governing community property, the court held that the
spendthrift provisions were nullities. 2 3
The justice of this analysis is confirmed by examining protective
trusts for the benefit of one spouse funded with another form of
uniquely marital property: property held in tenancy by the entirety.
Tenancy by the entirety is recognized in approximately half the states.
Each spouse is a co-owner with a right of survivorship. Husband and
wife, however, are treated as a single entity. Generally, neither one may
transfer, pledge, assign, or encumber his or her interest. The result is
that, in many states that recognize tenancy by the entirety, property so
held is completely beyond the grasp of the separate creditors of either
spouse. In these states, separate creditors may not even reach the debtor
spouse's interest, let alone the whole of the property held by the entirety. 2 4 In this respect, property held by the entirety may be just the
opposite of community property.
Not surprisingly, this has important consequences in trust law. When
a protective trust for the benefit of one spouse has been created using
property held by the entirety to fund the corpus, and if state law would
not allow a separate creditor to reach such property at all, then the protective trust terms inevitably have been upheld completely against the
separate creditors of the beneficiary spouse, even though the trust is necessarily partially self-settled.
For example, in Bolton Roofing Co. v. Hedrick,'-5 a husband and
wife conveyed property held by the entirety to a spendthrift trust, naming themselves and their sons as beneficiaries. Some six years later, a
creditor obtained a judgment against the husband alone. The creditor,
relying on a Missouri statute that codifies the common law rule against
protective provisions in self-settled trusts, sought to levy on trust assets.
Although the trust was self-settled to the extent of the husband's interest
in the property originally used to fund the corpus, the court rejected the
creditor's claim altogether:
This statutory section [i.e., R.S. Mo. § 456.080.3] referring to
spendthrift trusts provides that "[i]f the settlor is also a beneficiary of the trust, a provision restraining the voluntary or involun222. Glass, 330 S.W.2d at 535.
223. Id.
224. See Sawada v. Endo, 561 P.2d 1291, 1294-97 (Haw. 1977) (giving a thorough and
scholarly discussion of the law of tenancy by the entirety in all American jurisdictions that

recognize this form of marital ownership).
225. 701 S.W.2d 183 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985).
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tary transfer of his beneficial interest will not prevent his creditors
from satisfying claims from his interest in the trust estate." In the
context of the statute, "settlor" means one who furnishes the consideration for the creation of a trust ....Bolton's [i.e., the creditor's] claim would be valid if the judgment it relies on were
against Wayne and Alta, jointly and severally, but it is not. The
judgment is against Wayne, as an individual. Bolton would not
have had any legal right to levy against the real estate owned
jointly by Wayne and Alta [as tenants by the entirety] prior to the
time they conveyed it under the trust agreement ....It stands to
reason, therefore, that Bolton could not have the same real estate, after it had been conveyed to the trustee by Wayne and Alta,
as tenants by the entireties, sold to satisfy an individual debt of
Wayne's. The spendthrift provision in the trust did not do what
§ 456.080.3 forbids, as Wayne did notput his individualproperty in
trust to keep it from being used to satisfy the demands of his creditors. The spendthrift clause used here in the trust agreement offends neither statute nor public policy, because it does not deprive
Bolton of any rights it had before the conveyance in question was
made.226

The same result was reached applying Hawaiian law in Security Pacific Bank Washington v. Chang.227 There, a husband and wife had created two spendthrift trusts for one another's benefit, using property held
by the entirety to fund the corpora. A separate creditor of the husband's
sought to reach the husband's interest in his trust on the grounds that it
was self-settled, which indeed it was to the extent of his interest in the
marital property that had provided the res. The creditor also alleged
that the reciprocal trust doctrine applied because the creation of the
wife's trust was the "consideration" for the creation of the husband's
trust.2 28 The court was not persuaded. The fact remained that, if no
trust arrangement had been established, the husband's creditors could
not have reached his interest in property held by the entirety, much less
226. Id.at 184-85 (citations omitted; emphasis added). The rationale for the court's decision in no way depended on the fact that the original property was still in the corpus. The
trustee could have sold or exchanged it without affecting the basic reasoning that the court
used. The dispositive factor was that what the settlor-beneficiary had owned before the trust

was created was not within the reach of his separate creditors, and there was no principled
reason why they should be able to seize what he had acquired-i., an interest in the trust. Of
course, property held by the entirety would have been within the reach of the joint creditors of
both spouses. Accordingly, the spendthrift provision would have failed as to such creditors,
even if the original res were no longer in corpus.
227. 818 F. Supp. 1343 (D. Haw. 1993).
228. Il at 1344-45.
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his wife's interest. The spendthrift clause did not deprive his separate
creditors of anything that was available to them at the time the trust was
created. To have invalidated the restraint on alienation would have been
to give the creditor a windfall. Accordingly, the court upheld the spendthrift clause. 229
Likewise, in Watterson v. Edgerly,.3 Maryland law dictated a similar
outcome. A husband and wife had conveyed property held by the entirety to the wife alone as her separate property. The wife then promptly
executed a will directing that the property be used to establish a testamentary spendthrift trust for her husband. Within two months, the wife
died. The husband's creditors then attempted to reach trust assets,
claiming that the trust was self-settled. The court disagreed. At the inception of the transaction, the property held by the entirety would not
have been available to the husband's separate creditors, and they were in
no way prejudiced by the creation of a protective trust 31
As in Glass v. Carpenter,-32 the holding in Watterson was in no way
affected by the fact that the nonbeneficiary spouse had died before the
validity of the protective terms was called into question. Neither court
tried to say that the survivor held some sort of present marital property.
Rather, both courts looked to what had been used to fund the res originally. To the extent that the original joint contribution of the spouses
had been within the reach of the separate creditors of the surviving beneficiary spouse-and to that extent alone-the living beneficiary's interest remained within their reach, and the protective provisions were held
either valid or invalid to that extent. 33
Only a Byzantine logothete could argue seriously that the tenancy by
the entirety spousal trust cases stand for any general proposition that the
settlor-beneficiary of a protective trust may save the protective terms
completely, and thereby shield her own property, through the simple expedient of having a cosettlor contribute something to the trust. Conversely, only a Byzantine logothete could argue seriously that Glass v.
Carpenterstands for a general proposition that any beneficiary who contributes anything at all to a protective trust has thereby undermined the
protective provisions in toto. If the Shurley court did read Glass as supporting this position, it was very much mistaken."- 4 Everything depends
229.
230.
231.
232.
233.
234.

Id. at 1345-46.
388 A.2d 934 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1978).
1& at 939.
330 S.W.2d 530 (Tex. Civ. App. 1959).
Compare Watterson, 388 A.2d at 939 with Glass, 330 S.W.2d at 535.
See In re Shurley, 171 B.R 769, 780-82 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1994) (citing Glass).
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upon what creditors of the settlor-beneficiary could have reached when
she transferred property to the trust. This is but a variation on the pro
tanto rule.
In Shurley, no marital property with its unique attributes appears to
have been at issue.235 There is no indication that Mrs. Shurley's property
would have been beyond the reach of her creditors when she transferred
it to the Bryant Trust in 1965. Conversely, there is no indication that the
property of her sister or parents would have been within the reach of her
creditors at that time.3 6 Still less is there any indication that the property that her parents settled on the trust through their wills would have
been available to Mrs. Shurley's creditors.237 Everything would seem to
have called for the application of the pro tanto rule in its universally
recognized form.
The Shurley court, however, suggested that, if the Bryant Trust had
never been created, Mr. and Mrs. Bryant "probably" would have left
half their assets to Mrs. Shurley, and hence those assets should now be
available to her creditors.238 This sort of reasoning borders on self-parody. 39 "Such a calculus of probabilities is beyond the science of the
chancery. ' 24 0 It is irrelevant what testamentary dispositions the parents
would have made had the trust never been created.241 If one must speculate, they "probably" would have left their assets in a protective trust
for their daughters so that family wealth could be transmitted to future
generations. Indeed, that is precisely what they did.
Yet another line of spousal trust cases confirms the pro tanto rule.
Decades ago, some courts held that when one spouse devised or bequeathed his or her property in trust for the benefit of the surviving
spouse, and when the survivor gave up dower, curtesy, or the "widow's
election" in order to accept the status of a testamentary trust beneficiary,
then the survivor would be considered as a settlor. The rationale was
See iL at 776, 783-84 & n.12, 786.
See id.at 776, 783-84 & n.12; Trust Instrument (Appendix), § I.
Shurley, 171 B.R. at 783-84 & n.12, 786.
Id. at 783-84 & n.12.
239. Hear, P.D.Q. BACH, [Le, Peter Schickele], Oedipus Tex, on P.D.Q. BACH: OEDIPUS
TEx AND OTHER CHORAL CALAMrrIEs (TELARC 1990) ("If you hadn't have killed him, he
probably would have died of something else eventually anyway.").
240. Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545, 547 (N.Y. 1928) (per Cardozo, C.J.).
241. State v. Nashville Trust Co., 190 S.W.2d 785, 789 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1944) (spendthrift
term in trust for son's benefit upheld to extent of father's contribution, even though father had
originally intended to devise trust property to son); cf.Watterson v. Edgerly, 388 A.2d 934,
939 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1978) (spendthrift trust upheld against widower's separate creditors
where initial corpus consisted of property held by the entirety; had no trust transaction occurred, property would have passed to widower outright by right of survivorship).
235.
236.
237.
238.
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that, by giving up her (or his) right to take against the will, the survivor
had given "consideration" for the creation of the trust.24 Modem jurisprudence has rejected this view:
Where a trust is created by the will of one spouse in favor of the
other, the surviving spouse does not become the settlor of the
trust merely because she or he waives a right to insist on dower or
curtesy or a statutory distributive share of the estate of the deceased spouse. 243
Even these older cases uniformly held, however, that the spousal testamentary trust was self-settled by the survivor only to the extent of the
value of the rights surrendered. Protective trust terms would have been
void only pro tanto. To the extent that the survivor's interest in the trust
exceeded her "contribution," protective provisions would have been
valid.244
As with all other lines of authority, an examination of the spousal
trust cases leads to the inexorable conclusion that the Shurley court had
no understanding of the relevant principles and policies. While the court
may have been right to reject the contention that protective provisions
are totally valid when a beneficiary has bestowed some assets on the
corpus,245 the court embraced the position that partial self-settlement is
equivalent to total self-settlement, 24 a view that has no foundation
whatsoever in reason, authority, or public policy.
E. Fraudulent Transfer Policy and the Pro Tanto Rule
The very rationale for refusing to recognize protective provisions in
self-settled trusts is that no one may insulate his own property from being used to satisfy his debts while he simultaneously keeps that property
242. See Charles L. B. Lowndes, Considerationand the FederalEstate and Gift Taxes:
Transfers for PartialConsideration, Relinquishment of Marital Rights, Family Annuities, the
Widow's Election, and Reciprocal Trusts, 35 GEO. WASH. L. Rlv. 50, 66-76 (1966).
243. RE TATEmENT (SECOND) oF TRusTs § 156 cmt. f (1959); accordIn re Boon, 108 B.R.

697, 707-08 (W.D. Mo. 1989) (noting that a beneficiary may always disclaim her interest in a
protective trust; if failure to disclaim were equivalent to self-settlement, every trust could not
be anything but self-settled).
244. E.g., United States v. Bolster, 26 F.2d 760,761 (1st Cir. 1928) ("purchase" of interest
in testamentary trust created by husband's will through surrender of dower rights was
equivalent to self-settlement only to the extent that widow's interest in trust was proportionate to value of dower); National Bank of Commerce of Portland v. Clauson, 127 F. Supp. 386,
391-92 (D. Me.) (widow held to be settlor as to only one-third of her interest in husband's
testamentary trust; dower rights attached to only one-third of trust res), affd, 226 F.2d 446 (1st
Cir. 1955).
245. In re Shurley, 171 B.R. 769, 778-82 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1994).

246. Id at 784-86.
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available for himself.24 7 A self-settled protective trust is per se a constructive fraud on creditors, present and prospective, as many courts
have recognized. 4 8 Not surprisingly, the policy reasons for avoiding
protective terms in self-settled trusts are closely akin to the reasons for
considering fraudulent transfers void as to creditors. Indeed, the remedy
is much the same: avoiding the transfer. There is absolutely no offense
to public policy in simply establishing a trust for one's own benefit, provided that the settlor-beneficiary does not purport to shield his interest
in trust assets from his creditors. Hence, in the case of a self-settled
protective trust, the protective terms are stripped away by a kind of cy
pres reformation, and creditors are allowed to reach whatever the
trustee could distribute to the settlor-beneficiary, but the trust as such is
not destroyed.24 9
The Shurley court purported to determine that there are enormous
differences between what creditors may reach under a fraudulent transfer and under a self-settlement theory. 5 0 Indeed the two doctrines are
not quite identical. There is no need to show that a settlor-beneficiary
had any intention of hindering, delaying, or defrauding his creditors at
the time that the trust was established.?1 Moreover, the creditors who
may attack a self-settled protective trust are never limited to those
whose claims existed at the time the trust was created.5 2 A creditor
whose claim arose years after the establishment of a self-settled trust
may still seek to avoid any protective terms, even though the initial
transfer to the trustee could not possibly have been fraudulent as to that
creditor.5 3 These considerations, though, actually highlight the close relationship between the two doctrines. A self-settled protective trust is
247. Pacific Nat'l Bank v. Windram, 133 Mass. 175, 176-77 (Mass. 1882); accord,e.g., In re
Loe, 83 B.R. 641, 645 n.6 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1988); Glass v. Carpenter, 330 S.W.2d 530,533-34
(Tex. Civ. App. 1959).
248. BOGERT & BOGERT, supra note 5, § 223, at 449 ("Generally there will be actual
fraud, but it may be difficult to prove, and so the law strikes down the transaction as presumed
to be fraudulent."); see, ag., State Cent. Collection Unit v. Brent, 525 A.2d 241,244 (Md. Ct.
Spec. App. 1987), affd, 537 A.2d 227 (Md. 1988); In re Mogridge's Estate, 20 A.2d 307, 309
(Pa. 1941); State v. Nashville Mrust Co., 190 S.W.2d 785, 790-91 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1944).
249. In re Goff, 812 F.2d 931, 933 (5th Cir. 1987); Fewell v. Republic Nat'l Bank of Dallas,
513 S.W.2d 596, 598 (Tex. Civ. App. 1974); see BOGERT & BOGERT, supra note 5, § 223, at
450-51.
250. In re Shurley, 171 B.R. 769, 782 n.10, 783-84 & n.12, 786 n.15 (Bankr. W.D. Tex.

1994).
251. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TRUSTS § 156 cmt. a (1959).
252. GRISWOLD, supra note 71, § 472, at 538-39.
253. E.g., Bolton Roofing Co. v. Hedrick, 701 S.W.2d 183, 184 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985) (creditor's claim arose roughly six years after trust was established); BOGERT & BOGERT, supra note

5, § 223, at 448-49.
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inherently constructively fraudulent as to both the present and the prospective creditors of the settlor-beneficiary. 2s4
In fraudulent transfer law, it is clear that creditors are not permitted
to reach all the property of the transferee. They are not entitled to a
windfall, but only to be placed in as good a position as though no tainted
transaction had occurred. 255 Precisely the same rule holds true with respect to self-settled trusts. In upholding protective trust provisions, in
whole or in part, courts have often spoken of refusing to give creditors a
windfall. If the beneficiary's creditors could not have reached trust assets before the protective trust was created, they should not be able to
reach trust assets afterwards, even if the original res has long disappeared. 56 Precisely this analogue to fraudulent transfer theory lies at
the heart of the pro tanto rule. To the extent that trust assets came from
someone other than the settlor-beneficiary, to the extent that those assets would have been beyond the reach of creditors if there had been no
trust, and to the extent that the settlor-beneficiary's contributions are
smaller than her interest, then, pro tanto, protective provisions will be
upheld.2 7
One variation on the "no windfall" rule in fraudulent transfer cases is
that, to the extent that the property transferred was encumbered by perfected senior liens at the time of the transfer, the transaction could not
possibly have been fraudulent as to junior creditors. Up to the value of
the encumbrance, the property would have been beyond their reach in
any event.5 8 The same principle applies, mutatis mutandis, in the law of
trusts. Whoever discharges liens on trust property is to that extent a

254. See supra note 248 and accompanying text.
255. E.g., Johnson v. Fotie, 308 S.W.2d 662, 668 (Mo. 1958); Owen v. Vibrosearch Exploration, Inc., 694 S.W.2d 421, 425 (Tex. Ct. App. 1985).
256. Security Pac. Bank Wash. v. Chang, 818 F. Supp. 1343, 1344-45 (D. Haw. 1993); In re
Johannes Trust, 479 N.W.2d 25,29 (Mich. Ct. App. 1991); Bolton Roofing, 701 S.W.2d at 184-

85.
257. Johannes Trust, 479 N.W.2d at 29; State v. Nashville Trust Co., 190 S.W.2d 785, 78788, 790-91 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1944); accord In re Kincaid, 96 B.R. 1014, 1019 (Bankr. 9th Cir.
1989), rev'd in part on other grounds, 917 F.2d 1162 (9th Cir. 1990); In re Tisdale, 112 B.R. 61,
65-66 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1990); In re Conroy, 110 B.R. 492,499-500 (Bankr. D. Mont. 1990); In

re Cates, 73 B.R. 874, 877 (Bankr. D. Or. 1987); see Cole's Estate v. Commissioner, 140 F.2d
636, 637-38 (8th Cir. 1944); Krause v. Commissioner, 57 T.C. 890, 899-903 (T.C. 1972), affd,
497 F.2d 1109 (6th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1108 (1975); see also United States v.
Bolster, 26 F.2d 760,761 (lst Cir. 1928); National Bank of Commerce v. Clauson, 127 F. Supp.
386, 391-92 (D. Me.), affd, 226 F.2d 446 (1st Cir. 1955).

258. Richman v. Leiser, 465 N.E.2d 796, 798-99 (Mass. App. Ct. 1984); see Owen, 694
S.W.2d at 425.
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settlor. 259 If someone other than a settlor-beneficiary discharges the
liens, the trust is not self-settled as to that amount.
One issue in the Shurley case involved senior liens that apparently
had encumbered some of the property that Mrs. Shurley transferred to
the Bryant Trust in 1965. It is not clear whether or when the liens were
discharged. The court scoffed at the idea that the question had the remotest relevance.2 60 Actually, however, the issue was of some importance. If Mrs. Shurley had paid down those liens after her property was
conveyed to the trustee, she would have settled the total value of the
property on the trust, although the settlement would have occurred incrementally. If her parents or sister-who were also beneficiaries-had
paid down the encumbrances, then they would have been the settlors pro
1
26

tanto.

If the Bryant Trust itself had discharged the liens, then the trust itself
would have been the "settlor," or, more accurately, the vendee, to that
extent. The Shurley court was all but contemptuous of the suggestion
that the Bryant Trust might have "bought" a portion of Mrs. Shurley's
property; Mrs. Shurley apparently did not think of the transfer as a
sale.262 Mrs. Shurley's private view of the matter is neither here nor
there. Relief from debt is income.263 When a settlor bestows property
on a trust, and when the trust undertakes to pay down liens encumbering
the property, the settlor may have income as a vendor.2 4 The transaction may be treated as a gift or settlement of trust assets in part, and as a
sale in part. The settlor is, therefore, also a vendor, quite irrespective of
her subjective intent.265
None of this is to say that the Shurley court was necessarily wrong in
rejecting the contention that Mrs. Shurley was not a settlor at all, or in
denying that the protective terms were valid as to her entire interest in
the trust.2 66 Any determination of the extent to which the spendthrift
and support terms should have been avoided, however, would necessarily have involved ascertaining what portion of the corpus was attributable to Mrs. Shurley's contributions. This would have required not only
259. See RESTATEmENT (SEcoND) OF TRUSTS § 156 cmt. f (1959).
260. In re Shurley, 171 B.R. 769, 778 & nn. 4-5 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1994).
261. RESTATE ENT (SEcoND) OF TRusTS § 156 cmt. f (1959).
262. Shurley, 171 B.R. at 778 & nn. 4-5.
263. United States v. Kirby Lumber Co., 284 U.S. 1, 3 (1931) (per Holmes, J.).
264. Malone v. United States, 326 F. Supp. 106, 112 (N.D. Miss. 1971), affd, 455 F.2d 502
(5th Cir. 1972).
265. ld. at 113-14.
266. Shurley, 171 B.R. at 778-82.
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establishing the values of the contributions of her sister and her parents
(and her parents' contributions occurred in seriatim), but also investigating whether, when, and how liens were discharged. This would not necessarily have been easy, as the Shurley court rightly noted.267 Courts,
however, have not been daunted by more formidable tracing
problems.268
At bottom, it appears that the Shurley court rejected the pro tanto
rule and the most fundamental policies of trust law because it was incapable of conceiving that a beneficiary could have such a thing as a partially self-settled interest in a trust. In the court's view, a trust either
must be settled by someone other than the beneficiary (in which case
protective provisions are totally valid), or by the beneficiary herself (in
which case protective provisions are totally void). As the Shurley court
viewed the issue, there could be no middle ground. 2 69 One can only
echo the sentiments that Montesquieu expressed: "The critic is only ache does not know the
quainted with positive and absolute qualities;
'270
meaning of the terms 'more' or 'less'.
IV.

BENEFICIARY CONTROL AND THE INVALIDITY OF PROTECTIVE

TRUST TERMS

A.

The Meaning of Beneficiary Control

In addition to self-settlement, the Shurley court found that Mrs.
Shurley had "controlled" the assets of the Bryant Trust, and hence the
court concluded that trust property should be within the reach of her
creditors. 71 The court, however, never articulated the policy reason for
the rule that beneficiary control will undermine a protective trust term.
The rationale is simply that, if the beneficiary has the legal right to receive trust assets by some purely unilateral action, then her interest is
indistinguishable from outright ownership. Creditors have a right to de267. Id.at 783-84 & n.12; see id.at 785-86; see also supra notes 78-79 and accompanying
text.
268. See, e.g., In re Summit Airlines, Inc., 94 B.R. 367, 371-72 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1988),
affd, 102 B.R. 32 (E.D. Pa. 1989); Hicks v. Clayton, 136 Cal. Rptr. 512, 520-21 (Cal. Ct. App.
1977); In re Erie Trust Co. of Erie, 191 A. 613, 616-18 (Pa. 1937).
269. Shurley, 171 B.R. at 784-86; see supra notes 68-71 and accompanying text.
270. "Le critique ne connait que les qualit6s positives et absolues; ilne sait ce que c'est
que ces termes plus ou moins." Charles Louis de Secondat, Baron de Montesquieu, Dgfense
de l'Esprit des lois (original 1750), reprinted in 2 OEuvRns COMPLTES DE MONTESQtrMU
1121, 1152 (Roger Caillois ed. 1951).
271. Shurley, 171 B.R at 782-83.
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mand whatever the beneficiary could call upon in her sole and unquali2 72
fied discretion.
The Shurley court did not define beneficiary "control" in the relevant
sense.273 The standard for determining whether the beneficiary exercises
such control follows inexorably from the policy rationale: "If the beneficiary is entitled to have the principal conveyed to him immediately, a restraint on the voluntary or involuntary transfer of his interest in the
principal is invalid." 274 At least three requirements are explicit or implicit in this standard. First, access to trust assets for the beneficiary's
own use must be involved. Second, the beneficiary must have a present
enforceable right to demand the distribution. Third, the right must be
unilateral and unqualified.
As to the initial requirement, whenever beneficiary dominion and
control has been found, the beneficiary has had a right to compel the
distribution of trust assets to herself.275 When a beneficiary may order
distributions only to other parties, she does not have dominion over trust
assets in the requisite sense.2 76 If a beneficiary's right to order the distribution of trust assets is limited by the trust instrument to compelling
disbursements for the benefit of others, the settlor, rather than the beneficiary, is regarded as controlling the ultimate disposition.277 This is only
logical. If the beneficiary may transfer trust property to others but not
to herself, creditors may have no better rights. In effect, the beneficiary
is acting more as a trustee than as a beneficiary, and the purely legal
rights of a trustee are normally beyond the reach of the trustee's personal creditors.278
272. See, e.g., In re Peterson, 88 B.R. 5,7-8 (Bankr. D. Me. 1988); In re Rolfe, 34 B.R. 159,
161-62 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1983); Highlands State Bank v. Gonzales, 340 S.W.2d 828, 829-30
(Tex. Civ. App. 1960) (creditor was allowed access to those funds in employee retirement
account that employee could withdraw as he chose despite spendthrift provision).
273. See Shurley, 171 B.R. at 782-83.
274. RESTATEMENT (SECOND)OF TRUSTS § 153(2) (1959) (emphasis added).
275. In re Gillett, 46 B.R. 642, 644 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1985) (debtor-beneficiary's right to
have trustee convey trust property to himself at any time caused spendthrift provision to fail);
accord, e.g., Employee Benefits Committee v. Tabor, 127 B.R. 194, 199-200 (S.D. Ind. 1991)
(debtor-beneficiary's ability to withdraw funds for his own needs vitiated anti-alienation term
in retirement trust instrument), appeal dismissed & judgment vacated on other grounds, 972
F.2d 351 (7th Cir. 1992); In re Williams, 118 B.R. 812, 815 (Bankr. N.D. Fla. 1990); In re
Boykin, 118 B.R. 716, 719 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1990) (debtor's absolute right to receive retirement trust funds upon terminating employment rendered spendthrift term ineffective).
276. Pachter, Gold & Schaffer v. Yantis, 742 F. Supp. 544, 547 (W.D. Ark. 1990); see
Prescott v. Wordell, 65 N.E.2d 19, 19-20 (Mass. 1946); RESTATEMENT (SECOND)OF PROPERTY
§ 13.1 cmt. a (1986).
277. Jordan v. Caswell, 450 S.E.2d 818, 820 (Ga. 1994).
278. See Drummond v. Cowles, 278 F. Supp. 546, 551-52 (D. Conn. 1968).
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Second, the beneficiary must have an enforceable right to compel
distributions. What the beneficiary may have the right to request a
trustee to do is simply irrelevant. Indeed, the trustee's ultimate power to
make the final decision is a negation of beneficiary control. 279 Furthermore, what the beneficiary (or the trustee) may have purported to do is
beside the point. The question is whether the trust instrument gives the
beneficiary a right enforceable against the trustee to demand trust assets
for her own purposes. 280 The beneficiary's right must exist in
praesenti.2- 81
Third, the beneficiary's rights must be unilateral and unqualified. If
the concurrence or consent of other parties is required, the beneficiary
does not "control" the trust.28 Moreover, a beneficiary (or a trustee
subservient to a beneficiary) must be free to have distributions made
without breaching any duty, and without any need to account to anyone.
If the beneficiary or the trustee or both owe duties to third partiesespecially to other beneficiaries-concerning the distribution of trust assets, then there is no unqualified beneficiary control.8 3 The Shurley
court appeared to believe that, if a beneficiary plays any role at all in
determining how trust property will be distributed or trust assets administered, then the beneficiary "controls" the trust, and protective provisions will be defeated. 28" This is not the law in any jurisdiction.
It is well settled, for example, that one of several beneficiaries of a
trust, or even the sole beneficiary, may be one of several trustees.8 In
such a case, the beneficiary does not possess any right to force distribu87
tions to herself in her sole discretion. 286 For example, in In re Knight,1
279. In re Boon, 108 B.R. 697, 709 (W.D. Mo. 1989); In re Wallace, 66 B.R. 834, 841
(Bankr. E.D. Mo. 1986).
280. In re Hannegan, 155 B.R. 209,214 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. 1993) ("The issue is not whether
the trust beneficiary has tried to exercise dominion and control over the trust proceeds but,
rather, whether under the terms of the trust instrument he has the power to exercise dominion
or control over the trust."); see In re Baldwin, 142 B.R. 210, 214-15 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1992).
281. See, e.g., State Cent. Collection Unit v. Brendt, 525 A.2d 241, 244 (Md. Ct. Spec.
App. 1987), affd, 537 A.2d 227 (Md. 1988); Boston Safe Deposit & Trust Co. v. Paris, 447
N.E.2d 1268, 1270 (Mass. App. Ct. 1983).
282. In re Knight, 164 B.R. 372,376 & n.2 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1994); In re Hersloff, 147 B.R.
262, 265 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1992).
283. In re Kreiss, 72 B.R. 933, 938, 941-42 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1987) (where one beneficiary
became sole trustee, beneficiary did not "control" trust, and protective provisions were valid;
beneficiary-trustee had to account to other beneficiaries for trust administration).
284. See In re Shurley, 171 B.R. 769, 783 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1994).
285. RFSTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRusTs §§ 99(1), 99(3), 115(1), 115(2) (1959); 2 Scorr
& FRATcHER, supra note 2, § 99.1, at 49-53, § 99.4, at 65-66.
286. See Hill v. Conover, 12 Cal. Rptr. 522, 527-28 (Cal. Ct. App. 1961); In re Bower's
Will, 153 N.Y.S.2d 1009, 1012 (N.Y. Sur. Ct. 1956).
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a debtor-beneficiary was also one of several trustees of a support trust.
He certainly had a say in whether he would receive trust assets, but trust
property could not be distributed to him unless he and his cotrustees, in
the exercise of their sound discretion, agreed that this would be proper.
The court held that the protective provision was valid, and the beneficiary's interest in trust distributions was shielded from his general
creditors. 28
Similarly, all trust beneficiaries (or a group of them) may constitute
the board of trustees. 289 In such a situation, no one beneficiary-trustee
has the sole right to make an arbitrary and final decision concerning his
own equitable interest in the trust or the interest of any other beneficiary. Thus, no individual beneficiary-trustee "controls" the trust in the
relevant sense.290 When all the beneficiaries of a protective trust (or several of them) serve as the trustees, protective provisions are still valid.29 1
Indeed, one of several beneficiaries may serve as the sole trustee,
provided that she is not the only beneficiary. 2 In such a case, the interest of the beneficiary-trustee in trust assets is not equivalent to outright
ownership.2 93 Acting as the trustee, the beneficiary owes fiduciary duties to the other beneficiaries, and she may be called to account if she
favors herself unduly. Likewise, if one of several beneficiaries dominates the trustee, the trustee may be called to account. In no event does
the dominant beneficiary, or the beneficiary who serves as the sole
trustee, have an absolute and unfettered right to use trust assets for her
own purposes.2 94
In particular, the sole equitable life tenant of a trust may be the sole
trustee, provided that there are remainder beneficiaries who hold an interest in the trust. 295 For example, the only life tenant of a spendthrift
and support trust may be the only trustee, even if she also holds some of
287. 164 B.R. 372 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1994).
288. Id at 376 & n.2; accord In re Hersloff, 147 B.R. 262, 265 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1992).
289. RESTATEmENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS §§ 99(4), 115(4) (1959); see Morse v. Paulson,
186 P.2d 394, 396 (Or. 1947).
290. Blades v. Norfolk S. Ry. Co., 29 S.E.2d 148, 152-53 (N.C. 1944); 2 Scorr &
FRATCHER, supra note 2, § 99.5, at 66-73.
291. Waterbury v. Munn, 32 So. 2d 603, 606 (Fla. 1947) (en banc).
292. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS §§ 99(2), 115(3) (1959); 2 Scotrr & FRATCHER,
supra note 2, § 99.3, at 53-65.
293. Gilmer v. Gilmer, 17 So. 2d 529, 532 (Ala. 1944); Savings Inv. & Trust Co. v. Little,
39 A.2d 392, 394 (N.J. 1944); Tourigian v. Tourigian, 101 A.2d 611, 616 (NJ. Super. Ct. Ch.
Div. 1953).
294. In re Fox's Estate, 107 A. 863, 863-64 (Pa. 1919).
295. In re Baum, 22 F.3d 1014, 1019 (10th Cir. 1994); see In re Estate of Brenner, 547 P.2d
938, 942 (Colo. Ct. App. 1976).
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the remainder interests, provided that there is at least one remainder
interest that she does not hold. If that life tenant, acting as trustee,
makes unwarranted distributions to herself, or if the life tenant dominates the ostensible trustee and compels him to make unwarranted distributions to her, then there has been a breach of duty to the
remainderman that a court may redress.296 The life tenant has no untrammeled right to do with trust assets as she pleases; her interest is not
the same as ownership. She does not "control" the trust, and protective
provisions remain valid. 7
If the life tenant who serves as the trustee, or who dominates the
ostensible trustee, is the donee of a special power of appointment over
the corpus, she still does not "control" the trust in the sense necessary to
undermine any protective provisions. The objects of the power and the
takers in default are remainder beneficiaries, and a court may compel an
any unauthorized use of trust assets that is prejudicial to
accounting for298
their interests.
As the Shurley court correctly noted, the sole beneficiary of a trust
may not also be the only trustee. 299 In such a case, it is not a question of
spendthrift, support, or discretionary provisions failing; rather, there
simply is no trust at all.3 0 Where the beneficiary may dispose of trust
assets at her whim without any need to answer to anyone, and without
any breach of duty on anyone's part, her interest amounts to outright
ownership of trust property.3 1 Naturally, the trust property is within the
reach of her creditors. 3°
What this analysis ignores, when applied to the Shurley case, is that
Mrs. Shurley's lineal descendants-i.e., the objects of her special power
of appointment and the takers in default-were the remainder benefi296. Moody v. Pitts, 708 S.W.2d 930,934-37 (Tex. Ct. App. 1986) (sole life tenant and sole
trustee of spendthrift and support trust acquired three-fourths of remainder interests; court
held that she did not own trust assets; she owed fiduciary duties to remainderman, and court

would redress any breaches of duty, even after her death).
297. IL; see Fox's Estate, 107 A. at 863-64; see also First Church of Christ, Scientist v.
Snowden, 276 S.W.2d 571, 574 (Tex. Civ. App. 1955).
298. Pachter, Gold & Schaffer v. Yantis, 742 F. Supp. 544, 547 (W.D. Ark. 1990).
299. In re Shurley, 171 B.R. 769, 783 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1994).
300. Where all legal and all equitable interests are joined in the same hands, the estates
merge, and the holder of those interests owns the property outright. REsTATEMENT (SEcoND)
OF TRUSTS §§ 99(5), 115(5), 341(1) (1959); 2 ScorT & FRATcHER, supra note 2, § 99, at 46-49;
4 id § 341, at 523-25.

301. Harvest v. Craft Constr. Corp., 187 So. 2d 72, 74 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.), cert. denied,
189 So. 2d 634 (Fla. 1966); accord In re Estate of Donovan, 550 So. 2d 37, 39 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1989).
302. In re Klayer, 20 B.R 270, 273-74 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1981).
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ciaries of her interest in the Bryant Trust. 3 In other words, she could
not possibly be considered the only beneficiary, even if she were the only
trustee, de jure or de facto.30 a Furthermore, when the sole beneficiary of
a protective trust does become the only trustee, the correct remedy is
not to allow creditors access to trust assets. Rather, in deference to the
wishes of the settlor, and respecting his right to place restrictions on his
gift, a court should appoint a cotrustee or a substitute trustee so that the
trust will not fail.3 5
The Shurley court did not understand the meaning of beneficiary
"control," and it ignored the policies upon which the condemnation of
beneficiary control is based. Setting out on a mistaken path, the court
erred in its analysis of each factor that it believed constituted evidence of
beneficiary "control."
B. A Special Power of Appointment and Beneficiary "Control"
The Shurley court concluded that Mrs. Shurley's special power of appointment over half the trust assets bespoke Mrs. Shurley's "control"
over the trust, even though, by itself, it was insufficient to place trust
assets within the reach of her creditors.30 6 The Shurley court cited no
authority to support its view that a special power represents some sort of
beneficiary "control," for the all-sufficient reason that there is no such
authority to be cited.
The donee of a special power may not use the appointive property
for herself or for the benefit of her creditors, her estate, or the creditors
of her estate.30 7 The beneficial interest in the appointive property is
vested in the objects of the power and the takers in default. Such property is, therefore, beyond the reach of the creditors of the donee qua
donee.308
303. Trust Instrument (Appendix), § I(f); see supra notes 42-44, 56 and accompanying

text.
304. Pachter, Gold & Schaffer v. Yantis, 742 F. Supp. 544, 547 (W.D. Ark. 1990) (objects
of special power and takers in default were remaindermen to whom life tenant-trustee-donee
of spendthrift trust owed fiduciary duties).
305. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TRUSTS § 341(2) (1959); 4 Scorr & FRATCHER, supra
note 2, § 341.1, at 526-28; see In re Badenhausen's Estate, 237 N.Y.S.2d 928, 935 (N.Y. Sur. Ct.
1963); see also Thx. PROP. CODE ANN. § 112.034(c) (West 1984) (codifying the common law
rule).
306. In re Shurley, 171 B.R. 769, 783 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1994); Trust Instrument (Appendix), § I(f); see supra note 83 and accompanying text.
307. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY § 11.4 (1986).

308. Id § 13.1 & cmts. a-b, illus. 1, 3, 4;

RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY

§ 331 (1940); see

Thomas R. Andrews, Creditors' Rights Against Nonprobate Assets in Washington: Tme for
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When the donee is a trust beneficiary, and when the appointive property consists of trust assets, then it is the settlor-donor who is regarded as
having "control" over the disposition of the property, not the beneficiary-donee.3 0 9 When a protective trust is totally self-settled, and when
the settlor-beneficiary retains only an income interest together with a
special power of appointment over the corpus, then creditors of the settlor-beneficiary-donee may reach the income but not the corpus. 310 The
beneficiary, in her capacity as such, has ceased to "control" the corpus,
in that
she has no right to compel corpus distributions for her own benefit.3 1 ' It makes absolutely no difference to the analysis whether the spe312
cial power is inter vivos, testamentary, or both.
Even if a settlor-beneficiary-donee has retained an interest in the
corpus-for example, if the trustee may make corpus distributions to her
under a discretionary or a support provision-then creditors may reach
the corpus on grounds of self-settlement, but not on grounds of beneficiary control. 13 The objects of the power and the takers in default are
remainder beneficiaries, and they may compel the trustee to account for
any abuse in making distributions to the settlor-beneficiary-donee, especially if the settlor-beneficiary-donee is herself the trustee.314 As strong
as the rights of creditors might be under a self-settlement theory, creditors would have no rights at all under a beneficiary control theory. The
"control" that the settlor-beneficiary-donee could exercise would rest in
her capacity as the settlor and donor, not in her capacity as the beneficiary and donee.31 5
To be sure, a beneficiary-donee has discretion to determine how trust
assets will be distributed among the objects of the power. In this sense,
however, the donee of special power functions in a fiduciary or quasifiduciary capacity for the objects of the power and the takers in default.3 1 6 She is liable to those parties if she purports to exercise a unilatReform, 65 WASH. L. REv. 73, 115 (1990); Adam J. Hirsch, The Problem of the Insolvent Heir,
74 CORNELL L. REv. 587, 607 (1989).
309. Jordan v. Caswell, 450 S.E.2d 818, 820 (Ga. 1994).
310. United States v. Baldwin, 391 A.2d 844, 849 (Md. 1978); Prescott v. Wordell, 65
N.E.2d 19, 19-20 (Mass. 1946).
311. Fiduciary Trust Co. v. First Nat'l Bank, 181 N.E.2d 6, 9-10 & n.2 (Mass. 1962).
312. RESrATEmENT (SEcOND) OF PROPERTY § 13.1 cmts. a-b (1986); see Andrews, supra

note 308, at 115 & n.199.
313.
314.
315.
316.

RESTATEmENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 156(2) (1959).
See Pachter, Gold & Schaffer v. Yantis, 742 F. Supp. 544, 546-47 (W.D. Ark. 1990).
See Jordan v. Caswell, 450 S.E2d 818, 820 (Ga. 1994).
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY §§ 13.1 cmt. a, 13.6 cmt. b (1986).
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eral right to have the property distributed for her own use, or if she
otherwise perpetrates a fraud on the power. 17
The situation is quite distinct from cases where a trust income beneficiary exercises a general power of appointment over the corpus. In such
an instance, the life tenant may invade the corpus as he pleases. His
interest amounts to out-and-out ownership, and he does "control" the
property in his capacity as a beneficiary. Therefore, the property is
within the reach of his creditors. 18
Of course, trust property over which a beneficiary does exercise "dominion and control" becomes part of her bankruptcy estate.319 Courts

have repeatedly held, however, that property subject to a special power
of appointment is excluded from a debtor's bankruptcy estate. 320 This is
not because the debtor-donee exercises insufficient "control" over the
appointive property, but rather because the donee of such a power, qua
donee, does not "control" the property in the relevant sense at all.32 '
The Shurley court, then, was mistaken in viewing Mrs. Shurley's special power of appointment as some evidence that she "controlled" the
Bryant Trust. In truth, the special power was a negation of "control" in
the relevant sense. Although some trust property might have been available to her creditors because of partial self-settlement, Mrs. Shurley's
special power gave them no rights whatsoever to trust assets.

317. In re Carroll's Will, 8 N.E.2d 864,868 (N.Y. 1937); accord Drummond v. Cowles, 278
F. Supp. 546, 551 (D. Conn. 1968); Home v. Title & Trust Ins. Co., 79 F. Supp. 91, 95 (S.D.
Cal. 1948); see Hauptfuhrer's Estate v. Commissioner, 195 F.2d 548,552 (3d Cir.), cert. denied,
344 U.S. 825 (1952); Ingraham v. Meade, 13 F. Cas. 50, 52-54 (E.D. Pa. 1855)(No. 7045).
318. RESTATEMENT (SEcouND) oF PROPERTY §§ 13.4, 13.5 (1986); see Marie Rolling-Tarbox, Note, Powers of Appointment Underthe Bankruptcy Code: A Focus on General Testamentary Powers, 72 IowA L. REv. 1041, 1045, 1050-59, 1061 (1987). Some courts, however, have
held that appointive property is beyond the reach of the creditors of the donee of a general
power until the donee actually exercises the power for her own benefit. The rationale is that a
general power is a mere offer by the donor to the donee. So long as the power remains
unexercised, the donee has not accepted the offer, and thus she has no immediate right to the
appointive property. See Gilman v. Bell, 99 Ill. 144, 150-51 (Ill. 1881); Irwin Union Bank &
Trust Co. v. Long, 312 N.E.2d 908, 912 (Ind. Ct. App. 1974). This would appear to be a
misapplication of contract principles to property law.
319. E.g., In re Kaplan, 97 B.R. 572,578 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1989); In re Tomer, 117 B.R. 391,
394-96 (Bankr. S.D. Ill. 1990); In re Peterson, 88 B.R. 5, 7-8 (Bankr. D. Me. 1988).
320. In re Anders, 151 B.R. 543, 546 (Bankr. D. Nev. 1993) (rights of custodial parent in
child support payments were equivalent to a special power of appointment; debtor could not
apply such funds for her own use without breach of duty; funds held excluded from bankruptcy estate); see In re Welch, 31 B.R. 537, 540 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1983).
321. Drummond, 278 F. Supp. at 551-52 (decided under the former Bankruptcy Act); accord In re Kinsler, 24 B.R. 962, 966 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1982).
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C. A Veto Power Over Trust Revocation and Beneficiary "Control"
The Trust Instrument provided that, during his lifetime, Mr. Bryant
could revoke the Bryant Trust and cause trust assets to be distributed
back to the original settlors. He could not do so unilaterally, however.
At least one of his daughters-Mrs. Shurley or Mrs. Watkins-had to
concur in his decision.3' The Shurley court deemed this significant evidence that Mrs. Shurley "controlled" the Bryant Trust. 3a Actually, this
provision denied her any "control."
First, this provision gave Mrs. Shurley no present right to compel the
distribution of trust assets. Whatever rights it gave lapsed when Mr.
Bryant died in 1967.324 Moreover, had the trust been revoked while Mr.
Bryant lived, whatever distribution Mrs. Shurley would have received
would have been proportionate to her original contribution, not a larger
32
amount.
Second, and more important, Mrs. Shurley had no unilateral and unqualified right to compel the revocation of the trust.326 It is plain that
the initiative in revocation would have lain with Mr. Bryant.
Mrs. Shurley and Mrs. Watkins together could have vetoed his proposal
to terminate the trust, but neither one of the sisters alone, or even the
two of them together, could have demanded a distribution of trust assets.
Indeed, Mr. Bryant, with the consent of Mrs. Watkins, could have put an
end to the Bryant Trust despite Mrs. Shurley's wishes. 327
The situation was analogous to Mrs. Shurley sitting as one trustee
with a vote on whether trust assets should be distributed. Of course, this
is perfectly permissible. 2 s Courts have consistently held that such a
beneficiary does not "contror' the trust precisely because she may not
receive distributions without the consent of her fellow trustees. 32 9
322. Trust Instrument (Appendix), § I(c); see supra notes 47, 85 and accompanying text.
323. In re Shurley, 171 B.R. 769, 783 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1994).
324. See United Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Garrett, 64 F. Supp. 460, 466 (W.D. Ark. 1946)
(settlor's power to revoke during his lifetime or for a term of years makes beneficiary's interest subject to a condition subsequent; if settlor dies or time elapses without exercise of power
of revocation, beneficiary's interest remains intact); see also In re Trust Deed of Smaltz, 195 A.
880, 881 (Pa. 1938).
325. Trust Instrument (Appendix), § I(c) (calling for distribution of trust assets to Mr.
Bryant, Mrs. Bryant, Mrs. Shurley, and Mrs. Watkins in proportion to their original contributions if trust was revoked).

326. See supra notes 282-298 and accompanying text.
327. Trust Instrument (Appendix), § I(c).
328. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS §§ 99(1), 99(3), 115(1), 115(2) (1959); 2 Scorr
& FRATCHER, supra note 2, §§ 99.1, at 49-53, 99.4, at 65-66.
329. E.g., In re Knight, 164 B.R. 372,376 & n.2 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1994); In re Hersloff, 147
B.R. 262,265 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1992).
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More accurately, the situation was analogous to all the beneficiaries
(or a group of them) serving as trustees with the power to terminate the
trust. This
is entirely legitimate and does not bespeak impermissible
"control."33 The trust assets could have been distributed if two of the
three (Mr. Bryant, Mrs. Shurley, and Mrs. Watkins) voted to do so, provided that one member of the majority was Mr. Bryant.33 ' In Waterbury
v. Munn,33 2 three of five beneficiaries served as the trustees of a spendthrift trust. They had the power to sell and distribute all trust assets.
The restraint on alienation was valid because no one beneficiary-trustee
with a deciding power
on termination could unilaterally compel a distri333
bution to himself.
Once one understands what beneficiary control of a trust means, it is
clear that Mrs. Shurley's right to veto a possible trust revocation between 1965 and 1967 was the very antithesis of "control." If the revocation provision in the Trust Instrument is evidence of anything, it is that
the Bryant Trust was the creation of Mr. Bryant, and that he intended to
have a vehicle for the intergenerational transfer of his family's fortune
that suited him.3 4
D. Trustee Discretion Over Trust Termination and Beneficiary
"Control"
The Trust Instrument provided for the selection of three special trustees effective two years after the death of Mrs. Bryant. Upon request by
Mrs. Shurley or Mrs. Watkins or both sisters, the special trustees could
terminate the Bryant Trust, in whole or in part, and distribute trust assets
to the Bryants' daughters. 335 The Shurley court found that this was evidence that Mrs. Shurley "controlled" trust assets.33 6 In fact, this provision in the Trust Instrument denied Mrs. Shurley any "control."
The issue of beneficiary control by way of a right to terminate the
trust and compel a distribution of trust property was discussed fre330. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TRusTs §§ 99(4), 115(4) (1959); 2 Scorr & FRATCHER,
supra note 2, § 99.5, at 66-73; see Blades v. Norfolk S. Ry. Co. 29 S.E.2d 148, 152-53 (N.C.
1944); Morse v. Paulson, 186 P.2d 394, 396 (Or. 1947).
331. Trust Instrument (Appendix), § I(c); see Shellberg v. Shellberg, 459 S.W.2d 465, 470
(Tex. Civ. App. 1970) (where agreement plainly provided that trust could be terminated by
majority of beneficiaries, beneficiary who also served as trustee had no right to terminate trust
unilaterally).
332. 32 So. 2d 603 (Fla. 1947) (en banc).
333. Id at 606.
334. See supra notes 56-58 and accompanying text.
335. Trust Instrument (Appendix), § I(e); see supra notes 48-51 and accompanying text.
336. In re Shurley, 171 B.R. 769, 783 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1994).

1995]

PROTECTIVE TRUSTS

quently in the context of employee pension plans in bankruptcy. 337 Inevitably, whenever such control was found, the beneficiary had an absolute
right to terminate the trust by some unilateral act on her part; the trustee
had no discretion in the matter. 38 Whenever a retirement plan specified
that a beneficiary could receive trust assets only in the discretion of the
trustee, however, courts held that there was no beneficiary control. A
right to request is not the same thing as an enforceable right to
39
3

compel.

Outside the bankruptcy retirement trust cases, courts inevitably have
held that, where a trust instrument specifies that a settlor or beneficiary
may revoke or terminate a trust only with the trustee's consent, then the
settlor or beneficiary does not control trust assets. She has no unilateral
right to compel their return or distribution. 40 If the intent of a trust
instrument were to reserve or bestow such an unfettered power, then
any requirement of trustee consent would be self-defeating and fatuous.
A provision of this nature may only be construed as vesting discretion in
the trustee and denying "control" in the relevant sense to the beneficiary
or settlor.341
In exercising discretion as to whether a trust should be terminated, a
trustee is under a fiduciary duty to uphold the purposes for which the
337. See supra notes 104-114 and accompanying text.
338. E.g., In re Swanson, 873 F.2d 1121, 1124 (8th Cir. 1989) (debtor's unqualified right to
receive all funds in retirement plan upon termination of employment vitiated restraint on
alienation); In re Lyons, 118 B.R. 634,640 (C.D. Ill. 1990) (absolute right to receive all retirement monies upon termination of employment gave debtor-beneficiary "exclusive and effective control"), affd, 957 F.2d 444 (7th Cir. 1992); In re Knowles, 123 B.R. 428, 431-32 (Bankr.
M.D. Fla. 1991) (where debtor had enforceable right to compel trustee to convey trust assets
to her, antialienation terms in retirement plan failed); In re Boykin, 118 B.R. 716,719 (Bankr.
W.D. Mo. 1990) (unqualified right to receive all trust funds upon terminating employment
voided restraints on alienation); In re Gillett, 46 B.R. 642, 644 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1985)
(debtor's ability to terminate ERISA plan at any time meant that he controlled all trust
funds).
339. E.g., In re Boon, 108 B.R. 697,709 (W.D. Mo. 1989) (carefully distinguishing beneficiary's right to request a distribution from beneficiary's right to receive it); In re Wallace, 66
B.R. 834, 841 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. 1986) (noting that "the only 'right' the Debtor has is a 'right'
to request, which is not the same as the 'right' to receive." (emphasis in original)).
340. Hearst v. American Newspapers, Inc., 51 F. Supp. 171, 177-79, 178 n.3 (D. Del. 1943);
In re Mordecai's Trust, 201 N.Y.S.2d 899,902-03 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.), affd, 210 N.Y.S.2d 478 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1960); Damiani v. Lobasco, 79 A.2d 268, 271 (Pa. 1951); see Siegel v. Cherry, 502
N.Y.S.2d 735,738 (N.Y. App. Div. 1986) (where one settlor-beneficiary served as one of three
trustees, and trust instrument specified that trust could be terminated only by the trustees,
settlor-beneficiary-trustee could revoke or terminate only with consent of at least one other
trustee), appeal denied, 498 N.E.2d 433 (N.Y. 1986).
341. In re Boyer's Trust, 71 N.Y.S.2d 280,283 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1947); see Damiani,79 A.2d
at 271.
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trust was created. Any surrender of trust assets that would defeat those
purposes is a breach of duty.a' 2 Courts have regularly sustained the discretion of trustees when they have refused to terminate a trust if it is
even arguable that termination would be antithetical to the objectives of
the trust. 3
The duty of the three special trustees of the Bryant Trust to consider
the reasons for establishing the trust was not only imposed by law; it was
spelled out in the Trust Instrument. 3a The Trust Instrument contained
protective terms-a spendthrift clause and a support clause 4S
Although such provisions are not necessarily complete bars to trust termination in all jurisdictions, they are major obstacles. 46 Spendthrift and
support provisions are designed precisely to safeguard trust assets from a
beneficiary's improvidence. It would be almost per se prejudicial to the
purposes of a protective trust to terminate it prematurelya 47
The beneficiaries of the Bryant Trust included not only Mrs. Shurley
and Mrs. Watkins, the two life tenants. The class of beneficiaries also
included the lineal descendants of the two sisters, who were the objects
of their special powers of appointment.348 It is plain from the face of the
Trust Instrument that Mr. and Mrs. Bryant intended the trust corpus to
pass to their grandchildren and great-grandchildren, minus such corpus
distributions as their daughters might need to maintain their accustomed
standard of living.

49

Thus, the special trustees would have been obli-

gated to consider the interests of these lineal descendants, not merely
the interests of Mrs. Shurley or Mrs. Watkins, in deciding whether to
342. First Nat'l Bank of Port Arthur v. Sassine, 556 S.W.2d 116, 117 (Tex. Civ. App. 1977).
343. Hearst,51 F. Supp. at 177-79, 178 n.3; Mordecai's Trust, 201 N.Y.S.2d at 902-03; see
Boyer's Trust, 71 N.Y.S.2d at 283; Damiani,79 A.2d at 271; see also McLendon v. First Nat'l

Bank of Shreveport, 299 So. 2d 407, 410 (La. Ct. App. 1974).
344. Trust Instrument (Appendix), § I(e).
345. Id. §§ I(b), I(m).
346. See TEx. PROP. CODE ANN. § 112.054(b) (West 1984) (spendthrift clause in trust instrument, without more, is not necessarily a complete bar to trust termination); DuKEmINrnR
& JOHANSON, supra note 18, at 575.
347. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TRUSTS § 337 crts. 1-n (1959); 4A ScorT & FRATCHER,
supra note 2, § 337.2, at 264, § 337.4, at 458-60; accord Gail B. Bird, Trust Termination: Unborn, Living and Dead Hands-Too Many Fingers in the Trust Pie,36 HASTINGS LJ. 563,58587 (1985).
348. See Pachter, Gold & Schaffer v. Yantis, 742 F. Supp. 544, 547 (W.D. Ark. 1990)
(where trustee-life tenant was donee of special power of appointment, objects of the power
and takers in default were remainder beneficiaries to whom life tenant owed fiduciary duties
in his capacity as trustee); In re Eyre, 133 N.Y.S.2d 511, 516-17 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1954); Wachovia
Bank & Trust Co., N.A. v. Sevier, 255 S.E.2d 636, 639-40 (N.C. Ct. App.), review denied, 259
S.E.2d 305 (N.C. 1979).
349. See supra notes 56-58 and accompanying text.
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terminate the trust.350 The Shurley court appeared to have no comprehension of the rights of these remainder beneficiaries. 351
The Shurley court apparently was confused by the fact that a decision
on trust termination was committed to the three special trustees, to the
exclusion of the "regular" trustee of the Bryant Trust: "With no trust
res, the special trustees would appear to have no fiduciary duties and
would likely 'rubber stamp' a decision by Mrs. Shurley and Mrs. Watkins
to terminate the [Bryant] Trust."'3 52 It seems that the court was unaware
that a trust instrument may apportion different duties among different
trustees. There is no requirement whatsoever that a decision on termination must be made by the same trustees engaged in the day-to-day
administration of the corpus. 353 The allocation of a decision on termination to the special trustees would in no way insulate them from the fiduciary duty to consider the purposes of the trust and the interests of the
remainder beneficiaries, especially when that duty was spelled out in the
354
Trust Instrument.
What the special trustees would be "likely" to do if asked to terminate the trust was not a proper inquiry for a court of equity.355 Moreover, it seems that this section of the Trust Instrument was designed so
that the special trustees would not pliantly accede to the wishes of Mrs.
Shurley or Mrs. Watkins. The special trustees included a judge (in his
individual capacity), an attorney, and an accountant. Mrs. Shurley and
Mrs. Watkins were to play no role in selecting these trustees. 35 6 It seems
facially implausible that professionals well acquainted with tax and trust
matters would bend like willows to a casual and self-interested request
350. See RESTATEmENT (SEcolN) OF TRUSTS § 337 cmt. g (1959) (trust established for
successive beneficiaries may not be terminated, even if all beneficiaries consent).
351. See REsTATEMENT (TmmD) OF TRUSTS §§ 183, 232 (1992) (trustee owes duty of impartiality as between concurrent and successive beneficiaries).
352. In re Shurley, 171 B.R. 769, 783 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1994).
353. 3 Scorr & FRATCHER, supra note 2, § 194, at 169-70 (trust instrument may allocate
different duties to different trustees); see Henshaw v. Lewis, 118 N.Y.S.2d 360, 363 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct.) (noting that declaration of trust may give different powers to various trustees), affd, 125
N.Y.S.2d 544 (N.Y. App. Div. 1953); In re Obici's TRust, 134 A.2d 900, 905 (Pa. 1957) (trust
instrument vested right of physical possession of trust property in one trustee to the exclusion
of other trustees); see also Dunker v. Reichman, 841 F.2d 177,180 (7th Cir. 1988) (trust instrument gave any one trustee the right to enter into contracts on behalf of the trust without
concurrence of any other trustee); Tnx. PROP. CODE ANN.§ 114.003 (West 1984) (trustee is
not liable for any harm resulting from exercise of a certain authority if trust instrument has
vested that authority exclusively in another trustee).
354. Trust Instrument (Appendix), § I(e); see supra notes 344-51 and accompanying text.
355. See Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545, 547 (N.Y. 1928) ("Such a calculus of
probabilities is beyond the science of the chancery.") (per Cardozo, C.J.).
356. Trust Instrument (Appendix), § I(e).
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for trust termination. Furthermore, the special trustees could terminate
the trust only by unanimous consent.3 57 Under Texas law, the general
rule is that, when any matter is committed to the discretion of three or
more trustees, the trustees may act by majority vote. 358 The unanimity
requirement made a "rubber stamp" decision highly unlikely.
The ultimate conclusion is that Mrs. Shurley had no way to force the
special trustees to terminate the trust. All that she had was a "right" to
request, and such a pallid "right" is a negation of beneficiary control.359
E. Loans From a Trust to a Beneficiary and Beneficiary "Control"
The Shurley court believed that the Bryant Trust had made loans to
Mrs. Shurley at her request, and that this was further evidence that she
"controlled" trust assets.360 Once more, the court was mistaken.
Loans from a trust to a beneficiary are not necessarily evidence that a
beneficiary exercises "dominion and control" over the trust.361 In determining whether a loan is evidence of impermissible beneficiary control,
courts have looked to at least four factors. The Shurley court did not
discuss any of them.
First, one must inquire whether loans to the beneficiary were authorized by the trust instrument.362 In the case of the Bryant Trust, the Trust
Instrument plainly allowed the trustee to lend to any beneficiary.363
Second, and most important, is the question whether the trustee had
discretion over whether the loan should be made.3 4 If discretion is
357. Id
358. TEx. PROP. CODE ANN. § 113.085(1) (West 1984) (three or more trustees may act by
majority vote unless trust instrument specifies otherwise).
359. In re Boon, 108 B.R. 697, 709 (W.D. Mo. 1989); In re Wallace, 66 B.R 834, 841
(Bankr. E.D. Mo. 1986).
360. In re Shurley, 171 B.R. 769, 783 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1994).
361. In re Kincaid, 917 F.2d 1162, 1168 (9th Cir. 1990); Danning v. Lederer, 232 F.2d 610,
614 (7th Cir. 1956); In re Conroy, 110 B.R. 492, 500-01 (Bankr. D. Mont. 1990); see In re
Kreiss, 72 B.R. 933, 941-42 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1987); Hines v. Sands, 312 S.W.2d 275, 279 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1958) (noting with some vehemence that alleged corpus distribution to beneficiary
was actually a loan).
362. Danning, 232 F.2d at 614; see Kincaid, 917 F.2d at 1168; In re James, 126 B.R. 360,
362-63 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1991). Texas law-like the law of many jurisdictions-permits loans
from a trust to a beneficiary if the trust instrument so provides. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN.
§ 113.051(b)(1) (West 1984); see Beaty v. Bale, 677 S.W.2d 750, 754 (Tex. Ct. App. 1984).
363. Trust Instrument (Appendix), § 1(j).
364. Boon, 108 B.R. at 709 ("Likewise, a debtor's right to request a loan ... must be
distinguished from his right to receive the funds, for where the trustee retains unhindered
discretion to deny the request, the debtor does not have true dominion or control over the
trust res." (emphasis in original)); Conroy, 110 B.R. at 500-01 ("The fact that a beneficiary
may borrow from the trust does not necessarily invalidate a spendthrift clause. This [is] partic-
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vested in the trustee, then the beneficiary has at most a right to request a
loan, with no power to compel the trustee to lend if he chooses not to do
so. As a matter of law, this would be a denial of beneficiary control, not
evidence of it.3 65 The Trust Instrument plainly vested such discretion in
the trustee.3 66 If the trustee were imprudent in lending to Mrs. Shurley,
he would have to account for his breach of duty, but this would not undermine the protective provisions in the trust.3 67 Mrs. Shurley's lineal
descendants-the objects of her special power and the takers in default-were remainder beneficiaries on whose behalf a court could redress a breach of fiduciary duty. 68 Even when loans have been
imprudent, courts have held that an abuse of discretion by the trustee
does not undercut protective trust provisions. 69
One need not go any further. The Shurley court was mistaken in
thinking that the loans could have bespoken any "control" on Mrs.
Shurley's part. More should be said, however. In examining loan transactions of this sort, courts have sometimes looked to a third and a fourth
factor that the Shurley court simply ignored.
As a third consideration, it is certainly worth asking whether the
transaction was really a loan rather than a disguised distribution.370 A
distribution would be income to a beneficiary, while a loan would not be.
With a true loan, there would be no net increase in the beneficiary's
wealth because the loan proceeds would be offset by an obligation to

ularly true where The trustee is not obligated to make the loan."); Kreiss, 72 B.R. at 941-42
(beneficiary had no legally enforceable guarantee that he would receive a loan upon request);
see Kincaid, 917 F.2d at 1168.
365. Boon, 108 B.R. at 709; see In re Wallace, 66 B.R. 834, 841 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. 1986).
366. Trust Instrument (Appendix), § I(j); see Danning, 232 F.2d at 614.
367. In re Kreiss, 72 B.R. 933, 942 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1987) ("Furthermore, although the
trust instrument holds the trustees harmless if a loan is granted and not repaid, the trustees are
still accountable to the remaindermen for proper administration of the trust."); see Moody v.
Pitts, 708 S.W.2d 930, 934-37 (Tex. Ct. App. 1986) (income beneficiary who was sole trustee
with right to look to corpus for her support nonetheless was under fiduciary duty to remainderman not to perpetrate abuses in administration of corpus); see also In re Roberts' Estate,
35 N.W.2d 756, 758-59 (Iowa 1949).
368. Pachter, Gold & Schaffer v. Yantis, 742 F. Supp. 544,547 (W.D. Ark. 1990); see In re
Eyre, 133 N.Y.S.2d 511, 516-17 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1954).
369. In re Bloom, 839 F.2d 1376, 1379 (9th Cir. 1988) (making unsecured loans of more
than half the corpus to the beneficiary where principal was never repaid may have been imprudent on trustee's part, and it may have been a breach of the duty to diversify investments,
but it did not bespeak excessive beneficiary control).
370. In re Kincaid, 917 F2d 1162, 1168 (9th Cir. 1990); see In re James, 126 B.R. 360,36263 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1991); Hines v. Sands, 312 S.W.2d 275, 279 (rex. Civ. App. 1958).
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repay. 7 Although a loan may possibly result in a loss to the lender if it
is not repaid, it can never result in a net gain to the borrower.3v
The critical question turns on the intentions of the parties. A transaction will be deemed a loan, rather than an outright distribution, if
there is evidence that both parties understood that the funds were to be
repaid, and especially if the recipient voluntarily acknowledged the obligation. 73 Even if the borrower is effectively in a position to demand a
loan, a transaction may still involve bona fide lending. In the context of
closely held corporations, for example, courts have consistently held that
loans to a controlling officer, shareholder, or director are not a disguised
payment of salary or dividends so long as there are indicia that both the
corporation and the controlling person acknowledged that the lender
had an enforceable right to receive repayment. 4 Thus, in the case of a
loan from a trust to a beneficiary, it would be important to determine
whether the beneficiary clearly accepted an obligation to repay. 75 The
Shurley court apparently did not make this inquiry.37 6
Fourth, and finally, it may be significant whether the trust has
charged interest on the funds advanced to the beneficiary. 377 A no-interest loan may still be a bona fide loan.37 Nonetheless, a loan without
interest has at least some of the earmarks of a disguised distribution,
while an interest-bearing loan to a beneficiary is normally seen as an
investment of trust assets. 9 Again, the Shurley court never discussed
371. Webb v. IRS, 15 F.3d 203, 205 (1st Cir. 1994); Collins v. Commissioner, 3 F.3d 625,

630 (2d Cir. 1993).
372. See Commissioner v. Wilcox, 327 U.S. 404, 410 (1946).
373. Webb, 15 F.3d at 205; Collins, 3 F.3d at 631. There is a net gain to the recipient, and a
net loss to the party advancing the funds, if, but only if, there was no intention that the recipient pay back the monies-i.e., if the so-called loan were a sham from its inception, or if the
lender subsequently forgave the loan. Fairchild v. Commissioner, 462 F.2d 462, 463 (3d Cir.
1972).
374. Baker v. Commissioner, 677 F.2d 11, 11-13 (2d Cir. 1982); Martin v. Commissioner,
649 F.2d 1133, 1133-34 (5th Cir. 1981); Suttle v. Commissioner, 625 F.2d 1127, 1128 (4th Cir.
1980).
375. Danning v. Lederer, 232 F.2d 610, 614 (7th Cir. 1956) (beneficiary's receipt of loans
from trust in trustee's discretion did not expand beneficiary's rights in the corpus); accord In
re Bloom, 839 F.2d 1376, 1379 (9th Cir. 1988) (where parties had clearly treated transaction as
a loan, beneficiary did not "control" trust assets); Hines, 312 S.W.2d at 279 (beneficiary had
promptly arranged for repayment of loan from trust).
376. See In re Shurley, 171 B.R. 769, 783 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1994).
377. In re Kincaid, 917 F.2d 1162, 1168 (9th Cir. 1990); In re James, 126 B.R. 360, 362-63
(Bankr. D. Kan. 1991); see In Re Bloom, 839 F.2d 1376, 1379 (9th Cir. 1988); Danning, 232
F.2d at 614.
378. Baker, 677 F.2d at 11-13; Martin, 649 F.2d at 1133-34; Suttle, 625 F.2d at 1128.
379. Kincaid, 917 F.2d at 1168; see Bloom, 839 F.2d at 1379 (even though principal was
never repaid, loans from trust to beneficiary were legitimate transactions and did not indicate

1995]

PROTECTIVE TRUSTS

whether 38interest
had been charged on the funds advanced to Mrs.
0
Shurley.
Even if the advances to Mrs. Shurley had not carried any interest,
and even if the transactions had amounted to sham loans with no realistic expectation of repayment, the most that this would establish would be
a breach of duty on the trustee's part. He would have to account for his
imprudent use of trust funds, or for making a distribution that violated
the support standard, but this would not vitiate the protective terms
shielding trust assets.381
Once more, the Shurley court mistook the nature of what it was discussing. An abuse of discretion by a trustee in making loans-if this
discretion were abused-is not the same thing as a beneficiary's enforceable right to demand loans, much less a unilateral right to demand outand-out corpus distributions.
F. Corpus Distributionsto the Beneficiary of a Support Trust and
Beneficiary "Control"

The Shurley court found that the trustee of the Bryant Trust had
made corpus distributions to Mrs. Shurley that the court deemed unwarranted, and the court believed that this was evidence of her "control."
In the court's view, corpus distributions had been excessive, and they
apparently were made upon the request of a beneficiary or beneficiaries. 3 2 Once more, the court failed to undertake a proper analysis.
At the outset, the court seemed confused as to when the trust had
been under beneficiary "control," and as to what beneficiaries had exercised "control." The court spoke of supposedly overly liberal distributions made by the original trustee of the Bryant Trust, who had been
replaced by a successor trustee.383 This would imply that there was no
present beneficiary control at all.A
beneficiary control where, interalia, beneficiary was charged a reasonable rate of interest and
had made regular interest payments); Danning,232 F.2d at 614.
380. See Shurley, 171 B.R. at 783.
381. Bloom, 839 F.2d at 1379 (excessive and imprudent loans to beneficiary may have
been a breach of trustee's duties but did not evidence beneficiary control); In re Kreiss, 72
B.R. 933, 942 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1987) (trustees would have to account to other beneficiaries
for imprudent loans to one beneficiary; protective trust terms were not undercut by beneficiary control); see In re Roberts' Estate, 35 N.W.2d 756, 758-59 (Iowa 1949); see also Moody v.
Pitts, 708 S.W.2d 930, 934-37 (Tex. Ct. App. 1986).
382. Shurley, 171 B.R. at 783.
383. Id.
384. See supra notes 281, 324 and accompanying text.
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The court also spoke of Mr. Bryant, Mrs. Bryant, Mrs. Watkins, and
Mrs. Shurley together dominating the initial trustee. 385 If the court
meant to say that these beneficiaries collectively had served as the de
facto board of trustees, with the ostensible trustee as their agent, then
there would have been no impermissible beneficiary control. If the Bryants and their daughters actually had been the trustees de jure, none of
them could have made a unilateral decision regarding corpus distributions to himself or herself, and hence none of them would have exercised
the sort of control necessary to destroy a protective trust provision. 6 If
the court did mean that the dominance was collective, then there could
not have been "control" by Mrs. Shurley.
If the court meant that individual beneficiaries other than Mrs.
Shurley-notably Mr. Bryant-had dominated the initial trustee, then
the court's findings in this regard would be completely irrelevant.3 8 The
question was not whether someone besides Mrs. Shurley was able to
force the trustee to make distributions, but whether Mrs. Shurley was
able to compel distributions to herself.
At the most generous reading, what the Shurley court may have intended to express was that the trustee had abused his discretion and had
made disbursements to Mrs. Shurley at her individual request.8 8 If this
is what the court meant, it had no conception of how to judge an exercise
of discretion by the trustee of a support trust. Moreover, even if the
trustee had abused his discretion, this would not equate to "control" by
Mrs. Shurley. Mrs. Shurley had no enforceable right to compel corpus
distributions to herself at her unfettered pleasure, and any abuse of discretion on the trustee's part would be subject to correction.
In expressing a belief that the trustee had exceeded his discretion, the
court labored under the mistaken view that Mrs. Shurley's interest in the
corpus was governed by a discretionary provision, under which the
trustee would be guided only by a standard of subjective good faith in
making distributions to her.38 9 In fact, the relevant portion of the Trust
Instrument called for corpus distributions in the trustee's discretion in
order to maintain Mrs. Shurley in her accustomed standard of living, taking into account her income from all other sources, including trust in385. Shurley, 171 B.R. at 783.

386. Waterbury v. Munn, 32 So. 2d 603, 606 (Fla. 1947) (en banc);

RESTATEMENT (SEC-

TRUsrs §§ 99(4), 115(4) (1959); see Blades v. Norfolk S. Ry. Co., 29 S.E.2d 148, 152153 (N.C. 1944); Morse v. Paulson, 186 P.2d 394, 395 (Or. 1947).
387. See Shurley, 171 B.R. at 783.
388. See id
389. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
OND) OF
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come.390 This was a support term, providing an objective standard for
the trustee's guidance. The decisions of the trustee of a support trust are
subject to review for objective reasonableness rather than mere private
good faith.391 The only circumstance that the court seemed to consider
was that distributions may have been made at Mrs. Shurley's request.392
This was largely irrelevant.
Under a support provision, the proper inquiry would have been
whether, objectively, the corpus distributions could be said to have been
reasonably necessary to maintain Mrs. Shurley's accustomed standard of
living at the time they were made. Unlike the beneficiary of a discretionary trust, the beneficiary of a support trust may compel the trustee to
make disbursements, provided that there is no room for reasonable disagreement that distributions are necessary to meet the standard specified
in the trust instrument. This is so regardless of the trustee's subjective
good faith in refusing to expend trust funds.393
Similarly, creditors who furnish necessities to the beneficiary of a
support trust may reach trust assets if: (1) the goods or services were
supplied for the essential maintenance of the beneficiary; (2) the charges
were reasonable; and (3) it would be patently unreasonable of the
trustee not to pay the charges, in light of the beneficiary's other sources
of income and the purposes and resources of the trust.3 94 This ability of
some creditors to reach trust assets does not destroy the protective nature of a support trust. Due to the highly restricted nature of a beneficiary's interest in a support trust, trust property is beyond the reach of

390. Trust Instrument (Appendix), § I(b).
391. See supra notes 3-9 and accompanying text.
392. See Shurley, 171 B.R. at 783.
393. Rekdahl v. Long, 407 S.W.2d 339, 340,344 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966) (trustee ordered to
increase payments to beneficiary in order to meet standard of enabling beneficiary to enjoy
his "customary standard of living"), affd, 417 S.W.2d 387 (Tex. 1967); accord Chenot v. Bordeleau, 561 A.2d 891, 894 (R.I. 1989) ("The beneficiary of a support trust can compel.., a
distribution of trust income or principal merely by demonstrating that the money is necessary
for his or her support, maintenance, education, or welfare."). By contrast, the beneficiary of a
pure discretionary trust may compel a distribution only if the trustee has acted fraudulently or
in bad faith. See Town of Randolph v. Roberts, 195 N.E.2d 72,73 (Mass. 1964); Lineback by
Hutchins v. Stout, 339 S.E.2d 103, 106 (N.C. Ct. App. 1986).
394. State v. Rubion, 308 S.W.2d 4, 8-10 (Tex. 1957); accord In re Estate of Dodge, 281
N.W.2d 447, 451 (Iowa 1979). In practice, this means that only those creditors who supply
essential goods or services to an otherwise destitute beneficiary may reach the assets of a
support trust. In re Estate of Browning, 352 N.Y.S.2d 769,770-71 (N.Y. Sur. Ct. 1974); Bureau

of Support in Dept. of Mental Hygiene v. Kreitzer, 243 N.E.2d 83, 85-86 (Ohio 1968); see
RESTATEmENT (SEcoND) OF TRUSTS § 157(b) (1959).
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general creditors, and the beneficiary's interest does not pass to her
bankruptcy estate.395
At a minimum, the Shurley court should have inquired whether the
corpus distributions were necessary to maintain Mrs. Shurley's standard
of living. If reasonable minds could only conclude that the distributions
were essential for that purpose, then, objectively, the trustee had no
choice but to make them. Whether he did so in response to Mrs.
Shurley's request would be neither here nor there. It would have been
an abuse of discretion if he had not turned trust property over to her.
At a middle level, there would be a range of situations where there
could be honest disagreement as to whether the corpus distributions
were needed to meet the standard set out in the Trust Instrument. That
is the latitude of a trustee's discretion under a support trust, and courts
will scarcely ever disturb a trustee's exercise of discretion within that
sphere.396 Thus, if it were fairly arguable that the distributions were
needed to maintain Mrs. Shurley's standard of living, there was no abuse
of discretion, even if a contrary argument could be made. The fact that
Mrs. Shurley may have requested the distributions would have no bearing on the question whether the exercise of discretion was proper.
At the outer extreme, there are cases where it would be plainly unreasonable for the trustee of a support trust to make a distribution. In
such an instance, a court may enjoin the distribution, or compel the
trustee to account for it, even if the trustee has acted with the utmost
subjective good faith.39 7 Of course, this would not be possible with a
discretionary trust, where subjective good faith is the only standard to
which the trustee is held.3 98 In Mrs. Shurley's case, then, the trustee
would have abused his discretion in making corpus distributions to her if
no reasonable person could have thought that those distributions were
needed to maintain her standard of living. If the distributions were
made simply at Mrs. Shurley's behest, then the trustee would have been
guilty of further misconduct. He would have failed to investigate the
need for distribution in order to determine how to exercise his discretion
395. In re McLoughlin, 507 F.2d 177, 185-86 (5th Cir. 1975); In re Kinsler, 24 B.R. 962,
966-67 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1982); see 2A ScOrr & FRATCHER, supra note 2, § 154, at 146-52.
396. See, e.g., Estate of Dodge, 281 N.W.2d at 451; Woodberry v. Bunker, 268 N.E.2d 841,
843-44 (Mass. 1971); In re Lazarus' Estate, 283 N.Y.S.2d 235, 238-39 (N.Y. Sur. Ct. 1967);
Rubion, 308 S.W.2d at 8-10; In re Larson's Estate, 364 P.2d 494, 498-99 (Wash. 1961).
397. Heisserer v. Friedrich, 797 S.W.2d 864, 871-73 (Mo. Ct. App. 1990); Kemp v. Paterson, 163 N.Y.S.2d 245, 247-48 (N.Y. App. Div. 1957), affd, 159 N.E.2d 661 (N.Y. 1959).
398. First Nat'l Bank of Md. v. Department of Health & Mental Hygiene, 399 A.2d 891,
893-96 (Md. 1979); see In re Penn Yan Manor Nursing Home, Inc., 409 N.Y.S.2d 201, 203
(N.Y. Sur. Ct. 1978).
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properly. Perhaps this is what the Shurley court believed had happened.399 Of course, objectively, there would have been misconduct on
the trustee's part if he had made unwarranted corpus distributions to
Mrs. Shurley without any request from her.
If the corpus distributions to Mrs. Shurley were not justifiable, what
would be established would be the trustee's breach of duty in favoring
the life tenant (Mrs. Shurley) over the remainder beneficiaries (her lineal descendants), who also had an interest in the corpus.4 °0 The trustee
could be called to account for any improper corpus distributions. 401 Indeed, if Mrs. Shurley herself had been the trustee, a court could redress
any misconduct on her part in making distributions unauthorized by the
objective support standard.4 °2 Such misconduct, however, would not be
the same thing as dominion and control by the beneficiary. Protective
trust provisions would not be destroyed.40 3
Whenever beneficiary control has been found, the beneficiary has
had an absolute, unqualified, and unilateral right to demand corpus distributions. 4 1 The fact remains that Mrs. Shurley had no unilateral right
to do anything but request corpus distributions. A right to request distributions under a support trust is not the same thing as a right to invade
the corpus at the beneficiary's whim. 40 5 Discretion to make or withhold
399. See In re Shurley, 171 B.R. 769, 783 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1994).
400. See REsrATEmENT (Tim) OF TRUSTs §§ 183,232 (1992) (trustee may not favor one
beneficiary over another, in particular, trustee must be impartial as between successive
beneficiaries).
401. In re Kreiss, 72 B.R. 933, 941-42 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1987) (beneficiary who became
sole trustee would have to account to other beneficiaries for self-favoritism or self-dealing);
accord Finlay v. United States, 752 F.2d 246,249 (6th Cir. 1985) (under objective standard, life
tenant with power to invade could not dispose of property at her whim, but only in cases of
demonstrable need; her interest was not equivalent to fee ownership); see also In re Fox's
Estate, 107 A. 863, 863-64 (Pa. 1919).
402. Moody v. Pitts, 708 S.W.2d 930, 934-37 (Tex. Ct. App. 1986) (life tenant became sole
trustee of spendthrift and support trust; court held that her interest in trust assets was not
equivalent to ownership, that she owed fiduciary duties to at least one remainderman, and
that any improper administration of trust assets would be redressed, even after her death); see
also, In re Bloom, 839 F.2d 1376, 1379 (9th Cir. 1988) (in making loans of more than half the
corpus to beneficiary, trustee may have breached duty to manage trust assets prudently, but
protective nature of trust was not vitiated).
403. Moody, 708 S.W.2d at 934-37; see Finlay, 752 F.2d at 249; Kreiss, 72 B.R. at 941-42.
404. E.g., In re Swanson, 873 F.2d 1121, 1124 (8th Cir. 1989) (beneficiary could withdraw
all trust funds by unilaterally terminating employment); In re Kaplan, 97 B.R. 572,577 (Bankr.
9th Cir. 1989) (debtor-beneficiary had legal right to withdraw trust funds as he wished); In re
Knowles, 123 B.R. 428,432 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1991) (debtor's ability to reach entire interest in
plan at any time disqualified plan as spendthrift trust).
405. See In re Boon, 108 B.R. 697, 709 (W.D. Mo. 1989) ("Likewise, a debtor's right to
request a ...withdrawal from a [trust] must be distinguished from his right to receive the
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distributions was vested in the trustee, guided by the objective limits provided by the Trust Instrument.40 6 If the trustee abused his discretion
(and it is not at all clear that the Shurley court understood what this
meant in the context of a support trust), then the trustee would have to
answer for the abuse. This would not undermine the protective terms
shielding trust assets.
G. Beneficiary Conduct and Beneficiary "Control"
Finally, the Shurley court seemed especially incensed because it
found that Mr. and Mrs. Shurley had apparently purported to pledge or
encumber Mrs. Shurley's interest in the Bryant Trust, or to use specific
trust property as security.4 "7 In the court's view, this was evidence that
Mrs. Shurley thought that she owned trust assets outright, and this belief
was alleged to be additional support for her "control" over trust
assets.408
The subjective belief or conduct of a beneficiary is irrelevant with
respect to the issue of beneficiary control. As a matter of law, a beneficiary may not waive or be estopped from asserting the protection afforded
by a spendthrift, support, or discretionary clause.4 °9 If it were legally
possible for a beneficiary to do so, then the intentions of the settlor
would be thwarted, and the entire body of law upholding such shields
against the claims of creditors would collapse. Therefore, any attempt
by a beneficiary to pledge or assign her interest is automatically void.410
Certainly any act by a beneficiary purporting to encumber specific trust

funds, for where the trustee retains ...

discretion to deny the request, the debtor does not

have true dominion or control over the trust res." (emphasis in original)); In re Wallace, 66
B.R. 834,841 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. 1986) (a debtor-beneficiary does not have dominion over trust
assets "where the only 'right' the Debtor has is a 'right' to request, which is not the same as the
'right' to receive." (emphasis in original)).
406. Trust Instrument (Appendix), § I(b). The trustee could not refuse to make a distribution if it was essential for Mrs. Shurley's support and if reasonable minds could not differ on
that point. This, however, would not undercut the protective nature of a support trust.
407. In re Shurley, 171 B.R. 769, 783 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1994).
408. ld.; see supra note 88 and accompanying text.
409. E.g., Johnson v. Morawitz, 292 F.2d 341, 343 (10th Cir. 1961); Hines v. Sands, 312
S.W.2d 275,279 (Tex. Civ. App. 1958) (beneficiary "had no authority to waive the spendthrift
provision.").
410. King v. United States, 12 F. Supp. 614, 616 (D. Mass. 1935), affd, 84 F.2d 156 (1st
Cir. 1936); Mahan v. Mahan, 577 A.2d 70,77 (Md. 1990); Lundgren v. Hoglund, 711 P.2d 809,
814 (Mont. 1985); In re Heyl's Estate, 40 A.2d 149, 151 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1944).
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assets cannot possibly destroy protective provisions or give rise to any
enforceable lien.411
The real question is what the trust instrument gives the beneficiary
an enforceable right to do with trust property, not what she believes she
can do or has purported to do.4 12 This principle was well expressed in In
re Hannegan.1 3 There, a Chapter 7 bankruptcy trustee sought the turnover of a debtor's interest in a spendthrift trust that the debtor's deceased father had established. The bankruptcy trustee-like the Shurley
court-maintained that the debtor-beneficiary controlled trust property
because he had purported to assign or pledge his interest. At the very
least, the bankruptcy trustee argued, there was a fact issue as to beneficiary control. 414 The Hannegan court disagreed:
The trustee contends that a factual issue exists whether Mr.
Hannegan [i.e., the debtor-beneficiary] has dominion or control
over the trust . . . . The trustee points to the fact that Debtor
attempted to pledge his interest in the trust as proof that he exercised dominion and control over the trust. The trustee, however,
confuses the issue. The issue is not whether the trust beneficiary
has tried to exercise dominion or control over the trust proceeds
but, rather,whether under the terms of the trusthe has the power to
exercise dominion and control over the trust [proper]....
In
fact, the Will [of the settlor] specifically denies Robert Hannegan,
Jr. and the other beneficiaries the "power to sell, assign, convey,
mortgage, pledge, anticipate or hypothecate, or otherwise dispose
of any right, title or interest which any of them may acquire in
and to the income or principal of the trust .... " ... The terms of
the Will are clearand no factual issue exists regardingthe Debtor's
dominion or control of the funds held in the spendthrift trust that
the Will created.41
The firmly established rule that a beneficiary may not waive or be
estopped from asserting the protective terms of a trust instrument may
seem harsh for creditors. It represents, however, a conscious policy
choice that was made over a century ago. A creditor acts at his peril in
extending credit on the security of a beneficiary's interest in a protective
411. Roberson v. Farm Credit Bank of Texas, 818 F. Supp. 933, 938 (N.D. Miss. 1993)
(deed of trust executed by beneficiary purporting to encumber certain protective trust property held void as a matter of law); see In re Estate of Vought, 351 N.Y.S.2d 816, 820-22 (N.Y.
Sur. Ct. 1973).
412. See In re Baldwin, 142 B.R. 210, 214-15 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1992).
413. 155 B.R. 209 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. 1993).
414. Id. at 213-14.
415. Id. at 214 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
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trust, especially a spendthrift trust.4 16 Courts invariably hold that creditors should inquire into the nature of the trust, and that, if they do not
actually know of the shields against their recovery, then they reasonably
should know. Lending to the beneficiary of such a trust is neither more
nor less than a calculated risk.4 17
The Shurley court, then, was mistaken if it believed that Mrs.
Shurley's private beliefs, or even her overt actions, had anything whatsoever to do with the beneficiary control question. Her beliefs and actions-let alone those of her husband-had no more bearing on that
issue than did the double nexus test, the fellow servant doctrine, or the
Rule in Mountjoy's Case. Perhaps strong policy arguments could be
made for applying the doctrines of waiver and estoppel to a protective
trust beneficiary, but, at this late date, those arguments should be addressed to a legislature.418
H. Beneficiary Control and the Pro Tanto Rule
Compared to the Shurley court's analysis of self-settlement, its discussion of beneficiary control is exceedingly sketchy.419 It appears that
the court meant to ground its holding on self-settlement, and it only
threw in a few remarks about beneficiary control for good measure.420
Perhaps the best response to the short paragraphs on beneficiary control
in the Shurley opinion is to regard them as dicta.
One might be able to cobble together a good faith argument that
Mrs. Shurley controlled the Bryant Trust in the relevant sense, but such
an argument would rest upon self-settlement and would add nothing to
it. It is well established that the sole settlor of a trust who is also the sole
beneficiary may revoke the trust at any time and compel a distribution of
416. Nichols v. Eaton, 91 U.S. 716, 724-27 (1875); Broadway Nat'l Bank v. Adams, 133
Mass. 170, 173-74 (Mass. 1882); see Emanuel, supra note 14, at 192-93.
417. E.g., In re Ross, 161 B.R. 36, 40-41 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. 1993) (any creditor lending on
security of borrower's interest in a trust is under a duty to investigate trust instrument); In re
Elsea, 47 B.R. 142, 149 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1985) (anti-alienation terms in ERISA plan qualified as valid spendthrift provision, even though plan was not recorded, as Tennessee law required for spendthrift trusts; creditors held to have constructive notice of anti-alienation terms
in ERISA plans as a matter of law); see BOGERT & BOGERT, supra note 5, § 222, at 387.
418. See Emanuel, supra note 14, at 203-09.
419. CompareIn re Shurley, 171 B.R. 769,778-82, 784-86 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1994) (giving
a detailed analysis of the court's understanding of self-settlement) with id. at 782-83 (discussing the control issue).
420. See id. at 782 (rejecting the argument that control is needed in addition to self-settlement in order to avoid protective trust provisions, and then claiming that, even if control were
an additional requirement, there was evidence that Mrs. Shurley "controlled" the Bryant

Trust).
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the corpus to himself.4 2 In other words, precisely because of total selfsettlement, the settlor-beneficiary has the total right to control trust assets.4 Therefore, one could argue, Mrs. Shurley, as a settlor-beneficiary, had the right to compel a distribution of trust property to herself,
and hence she necessarily exercised dominion and control.
This argument has many problems, not the least of which is that it
cannot possibly work unless the party's contribution as a settlor and his
interest as a beneficiary are coextensive. 423 What a settlor may revoke is
his contribution to the trust. If there are several settlors, however, one
of them alone may not partially revoke, even to the extent of his contribution, regardless of whether the would-be revoking settlor is a beneficiary. 424 As a settlor, the most that Mrs. Shurley could revoke would be
her own contribution, which was much smaller than her interest. She
could not revoke even to the extent of her contribution, however, without the consent of her cosettlors, and two of them-her parents-were
dead.
A beneficiary may consent to trust termination only with respect to
her interest.42- If a sole settlor is a beneficiary, however, she may not
terminate the trust, even to the extent of her retained interest, if she has

421. R-EsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 339 (1959); 4 Scorr & FRATCHER, supra note
2, § 339, at 487-94.
422. BOGERT & BOGERT, supra note 5, § 1004, at 375-76, 378-79; see, e.g., Levy v.
Crocker-Citizens Nat'l Bank, 94 Cal. Rptr. 1, 3 (Cal. Ct. App. 1971); Woodruff v. Trust Co. of
Ga., 210 S.E.2d 321,323-24 (Ga. 1974), appeal after remand,223 S.E.2d 91 (Ga. 1976); Stewart
v. Merchants Nat'l Bank of Aurora, 278 N.E.2d 10, 13 (Ill. App. Ct. 1972); Phillips v. Lowe,
639 S.W.2d 782, 783-84 (Ky. 1982).
423. Aside from the problems discussed in the text, the Trust Instrument made it impossible for Mrs. Shurley to revoke or terminate unilaterally. A trust instrument may specify or
limit the manner in which a settlor or beneficiary may revoke or terminate, or the instrument
may delegate the right to a third party, such as a trustee. In re Mordecai's Trust, 201 N.Y.S.2d
899, 902-03 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.), affd, 210 N.Y.S.2d 478 (N.Y. App. Div. 1960); 4 Scorr &
FRATCHER, supra note 2, § 339, at 494-95; see also McLendon v. First Nat'l Bank of Shreveport, 299 So. 2d 404,410 (La. Ct. App. 1974); Damiani v. Lobasco, 79 A.2d 268,271 (Pa. 1951).
In the case of the Bryant Trust, revocation could have been undertaken by Mr. Bryant so long
as he lived, provided that one of his daughters consented. Trust Instrument (Appendix),
§ I(c). Later, power to terminate was vested in three special trustees. Id. § I(e). By the terms
of the Trust Instrument, therefore, Mrs. Shurley never had any unqualified right to terminate
any part of the Bryant Trust in her sole discretion. See supra notes 322-360 and accompanying
text.
424. See Culver v. Title Guar. & Trust Co., 70 N.E.2d 163,165 (N.Y. 1946); Hanover Bank
v. United Brethren's Church on Staten Island, 134 N.Y.S.2d 356, 361 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1954).

425. See

BOGERT

& BOGERT, supra note 5, § 1005, at 383-87; 4 Scorr &

supra note 2, § 337, at 431-36, § 338, at 477-87.

FRATCHER,
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created other beneficial interests. These include remainder interests.426
The remaindermen may be the objects of a special power of appointment and the takers in default.42 7 Thus, even assuming that Mrs. Shurley
was the only settlor of the Bryant Trust and the only income beneficiary,
the interests of the remaindermen, her lineal descendants, would bar any
right of revocation that she might have.
The fact that a settlor may revoke what he has contributed, and that a
beneficiary may consent to termination to the extent of her interest,
means that, in cases of total self-settlement, with one settlor and one
beneficiary, the right to revoke is absolute, and hence control is absolute.
The contribution and the interest are one and the same. 428 The existence
of multiple settlors and of multiple beneficiaries, however, would defeat
the application of this rule in the Shurley case, even if Mrs. Shurley's
contribution were coextensive with her interest.
This discussion highlights the fact that Mrs. Shurley's interest in the
Bryant trust was substantially greater than her contribution. If partial
revocation were possible, she could revoke only what she had contributed. If partial termination by beneficiary consent were possible, she
could consent to the extent of her interest. The two were not coterminous. This consideration points unmistakably to the pro tanto rule with
respect to partial self-settlement.
Whenever a beneficiary has been able to withdraw some funds from
a protective trust at her pleasure, but not all of them, courts inevitably
have applied the pro tanto principle with respect to beneficiary control.
Creditors may receive so much of the trust assets as the beneficiary has a
unilateral and unqualified right to demand, but no more. There is no
principled reason why partial beneficiary control should undermine protective trust terms in their entirety.4 "9 Precisely the same reasoning ap426. Hatch v. Riggs Nat'l Bank, 361 F.2d 559, 560-61 (D.C. Cir. 1966) (declining to apply
doctrine of worthier title and holding that heirs of sole settlor-life tenant took by purchase
rather than inheritance; since heirs took under the trust instrument, they were remainder beneficiaries, and sole settlor could not terminate trust unilaterally); BOGERT & BOGERT, supra
note 5, § 1004, at 377 ("If the court finds that the settlor is not the sole beneficiary, the settlor
alone may not revoke or terminate the trust.").
427. See, e.g., Wachovia Bank & Trust Co., N.A. v. Sevier, 255 S.E.2d 636, 639-40 (N.C.
Ct. App.), review denied, 259 S.E.2d 305 (N.C. 1979); In re Eyre, 133 N.Y.S.2d 511, 516-17
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1954).
428. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TRUSTS § 339 cmts. a-b (1959).
429. E.g., In re Peterson, 88 B.R. 5, 7-8 (Bankr. D. Me. 1988) (in pension plan totally
funded by employer, creditors of debtor-beneficiary could reach that portion of trust funds
that he could withdraw as he chose, but no more); In re Berndt, 34 B.R. 515, 520-21 (Bankr.
N.D. Ind. 1983) (spendthrift provision failed to extent that debtor could withdraw from retirement fund, but was valid as to amounts he could not withdraw; funds that debtor could reach
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plies to partial self-settlement and supports the pro tanto rule in that
context as well.43 °
Mrs. Shurley plainly did not exercise "control" at all over the corpus
of the Bryant Trust. She had no absolute and enforceable right to demand any part of the corpus at her whim. Her interest in trust income
was shielded by the spendthrift provision. The rights of her creditors to
reach trust assets depended entirely on the fact that she was a settlor.
Their reach, however, should have been limited by the extent to which
her interest was attributable to her own contribution.
V.

CONCLUSION

Although one could make good faith arguments that protective trusts
should not be recognized at all, such arguments are now largely academic; in the practical world, the debate has long since concluded. 31
Given the recognition of protective trusts as legitimate vehicles for the
intergenerational transfer of family wealth, certain limits are necessarily
imposed upon doctrines that will vitiate protective trust provisions and
allow creditors to reach trust assets.
Certainly beneficiary control will undermine a protective trust, on
the principle that the creditors of a beneficiary may obtain whatever the
beneficiary has an unqualified right to demand. Logically, however, control must entail an enforceable right by the beneficiary qua beneficiary
to compel the trustee to turn over assets to her at her pleasure. If the
beneficiary may only demand that property be distributed to others,
creditors may not assert that they have a right to distribute trust property to themselves. If the beneficiary may receive trust assets only with
the consent of a third party, creditors have no claim to a unilateral right
to demand that trust property be given to them. If the trustee has
breached his duty in dealing too favorably with the debtor-beneficiary,
the chancery should recoil at the suggestion that creditors have a right to
demand a continuing breach of duty for their benefit. The trustee should
be called to account, but not for the sake of creditors.
The Shurley court never understood these principles. Hearing the
word "control," it looked for any sign of beneficiary dealings with trust
apparently corresponded to his own contributions); In re Rolfe, 34 B.R. 159, 161-62 (Bankr.
N.D. Il. 1983) (where daughter, in her sole discretion, could receive up to half the funds in
spendthrift trust established by her mother, spendthrift provision was void to that extent, but
to that extent alone); Highlands State Bank v. Gonzales, 340 S.W.2d 828, 829 (Tex. Civ. App.
1960); see In re Brooks, 844 F.2d 258, 262 (5th Cir. 1988) (discussing Gonzales).
430. In re Tomer, 117 B.R. 391, 394-96 (Bankr. S.D. IM.1990).
431. See supra notes 14-25 and accompanying text.
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property, and even for a beneficiary's subjective beliefs as to her
rights.4 32 As a result, the court lost sight of the entire reason for the
beneficiary control doctrine. The court's utterances are a paradigm as to
how one should not proceed in analyzing beneficiary control of a protective trust.
Perhaps the Shurley court itself did not mean its discussion of the
control issue to be taken too seriously. At all events, it is clear that it
meant to ground its decision primarily on a self-settlement theory.433
Here, too, the court lost sight of the policies involved.
The very reason that the creditors of a settlor-beneficiary may reach
her interest in a protective trust is that she may not place her own property beyond the reach of her creditors and still keep it available for herself. When a settlor-beneficiary's interest is only partly self-settled,
therefore, the only logical result is to avoid the protective provisions pro
tanto. Employment retirement fund cases in bankruptcy, reciprocal trust
cases, and even cases involving trusts for the benefit of one spouse created with uniquely marital property, all illustrate this principle.
The Shurley court, however, behaved with self-settlement much as it
did with beneficiary control. Finding that a beneficiary was also a settlor, it concluded that there could be no such thing as partial self-settlement. The Shurley court was convinced that if a beneficiary contributes
anything to a common trust arrangement, no one else can possibly be a
cosettlor of her 35interest. 4" "The law does not lead us to so inconsequent
4

a conclusion.1

The Shurley court was right to say that, if a beneficiary has contributed anything to the corpus, then she is a settlor.436 Having seized on
this simple idea, however, the court proceeded to carry it to a reductio ad
absurdum. To say that an interest in a trust is totally self-settled because
the beneficiary has contributed something to it, is as much of a mistake
as to say that, because there are cosettlors, the settlor-beneficiary is not a
settlor at all.
The Shurley decision illustrates what happens when one loses sight of
the basic policies undergirding protective trust law and the purposes for
which protective trusts are used. Any tribunal that would follow the
Shurley court, either in its manner of reasoning or in its conclusions,
432.
433.
434.
435.
436.

In re Shurley, 171 B.R. 769, 783 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1994).
See id&at 782.
ld.
at 784-86.
MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 111 N.E. 1050, 1053 (N.Y. 1916) (per Cardozo, J.).
Shurley, 171 B.R. at 778-79.
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would surely deserve the reproaches of a distinguished Italian jurist:
"[S]o now with despotic impatience, now with effeminate timidity, they
will transform serious adjudications into4' a37kind of game in which chance
and subterfuge are the chief elements.

437. "[Cosi, or con dispotica inpazienza, or con donnesca trepidazione, trasformarono i
gravi giudizi in una specie di giuoco in cui l'azzardo ed il raggiro fanno la principale figura."
CESARE BECCAmA, DMl DEL=TTI E DELLE PENE, § XI, n. a (Gianni Francionci ed.) (original
1765), reprintedin 1 EDiZIoNE NAZ1ONALE DELLE OPERE DI CESARE BECCARIA 56 n. a (Lu-

igi Firpo ed. 1984).
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APPENDIX

THE STATE OF TEXAS

)

)
COUNTY OF TOM GREEN )

KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS:

THAT WE, M. D. BRYANT and wife, ETHEL C. BRYANT; ANNE
BRYANT RIDGE, joined herein by her husband, JAMES F. RIDGE;
and JANE BRYANT SHURLEY, joined herein by her husband, BILLY
R. SHURLEY, do hereby ESTABLISH and DECLARE this trust as
follows:
SECTION I: By Warranty Deed or Deeds to be executed on or
before December 31, 1965, we shall ASSIGN, TRANSFER and CONVEY unto BRYANT WILLIAMS as Trustee and his successors, IN
TRUST, all of our right, title and interest in and to the real property
described in Exhibit "A" attached hereto and made a part hereof, it being understood that the value of that portion of said real property to be
contributed by M. D. BRYANT and wife, ETHEL C. BRYANT, represents two-thirds (2/3) of the total value of all of said real property to be
contributed and that the value of that portion of said real property to be
contributed by ANNE BRYANT RIDGE and JANE BRYANT
SHURLEY each represents one-sixth (1/6) of the total value of all of
said real property to be contributed.
Additional properties acceptable to the trustee may hereafter be added to the trust herein created by supplemental instruments describing
such additional properties and declaring the intention that such additional property shall become and be a part of the said trust as if originally included herein. All property contributed to the trust shall be
considered proper trust investments and may be retained by the trustee.
The uses, purposes, conditions, provisions and limitations of this trust
are as follows, to-wit:
(a) The trustee shall distribute the net income of said trust two-thirds
(2/3) to M. D. BRYANT and wife, ETHEL C. BRYANT, and one-sixth
(1/6) each to ANNE BRYANT RIDGE and JANE BRYANT
SHURLEY. Upon the death of either M. D. BRYANT or wife, ETHEL
C. BRYANT, the trustee shall distribute the net income of said trust
one-third (1/3) to the survivor of M. D. BRYANT and wife, ETHEL C.
BRYANT, one-third (1/3) to ANNE BRYANT RIDGE, and one-third
(1/3) to JANE BRYANT SHURLEY. Upon the death of both M. D.
BRYANT and wife, ETHEL C. BRYANT, the trustee shall distribute
the net income of said trust one-half (1/2) to ANNE BRYANT RIDGE
and one-half (1/2) to JANE BRYANT SHURLEY, and in case of the
death of either ANNE BRYANT RIDGE or JANE BRYANT
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SHURLEY, prior to the final termination of said trust, that particular
beneficiary's share of the income of said trust may be used for the children and lineal descendants of said beneficiary or may be accumulated
for the children and lineal descendants of said beneficiary to be distributed to said beneficiaries upon final termination of said trust. The
trustee may, in lieu of distribution of the net income of said trust, allow
the beneficiaries of said trust to operate the ranch properties belonging
to said trust, wholly or partially rent free.
(b) If the trustee determines that the net income of said trust is insufficient to maintain and support any of the beneficiaries of said trust or
their children and lineal descendants in their accustomed manner of living, taking into account, however, such beneficiary's income from all
other sources, the trustee may use so much of the corpus of said trust as
the trustee sees fit to make up such deficiency. Further, the trustee shall,
to the extent called upon by the executor of a deceased Settlor, invade
corpus to pay the estate and other taxes due with respect to the contribution of each respective Settlor. In the event of an invasion of corpus,
such reduction shall be reflected in the beneficial ownership and such
share shall sometimes hereinafter be referred to, for example, as adjusted one-half (1/2) or other appropriate reference, such distributions to
be reflected in ownership regardless of whether such reference has been
made. Furthermore, to the extent such invasion materially affects the
income attributable to the initial contribution of a Settlor, the trustee
shall make appropriate adjustments to the relative income distributable
under paragraph (a). The trustee's good faith determination of this adjustment shall be final and binding on all interested parties.
(c) Settlor M. D. BRYANT, with the concurrence of either Settlor
ANNE BRYANT RIDGE or Settlor JANE BRYANT SHURLEY, shall
have the right at any time during his lifetime to revoke, alter and amend
said trust and to distribute the assets of said trust to the Settlors in the
same proportion as the original contributions by each of said Settlors,
taking into account any adjustments under paragraph (b). Should either
Settlor ANNE BRYANT RIDGE or Settlor JANE BRYANT
SHURLEY be deceased, that portion of said trust which would have
been distributed to said deceased Settlor shall be distributed in equal
shares to her children and lineal descendants and to the lineal descendants of a deceased child, per stirpes; provided, however, if any distributee be under twenty-five (25) years of age at the time of distribution, his
share shall be held in trust until he reaches twenty-five (25), if living, but
if not, until his children and lineal descendants reach twenty-five (25).
During such time the trustee may use so much of the net income and/or
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corpus of said trust assets as the trustee sees fit for the education, maintenance and support of the distributee and lineal descendants of said
distributee. If a distributee whose property is held in trust should die
prior to reaching twenty-five (25) years of age, with no children or lineal
descendants surviving, his part shall be added equally to the other parts
of such deceased Settlor's children and lineal descendants, to be distributed as if originally made a part thereof.
If, upon the termination of said trust as hereinabove provided in this
paragraph (c), either Settlor ANNE BRYANT RIDGE or Settlor JANE
BRYANT SHURLEY be deceased with no children or lineal descendants surviving, that share of the trust assets which would have passed to
said deceased Settlor shall be distributed to the other surviving Settlor,
subject to a life interest in one-half of the net income of the deceased
Settlor's share in the person to whom such deceased settlor was legally
married at the date of her death.
(d) Subject to the right of prior termination of said trust as provided
for in paragraph (c) above, and to any adjustments made in good faith by
the trustee pursuant to paragraph (b), M. D. BRYANT and wife,
ETHEL C. BRYANT, shall each have a special power of appointment
by the terms of their Last Will and Testament to distribute up to onethird (1/3) of the assets of said trust to and among their children and
lineal descendants upon such terms and conditions and subject to such
trusts as each sees fit; however, each person exercising the power must
appoint the assets in equal amounts to ANNE BRYANT RIDGE and/or
her children and lineal descendants in such proportion as he or she may
determine and to JANE BRYANT SHURLEY and/or her children and
lineal descendants in such proportion as he or she may determine [i.e.,
up to one-sixth (1/6) of the total trust assets may be appointed to each
daughter, her children and her lineal descendants].
(e) From and after two (2) years after the date of the last to die of
M. D. BRYANT and wife, ETHEL C. BRYANT, the following three
individuals shall be appointed Special Trustees of the trust: The Judge of
the 51st District Court of Texas, sitting in San Angelo, or such comparable court as may hereafter be established, acting in his individual and not
his judicial capacity; VESTER T. HUGHES, JR., or in the event of the
death, resignation, refusal or inability of VESTER T. HUGHES, JR. to
serve, a Texas attorney with some degree of specialization in tax matters,
to be selected by the President of the Tom Green County Bar Association, but not limited to members of that association; C. A. FREEZE, or
in the event of the death, resignation, refusal or inability of C. A.
FREEZE to serve, MARSHALL JONES, or in the event of the death,
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resignation, refusal or inability of MARSHALL JONES to serve, JOHN
ALVIN HAY, or in the event of the death, resignation, refusal or inability of JOHN ALVIN HAY to serve, an accountant with some degree of
specialization in tax matters, to be selected by the President of the San
Angelo Chapter of the Texas Society of Certified Public Accountants, or
comparable organization, but not limited to members of that association.
Upon application made by either daughter ANNE BRYANT RIDGE or
daughter JANE BRYANT SHURLEY, or both, showing that termination would best serve the intended purpose of the trust, such Special
Trustees shall in their sole and absolute discretion have the power and
authority by unanimous consent to terminate in whole or in part and
from time to time the trust or trusts established hereunder. The Special
Trustees' decision on termination shall be final and binding on all interested parties. Each daughter, if living, and if not, her (or their) children,
share and share alike, and the lineal descendants of any deceased child,
per stirpes, shall receive one-half (1/2) of the assets which are distributed
by the Special Trustees, adjusted by paragraph (b) distributions and
paragraphs (d) and (f). The powers of the Special Trustees are limited to
the above rights to terminate the trust or trusts created hereunder.
(f) Subject to the right of prior termination and powers of appointment, as provided for hereinabove, ANNE BRYANT RIDGE and
JANE BRYANT SHURLEY shall each have a special power of appointment over an adjusted one-half (1/2) of the trust assets, to appoint such
adjusted one-half (1/2) of the assets of said trust to and among their children and lineal descendants. Each holder of a power under this paragraph is exercising her power of appointment shall divide the assets over
which she has a power into as many parts as she has living children; if a
child has died leaving living descendants, such deceased child shall still
count as one part. Each daughter shall appoint each such part to that
child and/or to his or her lineal descendants in such proportions and
upon such terms and conditions and subject to such trusts as she sees fit.
Without limitation on the power of appointment hereinabove given, the
power to appoint assets to the lineal descendants of a living child to the
exclusion of such child is expressly authorized. Neither ANNE BRYANT RIDGE nor JANE BRYANT SHURLEY can appoint assets to
herself, her creditors, her estate, or the creditors of her estate. Such
power of appointment shall be exercisable by deed or will but shall be
effective with respect to corpus only after the deaths of M. D. BRYANT
and wife, ETHEL C. BRYANT, and with respect to income prior to the
deaths of M. D. BRYANT and wife, ETHEL C. BRYANT, only to the
extent of so much of the income as is distributable in accordance here-
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with to the settlor exercising such power of appointment. The fractional
share of the assets over which each beneficiary has a power of appointment shall be subject to adjustment under paragraphs (b) and (d), and
the trustee's good faith determination of this adjustment shall be final
and binding on all interested parties.
At the death of either of said beneficiaries, ANNE BRYANT
RIDGE and JANE BRYANT SHURLEY, without exercising her special power of appointment, leaving children or lineal descendants surviving, that beneficiary's adjusted one-half (1/2) share shall be distributed in
equal shares, after the death of her parents, to her children and lineal
descendants, and to the lineal descendants of a deceased child, per stirpes; if any distributee be under twenty-five (25) years of age at the time
of distribution, his share shall be held in trust until he reaches twentyfive (25). If a distributee whose property is held in trust should die prior
to reaching twenty-five (25) years of age, with no children or lineal descendant surviving, his part shall be added equally to the other parts of
such deceased beneficiary's children and lineal descendants, to be distributed as if originally made a part thereof.
Should either Settlor ANNE BRYANT RIDGE or Settlor JANE
BRYANT SHURLEY die leaving no children or lineal descendants surviving, or should either Settlor ANNE BRYANT RIDGE or Settlor
JANE BRYANT SHURLEY die leaving children and lienal descendants
surviving but all such children and lineal descendants die prior to receiving the full interest of such Settlor, her children and lineal descendants
under this trust, subject to a life interest in one-half of the net income of
the deceased Settlor's share in the person to whom such deceased Settlor
was legally married at the date of her death, that deceased Settlor's
share of the trust assets shall remain in trust for the benefit of the other
Settlor and her children and lineal descendants, subject to all of the
above provisions of said trust.
Should all the children and lineal descendants of either Settlor
ANNE BRYANT RIDGE or Settlor JANE BRYANT SHURLEY die
or be deceased prior to the termination of this trust, and prior to the
death of such Settlor but after the death of Settlors M. D. BRYANT and
ETHEL C. BRYANT, then in such event, that Settlor's adjusted onehalf (1/2) share of the trust assets may upon such Settlor's request be
divided into two equal parts. One of such equal parts shall remain in
trust for the benefit of such Settlor subject to all of the above provisions
of said trust except that the Settlor's special power of appointment provided for in paragraph (f) shall be exercisable only by will and if the
Settlor has no surviving sister, children or lineal descendants at the date
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of her death in favor of any person, persons, or objects other than the
Settlor, the Settlor's creditors, the Settlor's estate, or the creditors of the
Settlor's estate. The other such equal part shall be distributed outright
to such Settlor upon her request.
Subject to the powers of appointment herein given, should both Settlors ANNE BRYANT RIDGE and JANE BRYANT SHURLEY die
leaving no children or other lineal descendants surviving or should they
die leaving children surviving but all such children and descendants die
prior to the termination of this trust, then in such event one-half (1/2) of
the remaining trust properties shall be held for and distributed to the
JADE FOUNDATION, INC., and one-half (1/2) of one-half (1/2) of the
remaining trust properties shall continue to be held in trust for the benefit of the person to whom ANNE BRYANT RIDGE was legally married
at the date of her death and one-half (1/2) of one-half (1/2) of the remaining trust properties shall be held for the benefit of the person to
whom JANE BRYANT SHURLEY was legally married at the date of
her death, each husband of said ANNE BRYANT RIDGE and JANE
BRYANT SHURLEY respectively to receive the net income of one-half
(1/2) of one-half (1/2) of the trust during the respective life of each, and
if there are no such surviving husbands or upon the death of each such
surviving husband, the amount which would have been held for the benefit of such deceased husband shall be held for and distributed to the
JADE FOUNDATION, INC., a non-profit corporation organized under
the laws of the State of Texas, to be used for the purpose of the Foundation with the directors being hereby given the indication that the preference of the Settlors in respect of such use is the furtherance of higher
education by the granting of scholarships to colleges and universities
with special preference to be given to the extent appropriate in the sole
discretion of the administrators of the Foundation to students and colleges in the Southwestern section of the State of Texas. In the event the
JADE FOUNDATION, INC., organized under the Texas Non-Profit
Corporation Act, be not qualified as an exempt foundation under the
Internal Revenue Code of 1954 or any successor Revenue Act as appropriate, then the Settlors direct the trustee to create such a foundation for
exclusively charitable, religious, scientific, literary and educational purposes which is exempt from taxation under the federal income tax laws
then in effect and further direct that such substitute foundation be the
recipient of any gifts hereunder to the JADE FOUNDATION, INC.,
such gifts to be used exclusively for the purposes enumerated above or
as contributions to charitable trusts or foundations to which gifts and
bequests are exempt from the Texas Inheritance Tax under Arti-
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cle 14.015 of Title 122A of Vernon's Annotated Texas Statutes or under
any other provision of law then applicable.
(g) The powers of appointment provided for in paragraphs (d) and
(f) maybe exercised only by a specific statement in the will or deed that
the holder is exercising such power of appointment and by a specific
reference to this trust created hereby with respect to which such power is
being exercised.
(h) The trust herein created, and any trust created pursuant to a
power of appointment provided herein, shall in any event terminate not
later than twenty-one (21) years from and after the death of the survivor
of M. D. BRYANT, his wife, ETHEL C. BRYANT, their daughter,
ANNE BRYANT RIDGE, their daughter, JANE BRYANT
SHURLEY, the spouses of ANNE BRYANT RIDGE and JANE BRYANT SHURLEY, if living as of the date of this instrument, and all of the
grandchildren and lineal descendants of M. D. BRYANT and ETHEL C.
BRYANT living as of the date of this instrument, and upon such termination the assets and properties comprising each particular trust theretofore not finally terminated shall be delivered and distributed absolutely
and in fee simple and free of trust unto those parties who at the time of
such termination constitute the income beneficiaries of that particular
trust in the respective proportions in which said respective beneficiaries
shall be receiving or entitled to receive income from said trust at the
time of such termination.
(i) In case any income (or corpus) hereunder becomes payable to a
person under a legal disability, or for any other reason the trustee may in
his sole discretion determine, or to a person, who by reason of illness or
mental or physical disability is unable, in the opinion of the trustee,
properly to administer such income (or corpus), then payments thereof
may be in whichever of the following ways the trustee deems best:
(1) Directly to such beneficiary;
(2) To the legally appointed guardian or conservator of such
beneficiary;
(3) Expended directly by the trustee for the support, maintenance and education of such beneficiary;
(4) To a relative or friend of such beneficiary, to be applied for
the benefit of such beneficiary;
(5) Purchase for said beneficiary any form of annuity or life insurance policy on his or her life or on the lives of anyone in
whom said beneficiary may have an insurable interest.
Any such payment or expenditure shall be a full acquittance of the
trustee in such instance.
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(j) The trustee (and his successors) shall have full power and authority: to manage, handle, invest, reinvest, sell for cash or credit, or for part
cash and part credit, convey, exchange, hold, dispose of, lease for any
period of time, whether or not longer than the life of the trust, improve,
repair, maintain, work, develop, operate, use, mortgage, or pledge all or
any part of the funds, assets and properties constituting from time to
time all or any part of the trusts; to borrow money, lend money, give and
receive pledges as security for loans, enter into contracts, and execute
obligations, negotiable or non-negotiable; to vote shares of stock in person and by proxy with power of substitution, on any question, and to act
as said trustee deems proper in any merger, reorganization, liquidation
or consolidation; to take any action deemed appropriate with regard to
stock options, warrants and other rights accruing as a result of stock
ownership; to execute operating, pooling, co-operative development
and/or unitization agreements; to execute transfer orders and division
orders; to sell, convey, lease and/or otherwise deal with any oil, gas and
mineral leases, royalties, production payments or mineral rights of any
character whatsoever; to pay all reasonable expenses; to open custody
accounts, to retain the services of investment and/or legal counsel and
fully rely upon the advice thereof; to retain the services of an accountant
or accounting firm and rely in full upon the accuracy, correctness and
propriety of such services; to execute and deliver deeds, conveyances,
leases, notes, deeds of trust, pledges, releases, assignments, subleases,
contracts, or written instruments of any character; to hold stock or other
property in the name of the trustee, or any nominee, without mention of
the trust in the stock certificate or stock registration book or other evidence that such stock or other property belongs to and is a part of these
trusts; to purchase assets from and sell assets to, loan money to or borrow money from (with or without security and on such terms and conditions as he deems appropriate) and otherwise deal with any and all
persons, partnerships, corporations, other trusts and estates, including
the trustees in said trustees' capacity as individuals, any other trusts and
estates created for any and all the beneficiaries of said trusts or estates,
any other trust of which the trustee is trustee and without regard to who
may be the beneficiary or beneficiaries thereof, the beneficiaries of this
trust and/or the estate of any of the Settlors, and/or any other entities; to
litigate, arbitrate, compromise, abandon, or otherwise deal with any
claims in favor of or against the trusts or against the trustee in such capacity or personally when resulting from serving in the capacity of
trustee (so long as such action does not result in a final judicial determination or adjudication that the trustee has been guilty of dishonesty), to
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accept property either in total or in partial satisfaction of any indebtedness or obligation and to continue to hold same for such period of time
as the trustee may deem appropriate in this regard; and the trustee shall
have as broad powers respecting management, operation and handling
of the trust properties and assets as if said trustee was the owner of such
assets in his own right. The trustee shall have the right and power at any
time, or from time to time, to remove the situs of the trust from one state
to another in the trustee's sole discretion. The trustee shall have full
power to determine the manner in which expenses are to be borne and
in which receipts are to be credited, as between principal and income,
and also to determine what shall constitute income, and also to determine what shall constitute income or net income and what shall constitute corpus or principal; and may withhold from income such reserves
for depreciation or depletion as the trustee may deem fair and equitable.
Settlors believe that no reserve for depletion need be set aside for mineral interests which are now producing, and further believe that a
twenty-seven and one-half per cent (27-1/2%) reserve will be a reasonable retention from proceeds from sales of mineral interests hereafter
made or from proceeds by way of bonus money, royalty, overriding royalty, or otherwise, and from mineral interests which may hereafter become productive; however, the preceding statements shall not be
deemed to restrict the powers of the trustee. No person dealing with
said trustee shall be required to look to the application made by said
trustee of the proceeds arising from any transaction. The trustee shall
have the power to continue all business activities in which any of the
Settlors has an interest at their deaths, and to engage in any other business activities, whether alone, in corporate or in partnership form. The
trustee shall have the power to engage in any business activities as the
trustee sees fit, whether alone, in corporate or in partnership form, and
shall have specific authority to purchase interests in lands, alone, with
other trusts or otherwise, and to improve said lands and to sell or lease
said lands to such persons and upon such terms and conditions as the
trustee sees fit. The trustee is expressly authorized to enter into any kind
of joint venture, partnership, or other business arrangement for any kind
of activity with any other trust created by Settlor or anyone else, with
any other person, partnership, trust, estate or corporation or with any or
all of the trustees individually. The trustee is expressly authorized to
enter into any kind of business activity, whether or not speculative, including but not limited to exploration for oil on acreage which may be
acquired for such purposes. The said trustee shall in no manner be limited to the Texas Trust Act with respect to the types of investments to be
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made with trust funds or the kinds of businesses into which the trusts
may enter, and the trustee shall have the right to deal in investments of
any character or description, whether or not speculative, and to enter
into any kind of business ventures or arrangements, whether or not speculative; and the trustee shall have the right to hold the assets of any of
the trusts in the form of cash and/or any other non-income-producing
property or properties for such periods of time as the trusts deems advisable. The trustee shall in no manner be liable for any mistake or error in
judgment, but shall be liable only in case of bad faith or dishonesty. No
trustee shall in any case be liable for any loss which may occur by reason
of an operating loss or by reason of depreciation or decline in value of
properties at any time belonging to the trusts. Whenever the judgment
or discretion of the trustee may be exercised, it shall be binding upon
every person interested in or dealing with the trusts. The trusts created
herein shall constitute Texas trusts, and the provisions of the trust instrument shall be construed, and administered, controlled and governed, by
and in accordance with the laws of the State of Texas. The trustee shall
have all the rights, powers, duties, limitations and liabilities set forth in
the Texas Trust Act, except where and to the extent that it may be inconsistent with or in conflict with any of the provisions of this instrument,
and all powers exercised by any trustee hereunder, as trustee, shall be
exercised by such trustee only in a fiduciary capacity.
Notwithstanding the foregoing, no corporate trustee may sell either
ranch initially constituting the corpus hereof without the prior consent of
not less than one-half (1/2) of the beneficiaries hereof who are more
than twenty-five (25) years of age at the time of any such proposed sale
by a corporate trustee; provided, however, that the corporate trustee
may proceed with such sale if upon giving of notice by registered or certified mail to all beneficiaries who are twenty-five (25) years of age or
over such corporate trustee does not receive notification in writing
within two weeks from the date notice of the proposed sale was mailed,
from a majority of said beneficiaries of disapproval of such proposed
sale.
(k) Whenever the trustee is required to divide the corpus of the trust
estate into parts or shares, or to make distributions thereof, said trustee
is authorized in his sole discretion to make such division or distribution
in kind or partly in kind and partly in money, and the trustee may assign
undivided interests in any assets of the trust estate to the several parts or
shares; provided, however, in his sole discretion, the trustee may distribute assets of one kind or character to one or more beneficiaries or
trusts to the exclusion of others so long as distributions reflect the rela-
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tive approximate fair market value, as determined by the trustee, of assets distributed. The judgment of the trustee as to values for the purpose
of such division or distribution shall be conclusive and binding upon all
persons interested in the trust estate.
(1) No trustee or successor trustee shall be required to furnish bond.
No trustee shall be liable for any mistake or error in judgment, but shall
be liable only in case of bad faith or dishonesty. The individual and corporate trustees shall be entitled to receive reasonable compensation for
their services hereunder, with the fees of the corporate trustee not to
exceed compensation ordinarily and customarily charged by trust companies or trust departments of banks in the City of San Angelo, Texas
(or such other city in which the trust company or bank be located, if such
city be not San Angelo) for services of like nature.
(m) The interest of the beneficiaries in the trust estate and the increase and proceeds thereof, both legal and equitable, so long as the
same are held in trust, shall not be subject in any manner to any indebtedness, judgment, judicial process, creditors' bills, attachment, garnishment, execution, receivership, charge, levy, seizures or encumbrance, of
or against said beneficiaries; nor shall the interest of the beneficiaries in
said trust be in any manner reduced or affected by any transfer, assignment, conveyance, sale, encumbrance, act, omission or mishap, voluntary
or involuntary, anticipatory or otherwise, of said beneficiaries and said
beneficiaries shall have no right or power to transfer, assign, convey, sell
or encumber said trust estate and their interest therein, legal or equitable, during the existence of these trusts.
(n) Whenever the term "trustee" or "trustees" is used throughout
this instrument, the same shall mean all acting trustees of the trusts hereunder, whether one or more, acting at any given time.
(o) In the event any clause, provision or provisions of these trusts
created herein prove to be or be adjudged invalid or void for any reason,
such void or invalid clause, provision or provisions shall not affect any of
the other provisions of this instrument, but the remaining provisions
hereof shall remain operative and shall be carried into effect as far as
legally possible.
(p) The trustee shall render reports to the adult beneficiaries hereof
not less than annually and more often if, in his discretion, it appears to
be appropriate. Further, the books and records of the trust shall be open
to the beneficiaries or other duly authorized representatives at all reasonable times and upon the giving of reasonable notice.
(q) Upon the death, resignation, failure, refusal or inability to act of
BRYANT WILLIAMS hereunder, MARSHALL JONES shall be and
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become successor trustee. Thereafter, in case of the death, resignation,
failure, refusal or inability to act of MARSHALL JONES, C. A
FREEZE shall be and become successor trustee hereunder. Thereafter,
in case of the death, resignation, failure, refusal or inability to act of all
of the successor individual trustees, the SAN ANGELO NATIONAL
BANK of San Angelo, Texas, shall become and be sole successor trustee
hereunder. If the said SAN ANGELO NATIONAL BANK of San Angelo, Texas, should hereafter be merged or consolidated with any other
national bank, then such other national bank so consolidated with it shall
be trustee of the trusts hereunder. By joint action of ANNE BRYANT
RIDGE and JANE BRYANT SHURLEY, or the survivor, or if both are
deceased, by majority action of the beneficiaries who are at least twentyfive (25) years of age, the SAN ANGELO NATIONAL BANK of San
Angelo, Texas, or any other corporate trustee hereunder may be removed as trustee and a successor appointed by them provided such successor be a trust corporation or national bank having trust powers and
having an unimpaired capital and surplus of not less than Five Million
Dollars ($5,000,000.00); in case of the resignation, failure, refusal or inability to act of said SAN ANGELO NATIONAL BANK of San Angelo, Texas, the aforementioned person or persons may appoint a
successor. If no successor is appointed, then any District Court of Tom
Green County, Texas, upon application made therefor, shall appoint a
successor trustee. In any event, the successor trustee shall be any trust
corporation or national bank having trust powers and having an
unimpaired capital and surplus of not less than Two Million Dollars
($2,000,000.00).
SECTION II: This trust shall be irrevocable except to the extent
otherwise provided herein.
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WITNESS OUR HANDS at San Angelo, Texas, on this the 24th day
of September, 1965.
/s/ M. D. Bryant
M. D. BRYANT
/s! Ethel C. Bryant
ETHEL C. BRYANT
Is! Anne Bryant Ridge
ANNE BRYANT RIDGE
/s/ James F. Ridge
JAMES F. RIDGE
/s/ Jane Bryant Shurley

JANE BRYANT SHURLEY
/s/ Billy R. Shurley
BILLY R. SHURLEY
THE STATE OF TEXAS
COUNTY OF TOM GREEN

)

)
)

BEFORE ME, the undersigned authority, on this day personally appeared M. D. BRYANT and wife, ETHEL C. BRYANT, known to me to
be the persons whose names are subscribed to the foregoing instrument,
and acknowledged to me that they executed the same for the purposes
and consideration therein expressed; and the said ETHEL C. BRYANT,
wife of said M. D. BRYANT, having been examined by me privily and
apart from her husband, and having the same fully explained to her, she,
the said ETHEL C. BRYANT, acknowledged said instrument to be her
act and deed and declared that she had willingly signed the same for the
purposes and consideration therein expressed and that she did not wish
to retract it.
GIVEN UNDER MY HAND AND SEAL OF OFFICE, this the
24th day September, 1965.
Is! Mildred Morris
Notary Public in and for Tom
Green County, Texas
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)

)

)
COUNTY OF TOM GREEN
BEFORE ME, the undersigned authority, on this day personally appeared JAMES F. RIDGE and wife, ANNE BRYANT RIDGE, known
to me to be the persons whose names are subscribed to the foregoing
instrument, and acknowledged to me that they executed the same for the
purposes and consideration therein expressed; and the said ANNE
BRYANT RIDGE, wife of said JAMES F. RIDGE, having been examined by me privily and apart from her husband, and having the
same
fully explained to her, she, the said ANNE BRYANT RIDGE, acknowledged said instrument to be her act and deed and declared that she had
willingly signed the same for the purposes and consideration therein expressed and that she did not wish to retract it.
GIVEN UNDER MY HAND AND SEAL OF OFFICE, this the
24th day September, 1965.
/s/ Mildred Morris
Notary Public in and for Tom
Green County, Texas
THE STATE OF TEXAS

)

)

)
COUNTY OF TOM GREEN
BEFORE ME, the undersigned authority, on this day personally appeared BILLY R. SHURLEY and wife, JANE BRYANT SHURLEY,
known to me to be the persons whose names are subscribed to the foregoing instrument, and acknowledged to me that they executed the same
for the purposes and consideration therein expressed; and the said JANE
BRYANT SHURLEY, wife of said BILLY R. SHURLEY, having been
examined by me privily and apart from her husband, and having the
same fully explained to her, she, the said JANE BRYANT SHURLEY,
acknowledged said instrument to be her act and deed and declared that
she had willingly signed the same for the purposes and consideration
therein expressed and that she did not wish to retract it.
GIVEN UNDER MY HAND AND SEAL OF OFFICE, this the
24th day September, 1965.
Is! Mildred Morris
Notary Public in and for Tom
Green County, Texas
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BRYANT WILLIAMS, Trustee named in the foregoing Trust, hereby
acknowledges the receipt from M. D. BRYANT and wife, ETHEL C.
BRYANT, ANNE BRYANT RIDGE and husband, JAMES F. RIDGE,
and JANE BRYANT SHURLEY and husband, BILLY R. SHURLEY,
Settlors therein named, of the property named in said trust, and hereby
accepts the foregoing trust and agrees to execute the same according to
its terms and conditions.
Is! Bryant Williams
BRYANT WILLIAMS
THE STATE OF TEXAS

)

COUNTY OF TOM GREEN

)

)

BEFORE ME, the undersigned authority, on this day personally appeared BRYANT WILLIAMS, known to me to be the person whose
name is subscribed to the foregoing instrument, and acknowledged to
me that he executed the same for the purposes and consideration therein
expressed.
GIVEN UNDER MY HAND AND SEAL OF OFFICE, this the
24th day September, 1965.
/s/ Mildred Morris
Notary Public in and for Tom
Green County, Texas

